D Ward & J P Radford North American Cities in the Victorian Age

Historical Geography Research Series

North American Cities in the Victorian Age

David Ward and John P. Radford



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HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY RESEARCH SERIES

No. 12

NORTH AMERICAN CITIES IN THE VICTORIAN AGE

Two Essays by

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and

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EDITOR'S FOREWORD

The urban development of the United States, Canada, and Britain share common influences and connections in modern historical times, and consequently interest in a conceptual framework for understanding urban change in these regions has often been transatlantic. The essays in this volume continue that tradition. They stem from earlier versions presented to the Historical Geography Specialty Group of the Association of American Geographers at its annual meeting in Los Angeles in 1981.

While distinct in approach, they address a common theme in searching for the roots of the 'modern' city in these three economically advanced regions. David Ward seeks to clarify the timing and nature of critical social transformations in American cities, particularly in the industrialized northeastern and midwestern core region of the United States, while John Radford explores the role of the moral order in setting the 'tone' for urbanization, particularly in the peripheral regions to the north and south, often regarded as in some way 'deviant' cases. What emerges from these examinations is a more intricate functional typology of the timing and role of deep changes in Anglo-American society insofar as they affected urban growth, and the necessity of coming to grips with regional ideologies as they shaped the generation of and response to differing kinds of urbanization on the North American continent.

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June, 1983

M.P.C.

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SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL GEOGRAPHY IN LARGE CITIES OF THE U.S. URBAN-INDUSTRIAL HEARTLAND

David Ward

Efforts to define the transformation of western urban life over the past two centuries have for long concentrated on the degree to which modern cities were generically different from traditional or feudal cities. Among the most definitive indicators of this transformation were changes in the social geography of the city. Work and residence were decisively separated, a complex central business and industrial district replaced the once dominant seats of aristocratic and ecclesiastical power and a more complex division of labour based upon the Industrial Revolution created new strata and classes with their own residential quarters. Students of both the modern and traditional worlds now recognize a range of social formations within each category, and the adequacy of a dichotomous classification of socio-geographical patterns has been questioned.[1] The resolution of this taxonomic problem has increasingly involved a careful reconsideration of the socio-geographical implications of the presumably varied transitions derived from the complex range of traditional and modern societies.

The term 'Victorian' has long been used to describe the generic attributes of the first society to experience a transformation of the scale and complexity of urban life. The provincial industrial cities of the British Isles were for long viewed as prototypes of the urban destiny of the world at large.[2] The term 'Victorian' might seem inappropriate to describe the rapid growth of American cities during the last six decades of the nineteenth century, since the new republic was frequently contrasted with the monarchies of the Old World. Moreover, most American cities could not be said to have been transformed during the Victorian period since they were conceived during the course of the transformation itself. Like many provincial British cities, Victorian urban growth in the United States was grafted onto extremely diminutive earlier settlements or began *de novo*. The American experience of Victorian urban growth was not only truncated or compressed in many newly settled parts of the country but also uneven in its impact on some long settled areas. Specifically, the level of urbanization in the South was for long substantially lower than that of the nation as a whole while that in the northeast and Midwest was substantially higher. Indeed, the large ports of the northeastern seaboard and the industrial and metropolitan centres of the Midwestern interior are often the bases of generalizations about the transformation of urban life during the last six decades of the nineteenth century.[3]

There were certainly striking parallels in attitudes towards Victorian urban growth on both sides of the Atlantic. These similarities in the reactions of the British and Americans to their rapidly changing cities were an integral part of a range of attitudes which have been described as the 'Trans-Atlantic Persuasion'.[4] The values of classical liberalism dominated this Victorian persuasion and while British liberals encountered the organized resistance of an established church and a resilient landed and mercantile aristocracy, Americans were preoccupied with the degree to which liberal values were to be radical or restrained. Since the increasing impact of these values on British society was identified with the Victorian era, the term 'hyper-Victorian' might have been used to describe their less inhibited impact on American society. Certainly, many continental European observers drew attention to the similarities of provincial British industrial society and that of the American Northeast and Midwest.[5]

While the term 'Victorian' may be appropriate to describe the ideological setting of the rapid urbanization of the United States during the last six decades of the nineteenth century, it remains a matter of debate as to whether the dominance of a liberal ideology was confined to the Victorian period and also whether this dominance coincided with a distinctive phase of urban growth. While Victorian liberalism was in general confident about the possibilities for material and moral improvement, during economic downswings, when conditions hardly confirmed their optimistic expectations, liberals shared the anxieties of both conservatives and socialists about their immediate destiny. Under these circumstances, liberalism was closely identified with the need to reform society in order to remove obstructions to individual betterment. Reformers from Jacksonians to Progressives expressed acute anxieties about the growing social problems and deteriorating living conditions of large cities.[6] Victorian reformers shared a sense that the rate and kind of urban growth was at times so rapid and disruptive that growth itself became a threat to material and moral progress. In particular, they drew attention to the relationship between rapid urban growth and new and threatening levels of residential segregation between rich and poor.[7]

This graphic formulation of Victorian urban society is perhaps highly simplified and somewhat misleading.[8] While the residential segregation of the socially prominent and extremely affluent is itself not a matter of controversy, it is now clear that this process was well started long before the Victorian period. In contrast, the degree to which the residential patterns of the remainder of urban society were differentiated is less clear. If the residential segregation of the wealthy is viewed as the beginning of a suburban movement which progressively included lower and lower social strata, then Victorian cities were essentially modern. Their social areas were simply smaller in scale and different in their proportional extent than in twentieth century cities. If, by contrast, only a small affluent minority of the urban population lived in socially exclusive areas until the end of the nineteenth century, then weak

levels of residential differentiation amongst the remainder of urban society may distinguish Victorian from modern cities. Victorian cities also experienced high rates of population turnover and consequently, the social composition of relatively small precincts was not only heterogeneous but also potentially ephemeral.

These contrasting impressions of the socio-geographical patterns of Victorian cities may be derived from a lack of a consistent taxonomy and scale in the analyses of individual places. Our ability to interpret the developmental implications of these socio-geographical patterns is, however, directly or indirectly dependent upon prevailing or competing generalizations about the transition from traditional to modern societies. There are at least three groups of distinct interpretations of this transition which may be succinctly described as industrialization, modernization and the expansion of capitalism.[9] The first of these processes defines Victorian urban growth as the initial and negative impact of the industrialization of urban employment. In the second process, Victorian urban growth is more loosely defined as one segment of a much longer and more gradual transformation of urban life. The third process views Victorian urban growth as a distinct phase of urbanization initiated by the transition from mercantile to industrial capitalism and terminated by the transition from industrial to corporate capitalism. Each of these processes not only place Victorian cities in somewhat different developmental perspectives but they also imply equally different interpretations of their socio-geographical arrangements.

INDUSTRIALIZATION

Interpretations of Victorian urban growth as a direct consequence of the initial industrialization of urban employment are in many respects derived from the perceptions of Victorians themselves.[10] Despite their prevailing confidence in the material and moral potentialities of their revolutionary new means of production, Victorian liberals shared some of the apprehensions of those who were more sceptical of the promise of industrialism. In particular, the physical and social conditions in those cities whose rapid growth was closely linked to expanding industrial production provoked periodic anxieties. The factory provoked much discussion as one of the most visible consequences of industrialization, but the lives and environments of those who worked in smaller establishments with only a minimum of mechanical help were also radically altered.[11]

The social isolation of the poor in the deteriorating environment of the inner city was a predominant source of concern throughout the Victorian period. Early Victorians were preoccupied with the threatening implications of this apparently new socio-geographical pattern while late Victorians indicted their predecessors for their failure to contain the social and material problems of that new spatial order. By the first decade of the twentieth century, Victorian urban growth was clearly identified as the cause and the focus of those social

problems whose resolution would now require the forceful intervention of the state and local authorities. One of the sustaining motives of twentieth century reform has been the elimination of the Victorian inheritance.[12] Consequently, 'Victorian' urban growth was definitively and pejoratively distinguished from recent or 'modern' developments primarily because the values of liberal-individualism had been insensitive to social needs.[13]

Early Victorians were certainly aware of the social and environmental problems of their growing cities. They were also aware of the relationship between the accelerating rate of urban growth and the industrialization of urban employment. They were, however, inclined to blame urban problems on the segregation of rich and poor. While there were some reactions to similar conditions in British cities which viewed residential segregation as an unavoidable outcome of industrial capitalism, most American reformers believed these conditions to be merely temporary. As in Britain, the prevailing reaction of reformers to urban problems in the United States was far from unanimous. Many hoped to remove obstructions to individual betterment while others judged these measures to be a dangerous reversal of efforts to diminish the power of the state.[14]

Despite this wide range of opinion, a preoccupation with the residential segregation of the rich and poor was a common ingredient of early Victorian social thought. During the same decade in which Disraeli described the social and spatial divisions within British cities as 'Two Nations', Channing independently applied the same metaphor to conditions in Boston.[15] The social isolation of the poor from the presumably elevating influences of their social superiors left them prey to the counterveiling influences of the most depraved and the most radical amongst them.[16] Early Victorians believed that an earlier less segregated residential pattern was more conducive to social cohesion. While both contemporary and retrospective commentators are often vague about the precise socio-geographical arrangement of this more cohesive urban society, it was apparent that the close proximity, if not interspersal, of people of different ranks faciliated an easy and frequent interaction amongst them. This heterogeneity of neighbours was reinforced by the broadly-based memberships of both secular associations and religious congregations.[17] While most of the extremely affluent and socially prominent tended to live close to the city centre, they rarely formed an exclusive and homogeneous social area (Figure 1).

These more cohesive social conditions were not, of course, part of the history of those cities which were founded after the acceleration of urbanization was already well started. These so called 'instant cities' grew rapidly immediately following their initial settlement and never experienced a prolonged period as small urban settlements.[18] Nevertheless, the cityward movement from farms and small towns provoked concern about the migrants' loss of community.[19] In moving from the farming communities of the Middle West to Chicago, a migrant presumably encountered in days or weeks a social transformation which the residents of Boston experienced over the course of a decade or more.



Figure 1. The Victorian Vision of Socio-Geographic Change

Prior to industrialization, the spatial arrangement of urban society was presumed to encourage that mutual respect of rich and poor which also defined the rural world from which most urban migrants came. With the increasing tendency of the affluent to live in exclusive quarters, however, this cohesive social order was fractured. Residential segregation was reinforced by the emergence of socially exclusive associations and congregations. Under these circumstances, it was feared that depravity would spread amongst the once respectable poor and insurgent political movements would arouse those who had for long accepted their

station in life. With the spread of immorality and drunkenness, family life was destroyed and pauperism and dependency was thus directly attributed to deviant behaviour.[20] Without the influence and control of the socially prominent and especially of organized religion, popular disturbances might become insurgent rebellions.

The terms 'crowd' or 'mob' had for long described this unlikely synthesis of depravity and insurgency but to early Victorians, this threatening behaviour was spreading indiscriminately amongst the poor at large. The poor were a 'nation' with their own territory and the term slum came into popular usage to describe those parts of the city in which a threatening and deviant way of life prevailed.[21] With the arrival of large numbers of destitute Irish immigrants in the late forties, the slums of American cities were also identified with foreigners whose commitment to Roman Catholicism aroused intense hostility in a compulsively Protestant society.[22]

Slums were also major sources of epidemic diseases and it was assumed that deviant behaviour possessed similar contagious properties. Just as an entire city might be vulnerable to an epidemic disease, so might an entire city become a slum. Indeed, the causes of diseases were often attributed to the habits as well as the environments of the poor. Consequently, efforts to alleviate slum conditions emphasized the need to overcome the social consequences of residential segregation since environmental improvements alone would be futile unless the habits of the poor were simultaneously reformed. Institutions designed to influence and educate the poor served as 'missions' within the slums while the deviant and the able bodied poor were removed to asylums where their contagious habits might be reformed. There were also related schemes to remove the innocent young, either permanently or temporarily, to rural homes which were more conducive to their moral development.[23]

In short, public policy attempted to counteract both the effects of the residential segregation of the rich and poor and the indiscriminate mixing of the worthy and unworthy poor. The prevailing use of the vague term 'poor' rather than working class probably implied a vain hope that older paternalistic or mutualistic social relationships might survive despite industrialization. The term slum was equally vague in its territorial implications. While contemporary observers were quite specific about the location of the most notorious slums, the precise extent of these conditions within each city and amongst the poor were less clear (Figure 1). Nevertheless, the concept of the slum as a well defined territory within the city was an indispensable image for those who proposed measures to provide an environment in which self help might resolve the problem of poverty and of inadequate living conditions. As the most serious consequence of residential segregation, the slum was the antithesis of the early Victorian urban vision.

These remedial measures alleviated many immediate anxieties about the threatening implications of the social isolation of the poor but they did little to diminish either residential segregation or slum conditions. By the last decade of the nineteenth century, the urban vision of early Victorians had long since lost its credibility and vitality and renewed anxieties about the immediate destiny of urban society once again concentrated upon the social isolation of the poor in slums. Late Victorians were, however, more specific about the location and the social composition of slums.[24] They were now exclusively associated with those areas of the inner city blighted by the advancing claims of business and industry and abandoned by the upwardly mobile (Figure 1). Left behind in the slums were the most impoverished strata of the poor who were joined by destitute immigrants. While the residential and social mobility of households which had once lived in the inner city reduced fears about the indiscriminate mixing of the worthy and deviant poor, prolonged depressions always threatened to reverse the directions of social and residential mobility. Consequently, those who had only recently escaped from the slums were extremely vulnerable to an involuntary return.

In any event, the suburban movement of the lower strata of urban society had scarcely occurred at a scale that was likely to resolve the problem of the slums. The depressed economic conditions of the mid-nineties threatened the subsistence of many households who had never experienced poverty. To a much greater degree than during the economic downswings of the late fifties and mid-seventies, that of the mid-nineties provoked questions about previous responses to social problems and re-evaluations of the current or anticipated benefits of industrialization.[25] Earlier efforts to control and diminish the contagious effects of slums were of little consequence whenever depressed economic conditions exposed rapidly increasing proportions of the population to these conditions. Changes in the composition of foreign immigration during the last two decades of the nineteenth century further aggravated anxieties about urban social conditions. The Irish had for long been associated with the worst slums but newcomers from southern and eastern Europe were viewed as a more serious threat to the quality of living conditions in American cities. The term 'ghetto' was used to describe those slums where foreigners, ill-adapted to American conditions, complicated the general problems of isolation and deprivation which afflicted the poor in general.[26]

This tendency to blame slum conditions on unrestricted immigration represented a continuation of the early Victorian view which attributed the adverse environment of the slum to the bad habits of their residents. Late Victorians were, however, more sensitive to the damaging effects of housing conditions on the social life of the poor and they were sceptical of earlier institutional approaches to deviancy and poverty. Instead they developed the case-method approach whereby trained specialists attempted to tailor treatment to specific causes of social problems at the individual level.[27] By the beginning of the twen-



Figure 2. Victorian Cities in Developmental Perspective

tieth century, these new social policies were contrasted with the negligence of earlier decades. Victorian attitudes and policies were assumed to have directly contributed to urban social problems and changes in values at the turn of the century made possible a more progressive and hopeful vision of the modern city. In short, a re-orientation of attitudes and policies redirected the course of urban growth and these changes not only coincided with the end of the Victorian period but they also clearly differentiated the dominant ideology of that period from that of the immediately succeeding generations[28] (Figure 2).

Quite apart from these apparent shifts in public policies and popular attitudes, changes in the technology of industrialism also sustained the belief that urban growth might assume a new and more hopeful course. The first or 'paleo-technic' industrial revolution was based upon steam energy and had encouraged the concentration of production both in and within cities where a polluted and congested environment was unavoidable. In contrast, the second or 'neo-technic' industrial revolution was based upon cleaner forms of energy which would made possible the dispersal of people and production.[29] Decisive changes in the process of industrialization itself would profoundly alter the urban environment (Figure 2). Indeed, many western cities were of such recent origin that they already revealed the potentialities of the new more dispersed urban order. Unburdened by a

Victorian inheritance, these new settlements were able to take immediate advantage of new technologies.[30]

This definition of a discontinuity in the direction of urban growth was in part dependent upon a sense that there were new solutions to the problems of the slums. Slums were part of a graphic urban image which aroused the apprehensions of early Victorians because it represented a new but hopefully temporary level of residential segregation. To late Victorians, this same image defined the Victorian city and recorded the failure or absence of earlier efforts at reform. Although the social problems of the Victorian city were often linked to the effects of industrialization, the spatial and environmental consequences of that process were often treated as the primary causes of many social problems. Graphic representations of urban society were an effective demonstration of the limitations of the Victorian city but these limitations were often identified as reasons why industrialization had not fulfilled its promise. Some critics were indeed sceptical of the benefits of industrialization but often their vision of an alternative world was dependent upon a new kind of industrialization.[31]

The Victorian city was thus clearly defined in graphic terms as one of the dominant consequences of the initial and largely negative effects of the Industrial Revolution. Victorians themselves were decidedly sensitive to discontinuities in the course of urban growth at the beginning and end of their age. By the early twentieth century, the Victorian city was pejoratively defined as an ugly and insensate interlude between a more civilized past and a more sensitive future. Both the perceptions of Victorians and the post-Victorian indictments of the Victorian city were, however, dependent upon assumptions about the effects of industrialization which subsequently have become a matter of debate.

MODERNIZATION

In retrospect those discontinuities in the forms of urban growth which defined both the chronology and the characteristics of Victorian cities have also been interpreted as no more than two of several punctuations in a long and gradual process described as modernization (Figure 2). From this perspective the most decisive discontinuity between the traditional and modern world was not the Industrial Revolution but rather those changes in values associated with the Reformation and the expanding role of mercantile capitalists in local and international trade.[32] Industrialization accelerated a process which had already disrupted the traditional world. Certainly, interpretations of the 'uniqueness' of American society have suggested that the absence of a traditional or feudal social heritage made possible the precocious development of liberal values and capitalist enterprise in the colonial period.[33]

The responsiveness of colonial Americans to both local and distant markets has also been related to the selectivity of

migration from Western Europe. Most settlers were assumed to have belonged to the individualistic middling ranks of Old World societies and were already sensitive to opportunities for economic advancement. In the New World, their individualism was unencumbered by institutional restraints or limited resources. Their desire for economic independence provoked both the trans-Atlantic migration and the westward movement. The North American frontier, despite its remoteness, was the outer margin of the Atlantic economy. These assumptions about the sources of American individualism imply that modernization began with a peculiar intensity in the English colonies and proceeded at a rapid rate in the New Nation. Consequently, American liberalism was a predominant influence long before the Victorian period.

Interpretations of American history which stress the longevity and persistence of American values also question the impact of those changes which defined the end of the Victorian period. Negative visions of the Victorian city owed much to the influence of 'progressive' historians who contrasted their own proposals for a more regulated and humane society with the values of the so-called 'great barbecue' of the Gilded Age. Despite the greatly increased role of the state in the twentieth century, 'counter-progressive' interpretations of reform movements have questioned both the motives and achievements of public intervention and the degree to which this intervention was radically different from that of the Victorian period.[34]

While 'counter-progressive' interpretations of American history stressed the contribution of the ancestry and persistence of liberal values to a distinctive American identity, paradoxically they shared much common ground with generalizations about the modernization of western societies as a whole. From this perspective, social change was assumed to have proceeded gradually with only infrequent and temporary periods of disruption. Indeed, while the short term consequences of rapid disruptive changes often suggested that radical departures from past practice were likely to be firmly established, the long term results usually reveal that many new departures were short-lived. Consequently, it is argued that a focus on the immediate effects of radical change, and especially the anxious reactions of contemporaries to them, obscures the persistence of established ways of life and long term adaptations to pressure for change.[35] Once initiated the process of modernization alters the scale and differentiation of social, political and economic life and modern institutions and attitudes are necessary to integrate this increasingly complex and heterogeneous world.[36]

The urban implications of this process of differentiation were cogently developed in Louis Wirth's classic paper on urbanism as a way of life.[37] He attributed the distinctiveness of modern cities to the size, density and heterogeneity of their populations. Urban sociologists had long been preoccupied with the socially pathological consequences of the new scale and density of urban life and their interest in the regulation or elimination of deviant behaviour often made it difficult for them to come to

terms with the generic heterogeneity of modern urban life.[38] By connecting urbanization to the changing scale, density and heterogeneity of modern society, Wirth emphasized the disruptive effects of an increasingly segmented urban world. His perspective also drew attention to the enduring effects of urbanization rather than to those specific consequences of industrialization which had for long defined urban society.

Wirth, was of course, sensitive to spatial differentiation of people and activities which had earlier attracted the attention of his colleagues in the Chicago school of urban sociology.[39] They had described the modern American city as a series of concentric residential zones arranged about a central business district in which the innermost zone housed the lowest strata and the outermost the highest. Disagreements about the precise spatial patterns which resulted from the processes of differentiation were perhaps given more attention than the extent and bases of residential and functional specialization. Local circumstances might create highly irregular and diverse patterns of people and activities in different cities but residential differentiation and land use specialization did create common elements which might be arranged in a wide variety of mosaics. The relationship between modernization and urbanization was thus expressed more generally as concurrent changes in the size, density and heterogeneity of society rather than as the emergence of a particular socio-geographical pattern.

The Chicago model did, however, interpret the socio-geographical patterns which had alarmed both early and late Victorians in relation to processes which would subsequently be described as modernization. Like late Victorians, the Chicago School did identify social problems with the inner city where an old and delapidated housing stock awaited demolition in the face of the advancing claims of the central business district. Social problems were also associated with specific minority groups whose assimilation into the host society was likely to be slow and painful. Indeed, despite an implied faith in the assimilative capacity of American society, some boundaries created by ethnic or racial segregation were viewed as more permanent than those based upon wealth. These latter boundaries were assumed to be both ephemeral and permeable. Not only did upwardly mobile households advance across these boundaries but as the most affluent moved to the newest housing stock on the suburban fringe, their vacated quarters became available to progressively lower social strata (Figure 3).

While this process was often referred to as 'invasion-succession', this evocative organic metaphor clearly described how the downward filtration of housing met the needs of those who could not afford new dwellings. Under these circumstances, the social isolation of the poor in the inner city was judged to be temporary and certainly did not represent a permanent threat to social stability. As long as the suburban movement and the downward filtration of the established housing stock proceeded at an appropriate rate, improved living conditions would even-



Figure 3. The Progressive Vision of the City contrasted with the Chicago School

tually be extended to all except the really destitute. Consequently, the inner city would tend to house the most impoverished recent migrants to the city rather than a permanent, deprived stratum. In the absence of immigration, the inner city would presumably record rather drastic population declines.

Urban residential differentiation directly contributed to the social isolation of the poor and had, therefore, aroused the intense anxieties of both early and late Victorians but when viewed during a period of rapid suburbanization, this same process appeared to be an almost natural solution to the problems of the inner city. The assumptions of the Chicago School were



Figure 4. Generalized Sequence of the Relationship between Local Transportation and Suburbanization

thus somewhat distinct from the 'progressive' vision of a superficially similar arrangement of social groups (Figure 3). Progressives, like early Victorians, were alarmed at the apparent fixity of some socio-geographical boundaries and the endemic or residual nature of many urban problems.[40] Accordingly, they were preoccupied with the magnitude of the role of the state in the solution of urban problems while the Chicago model described levels of individual spatial and social mobility which greatly diminished the magnitude of many of the same problems. Despite the devastating disruption of the process of suburbanization during the Great Depression, the dimensions of the urban problems which afflicted American cities at the turn of the century were indeed drastically reduced but never resolved.

To the degree that suburbanization and filtration are regarded as the direct spatial manifestations of modernization, then certain retrospective implications may be inferred about these processes during the Victorian period. Firstly, those anxieties about urban society which defined the beginning and end of the Victorian period were the result of temporary reductions in filtration during prolonged depressions and secondly, Victorian urban growth proceeded in a fashion described by the Chicago School. Certainly, the Victorian period yielded its share of those innovations in local transportation which made the growth of exclusively residential suburbs possible. Indeed, relationships have been observed between improvements and extensions of local transportation and upswings in the residential building cycle.[41]

In particular, the introduction of horsecar services in the fifties and the electrification of streetcar services in the late eighties were associated with suburban building booms. Commuters also used the railways but most routes served established settlements at some distance from the contiguous suburban frings of the city.[42] Despite their growing dormitory function for affluent commuters, these satellite settlements continued to house long established residents and were, therefore, somewhat distinct from the more definitively suburban districts which grew on the immediate edge of the city (Figure 4). To the degree that the incremental expansion of the Victorian city was composed of streetcar suburbs developed in response to the sequential improvements of local transport, the process of residential differentiation was identical to that described by the Chicago School.[43]

This interpretation also highlights differences rather than similarities between the early and late Victorian conceptions of the social geography of the city (Figure 1). Late Victorian anxieties about the social isolation of the poor in the inner city tended to obscure the degree to which suburbanization had reduced the magnitude of the problem. Early Victorians complained of the residential segregation of an extremely affluent minority from the remainder of urban society but late Victorians were primarily concerned about the residential segregation of a much diminished if still substantial destitute minority from the more secure majority of urban society. The degree of security enjoyed by this majority was, moreover, recorded in an upward gradation in the quality of the suburban environment towards the edge of the city. In contrast, the internal residential differentiation of the less affluent majorities of early Victorian cities was quite weakly developed since complaints about the effects of the indiscriminate intermixture of the poor was a primary source of concern.

To be sure, early and late Victorians shared a common preoccupation with an apparently temporary fixity of socio-geographical boundaries but the precise divide about which they were concerned was in fact quite different (Figure 1). While early Victorians were concerned about the boundary between an affluent minority and the remainder of urban society often vaguely described as the poor, late Victorians emphasized the isolation of a destitute minority in an increasingly differentiated urban society. The beginning and the end of the Victorian period were indeed announced by apparently similar concerns about the socio-geographical patterns of the city but these common elements tended to obscure the degree to which suburbanization had transformed the complexity of the internal residential differentiation of the city.

This interpretation of Victorian urban growth has assumed that Victorian cities were essentially modern and that processes of residential differentiation described in the early twentieth century had prevailed throughout the preceding century.[44] From this perspective, the end of the Victorian period would now

appear to be a less definite discontinuity in the process of urbanization. The question remains, however, as to whether early Victorians were right in their insistence that a new urban spatial order had only recently been established. Residential segregation had apparently disrupted the comfortable relationships between people of different ranks and wealth which had for long been based upon the proximity or interspersal of their respective residential quarters. To some degree, this residential propinquity of different social groups was an unavoidable consequence of the limited extent and small populations of most North American urban places until the middle decades of the nineteenth century.

Nevertheless, the preference of the extremely affluent for exclusive residential quarters was already well established in the northeastern seaports by the time of the Revolution. Wealthy merchants were able to afford the expense of personal transport and the separation of home and work and, despite their small numbers, they had established exclusive precincts on elevated or secluded sites. These first suburbs were rapidly out-flanked by later developments and their urbane architectural styles provide few reminders of their once peripheral location.[45]

This early separation of home and work had corresponding effects on central land uses.[46] The waterfronts of the larger northeastern seaports were increasingly devoted exclusively to commercial activities. Buildings which had once housed merchants and their employees along with a diversity of business functions were eventually devoted to more specialized uses. For example, diminutive banking districts emerged near to the centres of local government while warehouses, often grouped according to the sources and destinations of their trade, lined the waterfront. Local commerce with the hinterlands of the colonial ports was also increasingly organized in market halls from which foodstuffs in particular were redistributed.

Specialized land uses were relatively small in extent but the beginnings of that separation of home and work which was to define the modern city were clearly evident by the end of the eighteenth century. Indeed, these patterns of land use specialization established in the northeastern seaports were replicated in many new urban settlements founded in the western interior and on the Pacific coast.[47] These changes, however diminutive, suggest that the processes of differentiation described as modernization were an integral part of mercantile capitalism and early Victorians, impressed by the new rate and scale of urban growth, may have exaggerated discontinuities in the patterns of urban growth.

This argument implies that American urban life was in many respects modern from its inception and parallels those interpretations of colonial society which have stressed the precocity of colonial merchants and the abundant opportunities for small scale artisanal and agricultural production.[48] The commercial entanglements of the northeastern seaports in the Atlantic economy not only supported small but wealthy groups of merchants but also

substantial numbers of petty producers who were increasingly sensitive to the opportunities of the market place. Although subsistence activities must have predominated in the backcountry, the 'putting-out' of certain kinds of manufacturing and the export of agricultural staples involved an increasing proportion of the rural population in the market economy.

If, indeed, the specialization of land uses and the differentiation of residential quarters was well started by the end of the eighteenth century, then Victorian cities were but one segment of a gradual if fluctuating change which altered the scale, density and heterogeneity of urban life to levels regarded as modern. While the relationship between suburbanization and modernization reveals the longevity of the socio-geographical transition from the pre-modern world, the rate and way in which these remote and for long diminutive indicators of modernity expanded within the city remains unclear. As long as suburbs housed only a small wealthy minority of urban society, the socio-geographical patterns of the diverse strata of the remaining residents require further elaboration.

The internal residential differentiation of the less affluent majority of the urban population which distinguished early from late Victorian cities did not proceed gradually during the last six decades of the nineteenth century. Indeed, industrialization disrupted many old distinctions of wealth and status and tended to create an increasingly homogenous wage-earning labour force. The complex occupational stratification of the labour force which underlies the elaborate residential differentiation of the modern city was not a predominant feature of the division of labour in Victorian cities. These observations suggest that there were discontinuities in the process of residential differentiation which coincided with the expanding and changing impact of capitalism on the spatial organization of the city.[49]

THE EXPANSION OF CAPITALISM

Unlike generalizations about modernization, discussions of the expansion of capitalism have emphasized a spasmodic rather than a smooth course of change. Major disruptions of established patterns of life were most pronounced during those periodic intensifications or alterations in the organization of capitalism.[50] Under conditions of mercantile capitalism, the effect of expanding markets on the long established world of the artisan and farmer was both limited and discontinuous. In contrast, the new scale and mechanized techniques of production associated with industrialization radically disrupted this older world. While there is some disagreement about the timing of this traumatic dissolution of long established patterns of life, it was fully apparent in a few sectors of the economy at the beginning of the Victorian period and had spread to almost all sectors by the end of the nineteenth century.[51] Victorian cities might then be viewed as a transitional phase of urban growth during which the earlier co-existence of old and new patterns of life under mercantile capitalism were rapidly and continuously disrupted. With



Figure 5. The Relationship between Victorian Urban Growth and Industrial Capitalism

the transition from industrial to corporate capitalism the last vestiges of an old way of life were finally eclipsed and a new and definitively modern urban order finally predominated (Figure 5).

As the direct product of industrial capitalism, the transitional characteristics of Victorian cities have been related to the ideological pre-eminence of liberal individualism or privatism.[52] Values which rejected communal obligations were fervently espoused but the unanimity and purity of these commitments may have been exaggerated. Victorians did indeed celebrate the rewards of individual enterprise and held the rights of individuals to be sacred but there were also expressions of concern about the loss of community and a sense of social obligation.[53] These expressions were especially intense at the beginning and the end of the Victorian period when presumably there was a heightened awareness of the beginning and the end of a revolutionary transformation of society. These anxieties also suggest that this transformation was a compound event rather than a simple transition from old to new.

While there have been numerous fluctuations in economic growth during the course of the expansion of capitalism, the prolonged downswings at the beginning and end of the Victorian period were also 'crises' which involved shifts in the sources and composition of capital.[54] These shifts were, of course, uneven in their regional and sectoral periodicities and older forms of capitalist organization have persisted despite their diminished proportions within the national economy. The transitions from mercantile to industrial and from industrial to corporate capitalism involved not only the problems of economic

depressions but also changes in the division and control of labour.

These changes in the division of labour profoundly altered the processes of residential differentiation and land use specialization both at the beginning and end of the Victorian period. The initial industrialization of urban employment dramatically reduced many of the distinctions among and between a wide diversity of artisanal trades.[55] New distinctions based upon the occupational hierarchies and segmented labour markets of corporate capitalism had spread to only limited sectors of the economy at the end of the nineteenth century. Under these circumstances, changes in the division of labour provided few new bases of residential differentiation since the extremely wealthy had already established their preference for residential exclusivity in an earlier period. For these reasons changes in the residential patterns of artisans, who formed the majority of the residents of mercantile cities, were likely to be the most sensitive indicators of the impact of industrial capitalism in the social geography of the Victorian city.

Although there is a strong tendency to idealize the security and satisfactions of the artisanal production, the working conditions in factories and sweatshops of Victorian cities were compared unfavourably with an earlier system by which the young were trained, became skilled journeymen and finally master craftsmen in their own right.[56] The artisan owned his own tools, established his own work schedules and responded to the market place in the context of long established customs. Often specific trades concentrated in a quarter or on a particular street and these occupational divisions did influence the spatial differentiation of urban society.[57] It is questionable whether this classic artisanal system was ever transplanted to the English colonies, but by the late eighteenth century it was clear that many journeymen had no expectations of becoming masters and many apprenticeships were never completed.[58]

A growing proportion of the labour force was composed of 'dependants' because they no longer had a secure place in the system of artisanal production.[59] Labour migration became more common and since eligibility for relief had for long been based upon the principle of residency, the problem of destitution amongst unemployed itinerant labourers was extremely stressful. In responding to fluctuating and often spasmodic distant markets, the old artisanal system was severely strained but not destroyed. The merchants who provided the critical link between producer and consumer still had only an indirect influence on the working conditions of the artisan. Periods of commercial prosperity had, however, increased economic inequality and these striking differences in wealth were graphically expressed in the emergence of exclusive merchant quarters.[60] There were periodic complaints about the contrasting effects of expanding markets on the fortunes of merchants, master craftsmen and journeymen but only in the early Victorian period did these complaints focus on the issue of residential segregation.

While most early Victorian cities were of decidedly modest dimensions, rapid population growth may have altered the degree to which residential segregation impeded social contacts and aggravated social tensions. It has also been argued that mercantile capitalists retained a deep sense of paternal involvement in the affairs of the civic community and by their leadership and charity bridged the divide between rich and poor.[61] In contrast, industrial capitalists represented a *nouveau riche* devoid of any sensitivity to the obligations of wealth and largely indifferent to the needs of local government. Consequently, a long established residential pattern assumed a new social meaning since residential segregation now involved the withdrawal of the affluent from civic affairs. This argument greatly exaggerates the differences between mercantile and industrial capitalists and the degree to which their presumed withdrawal deprived the remainder of urban society of their good favours.[62] Indeed, the social world of the artisan had thrived independently of mercantile paternalism and industrialization involved a direct confrontation with this independence. Despite preoccupation with residential segregation, early Victorian anxieties about the indiscriminate mixing of the poor were more likely to have been caused by the changing place of artisans in the system of production.

Victorians were extremely sensitive to variations amongst the poor who included groups as secure as small entrepreneurs and as vulnerable as day labourers. They did, however, assume that economic hardship was a sign of moral defect. The spread of poverty was, therefore, attributed to the contagious influences of the most depraved poor when in fact the process of industrialization itself impoverished many once secure and respectable artisans. With the introduction of machinery and the re-organization of production, the old distinctions of master and journeyman and of the skills of different trades were blurred. Certainly, popular resistance to the industrialization of production was led by those who had the most to lose and the most radical reactions thus came from artisans rather than from unskilled labourers or new factory operatives.[63] As the majority of artisans lost control over their work, the urban labour force became more homogeneous in its vulnerability to the vicissitudes of the wage labour market. Consequently, anxieties about the contagious effects of the most depraved or radical poor on their neighbours was a misperception of the effects of industrialization on a once secure segment of urban society.

As a growing proportion of the urban labour force became conscious of their common predicament, that diverse social category known as the poor was also described as the working class.[64] To the degree that the internal stratification or segmentation of this wage earning class was of less consequence than those amongst and between artisans, there were few new bases for residential differentiation.[65] Indeed, modest differences in the security and status of artisans and their dependants had not resulted in residential differentiation and if these distinctions were of even less consequence amongst the new working class, then vast areas of early Victorian cities must have housed an increasingly homogeneous population.

These developments were most pronounced whenever large scale capitalists established their plants on new sites far from existing settlements.[66] Under these circumstances, industrial capitalists did not have to contend with older modes of production and they attempted to provide many services, including housing, which would have supported numerous small entrepreneurs in established settlements. Industrialization did not, however, totally eliminate internal distinctions amongst a large wage earning group and the occasional use of the plural term 'working classes' was a response to these conditions. The disruption of artisanal production was quite varied over time and in some trades old values lingered on and long established systems of work persisted until the turn of the century.[67]

Moreover, the vast majority of new industrial entrepreneurs required modest amounts of capital and labour and consequently, the growth of urban employment was primarily in small scale enterprises in which owner and employees worked side by side in the fashion of the artisan shop. The so called 'sweated trades' were organized into an almost infinite division of tasks as small subcontractors made use of home labour as well as workships. The complex interdependencies of this system of production not only maintained but also stimulated the tendency for certain trades to cluster in well defined quarters. The 'external economies' of these concentrations of small scale producers were as decisive to the Industrial Revolution as were the scale economies of factory production.[68]

The immense physical growth of cities and the provisionment of their expanding populations created a host of petty entrepreneurial opportunities in the preparation and distribution of food, construction and personal services. The longevity and profitability of small scale enterprises were modest and there was, therefore, considerable movement between wage earning and proprietorship. As long as the majority of the urban labour force worked in small establishments and as long as most employers were small capitalists who lived on or near their workplace and amongst their employees, residential differentiation on the basis of new and often fragile differences in wealth and status was extremely unlikely.

Victorians moved with great frequency between and amongst urban settlements and high rates of population turnover must also have inhibited residential differentiation.[69] The majority of urban residents were committed to a given address for only a short period. They were, therefore, unlikely to be especially concerned about the precise social standing of their neighbours or neighbourhood particularly when most parts of the city housed a somewhat heterogeneous population. Indeed, the social networks of most urban residents were not built on the principle of propinquity for the ease with which so many of them moved from place to place was based upon information which they derived from their dispersed friends and relatives. Voluntary associations developed regional and national organizations in response to the rapid changes in local memberships so that institutions complemented the individual networks of contacts and movements.[70] High

population turnover also prevailed amongst immigrant groups. While there were ghetto-like concentrations of both Irish and German immigrants in most large cities, the vast majority of both groups lived in ethnically mixed environments. Their social exclusivity was based upon their institutional affiliations and kinship ties which were not necessarily dependent upon high levels of concentration.[71]

Apart from the extremely wealthy, changes in the division of labour and the organization of capitalism did not radically increase the level of residential differentiation in Victorian cities. Modern levels of residential differentiation were in part derived from a process of incremental suburbanization by which housing was filtered to progressively lower strata but until quite late in the nineteenth century this process was not well developed.[72] In many respects, the expansion of the residential quarters of the affluent should be distinguished from the classical incremental suburbanization described by the Chicago model. The housing needs of the extremely wealthy were rarely extensive enough to create a circumferential zone around the city. They were not dependent upon developments in public transport nor were their dwellings appropriate for more modest needs. Consequently, the wealthy tended to retain parts of the historic merchant quarters which formed the apex of a wedge-like pattern of expansion.[73] (Figure 6).

Not only were the origins of the residential patterns of the very wealthy firmly established in the eighteenth century but despite assertions about profound differences in the civic commitments of mercantile and industrial capitalists, they did have identical residential preferences. The socio-geographical divide between the wealthy and the remainder of urban society certainly became sharper during the nineteenth century but this amplification of an established pattern of residential differentiation did not involve those processes of filtration which defined the suburbanization process in modern cities. Even today the residential preferences of the wealthy are quite distinctive and might be viewed as a persisting inheritance of tastes first exercised in the eighteenth century.

In any event, the wealthy pioneered only a small sector of the perimeter of the Victorian city and most peripheral expansion was necessary to meet the initial and decidedly modest housing needs of a highly mobile but rapidly growing population. For the vast majority of these new residents, distinctions of wealth and status were not a pre-eminent influence on residential differentiation. In many respects, it is unwise to envisage in Victorian cities those modern levels and patterns of social mobility which have sustained rapid mass suburbanization. For the majority of Victorians, the social meanings of occupational categories and the motives involved in residential mobility were not necessarily based upon current assumptions.[74] Filtration made only modest contributions to the supply of housing since the rate at which the upwardly mobile vacated existing dwellings was far too slow to meet the demand for new accommoation.[75] To be sure, the introduction of horsecars in the mid-fifties did produce some



Figure 6. Socio-Geographic Patterns and the Expansion of Capitalism

peripheral suburbanization which catered to a specific clientele. The prosperity of some small entrepreneurs and the security of certain professional occupations was often marked by both an ability to employ at least one domestic servant and a degree of control over the length and periodicity of their working day.[76]

These developments continued at a fluctuating if modest rate until the late eighties when the electrification and co-ordination of most streetcar services radically enlarged the commuting range of most large cities without increased costs. The response to these new opportunities for suburban residence came mainly from a growing 'new' lower middle class comprising the salaried employees of large scale public and private organizations. This internal stratification of the labour force of corporate organizations and public bureaucracies was the beginning of a series of changes in the division of labour and the organization of work which defined the transition from industrial to corporate capitalism.[77] These new divisions within the labour force became more dominant in urban employment during the present century but the beginnings of new distinctions of wealth and status were clearly evident by the turn of the nineteenth century. The nuances of this complex system of occupational stratification were recorded in the increasing variability of the housing market and the identification of particular suburban developments with the tastes and needs of specific income and status levels.[78] This new division of labour was the basis of a process of structural mobility which provided the demand for improved public and private transport as well as for suburban housing. Under these circumstances, filtration became a means to supply housing for lower social strata (Figure 6).

The selectivity of suburbanization also left behind the least mobile and most deprived in those older sections of the city which had earlier housed a more heterogeneous population. These developments were, moreover, compounded by the arrival of large numbers of impoverished southern and eastern European immigrants who clustered in areas recently abandoned by their earlier residents. This process had been quite inadequate to meet the needs of Irish and German immigrants who had arrived in American cities two generations earlier. Indeed, substantial proportions of these earlier immigrants were housed in shanty-towns on the urban fringe and on poor sites which had been avoided by earlier developments. Differences in the residential patterns of successive waves of immigrants, like those of urban society at large, reveal the striking changes in the process of residential differentiation which occurred towards the end of the nineteenth century.[79]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Interpretations of the socio-geographical patterns of Victorian cities are thus dependent upon either explicit or implicit references to three broad sets of generalizations about the transformation of urban society. Most early views of industrialization equated Victorian urban growth with the initial and largely negative effects of the new systems of production on living conditions. The recent loss of more cohesive social conditions defined the

beginning of this phase of urban growth while a renewed sensitivity to collective needs was assumed to have marked its end. The extreme commitment of Victorians, especially in the United States, to liberal-individualism was held to be responsible for their failure to extend the benefits of industrialization to society at large.

Some changes attributed to industrialization were subsequently identified long before the Victorian period and described as the early manifestations of modernization. From this perspective, Victorian urban growth was viewed as a segment of a long and gradual transformation of the scale and complexity of urban life. While the degree of commitment to the values of liberal-individualism may have varied from time to time and place to place, Victorians were neither unique nor misguided in their preference for an ideology consistent with rapid modernization.

From the viewpoint of the expansion of capitalism, the transformation of urban life had started before industrialization but the disruptions associated with that process defined a distinctive phase of urban growth which in parts of the United States coincided with the Victorian period. Moreover, changes in the division of labour and the organization of work marked the end as decisively as the beginning of the Victorian period. Values attributed to Victorian liberals were more broadly associated with the expansion of capitalism but their precise influence varied according to the predominant source and scale of capital itself.

In each of these three sets of generalizations Victorian urban growth is assigned a somewhat different place in the transformation of urban life. The use of terms like industrialization, modernization and capitalism to describe a complex social transformation involves many interpretative problems but here they have been offered as descriptions of different developmental conceptions of the process of urbanization and especially of the spatial consequences of that process. The different socio-geographical implications of industrialization and modernization are largely matters of when essentially modern processes of residential differentiation emerged. In the former, the origin of well defined social areas based on the wealth and status of their residents was related to the industrialization of urban employment and in the latter, to the prosperity of mercantile capitalists. In many respects, however, the residential preferences of the extremely wealthy were quite distinct from the kinds of suburbanization which defined the modern American city. Until quite late in the nineteenth century, neither the stratification of the labour force nor the process of filtration had exercised a dominant influence on residential differentiation. Complaints about the indiscriminate mixing of the poor provide a more revealing impression of socio-geographical change within Victorian cities than those about the longer established process by which the extremely wealthy were segregated. In contrast, those changes associated with the transition from industrial to corporate capitalism introduced most of those occupational distinctions which were to

define the process of residential differentiation in the twentieth century.

These different conceptions of the distinctiveness of Victorian cities are not of course mutually exclusive and the chronological association of those changes and attitudes described as Victorian did not necessarily coincide with the Victorian period in all parts of the United States. In the northeast, and to a lesser degree in the midwest, not only the chronology of change but also reactions to those changes paralleled those observed in the industrial cities of Victorian Britain. To be sure, the ethnic pluralism of American cities greatly complicated their social geography, but these patterns too recorded those changes which defined the Victorian period. Elsewhere in the United States, these changes were either delayed or avoided and it is debatable whether these divergent experiences, especially in the South, were a result of different attitudes or simply their peripheral position in the national economy.

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II

REGIONAL IDEOLOGIES AND URBAN GROWTH ON THE VICTORIAN PERIPHERY: SOUTHERN ONTARIO AND THE U.S. SOUTH

John P. Radford

Most accounts of Victorian England suggest that its distinctiveness within the broader sweep of British history lay in the attainment of economic and social prominence by its middle classes. The Victorian ethic, however defined, derived from a middle class value system. Its main achievement was to transcend these origins and permeate most of wider society.[1] Some writers have deviated slightly from this view by emphasizing the obstacles which middle class values encountered in their struggle for social dominance.[2] One recent interpretation goes further in arguing that bourgeois values were absorbed and accommodated by the gentry who were thereby able to forestall their rise to pre-eminence.[3] Nevertheless, the middle class success story remains for many the quintessence of English Victorianism.

It has been customary to place the high point of Victorian culture in Britain somewhere around mid-century during a period of optimism and so-called 'equipoise.'[4] Yet, although later Victorians were less confident of the future than their parents had been, they had the advantage of being able to look back on well over half a century of solid progress. Middle class achievements were not undermined by the economic difficulties of the 1870's and 1880's, and they were enhanced during the boom years at the end of the century when they came to be most vividly reflected in the New Imperialism. The political implications of this newly found popular support for the Empire were realised by Disraeli as early as 1872, but its climax is often tied to the celebrations marking the Queen's Diamond Jubilee in 1897.[5] The prevailing mood of the time was nicely captured by Arnold Toynbee, who as a boy of eight watched the Jubilee procession pass along Fleet Street. Toynbee subsequently recalled how this event brought to the surface a deeply engrained feeling of being 'on top of the world.' The middle classes in particular, as the major beneficiaries of economic and technological advancement seemed to have overcome the oppression of formerly inevitable forces. As they viewed the world from this pinnacle of 'splendid isolation', with a mixture of arrogance, pity and satisfaction, the late Victorians felt somehow 'emancipated from history.'[6]

The triumph of the middle class in Britain in the nineteenth century was not a unique development. Toynbee himself felt that, had he been in New York in 1897, his sentiments might have been very similar. On the other hand he expressly exempted the U.S.

South where a different ethos predominated.[7] The Southern population, he felt, had been worn down by poverty and defeat, and remained subject to the oppressive hand of its history. C. Vann Woodward, in a well-known essay which uses Toynbee's observations as a point of departure, has argued that the dominant American legend of military and economic success could not be widely shared by a Southern population which had suffered deprivation, defeat, and military occupation. The South carried its history as a burden, and there was little sense of imperial triumph.[8]

A survey of other areas of North America around the year 1897 would reveal further examples of regional variations in ideology. The case of Quebec is one which most would regard as outside the mainstream. A more deceptive Canadian case is Ontario, which appears to fit more nearly into dominant North American trends, but which had at the time a reputation for emphasizing conservative British traits so as to become in some ways 'more British than Britain.' Its cities, often viewed functionally as an extension of the U.S. urban system, were at the same time nodes in the imperial connection and transmitters of imperial ideologies.[9] 'A Toronto man (wrote Rupert Brooke) has some inkling of the conditions and responsibilities of the British Empire. The tradition is in him.'[10] Few who attended the city's elaborate celebrations of Victoria's Jubilee in 1897 would have disagreed.[11]

The adjective 'Victorian' has found increasing use in modern studies of nineteenth century North America, including the writings of urban historians. The term is usually meant to imply no more than a certain time period. However, given its close associations with a particular, if nebulous, set of social and political qualities, casual use of the description 'Victorian' has the potential for causing confusion. It is difficult enough to accommodate within this term the wide range of local variations which existed even within nineteenth century Britain. Yet there exists in the British literature on the era a common ground, if not always for agreement, then at least for a basis on which to disagree. Moreover one finds in the writings on Victorian Britain no fundamental discrepancy between the urban literature *per se* and the wider mainstream of political and social history. An earlier generation of social historians may have lamented the effects of urban industrialization upon English society, but they rarely doubted its origins.[12] The pioneers of a specifically urban history - the comparative survey of Briggs[13] or the detailed investigation of the growth of Camberwell by Dyos[14] - firmly attached their subdiscipline to a wider social framework. Recent British scholarship, Marxist and non-Marxist alike, has shown a readiness to acknowledge that, in the words of E. P. Thompson, 'There is no such thing as economic growth which is not, at the same time, growth or change of a culture.'[15] In short, the question of the social origins of urban growth in Britain has seemed an almost inevitable field of enquiry, and while it would be wrong to paint a picture either of completeness or unanimity, the general outlines of the links between ideology, social change and urban growth have been drawn with relative clarity.

Such a claim can hardly be made for North America. Here, despite numerous studies dealing with specific aspects of nineteenth century cities, the ideological bases of urban growth remain largely unspecified. The best attempt is Warner's concept of 'privatism',[16] an important insight but too general to form an effective analytical cutting edge. The general lack of clarity appears to stem from two areas. First the concept of social class has been much more controversial. Inequality is, of course, accepted as a major feature of nineteenth century North American society, and occupational and social status are regarded as important variables of social differentiation. However, whether attributed to high rates of population turnover, or rapid upward social mobility, or both, the existence of persistent class associations and ideologies is widely doubted. Thernstrom's questioning of the myth of the open society on the basis of an analysis of Newburyport, Massachusetts has, for example, been largely swept aside by waves of contrary evidence.[17] The majority position may be, as some would claim, something of a delusion, but it is more likely mainly a reflection of real contrasts with European social structures. Certainly social class has never held in the mainstream literature on North America the kind of pivotal position which it occupies in that of Britain. When the social origins of urban growth have been explored in North America, they have usually been approached through ethnicity rather than class. This has posed additional problems. In the classical urban view, ethnic differentiation tends to evaporate as immigrant groups seek assimilation through suburbanization. Ultimately, social differentiation is registered neither in ethnicity nor strictly in class terms, but through socio-economic status. More modern views on ethnicity tend to emphasize the persistence of ethnic identities, which are regarded as playing an important role in ameliorating the adjustment process.[18] Neither version provides a basis for analysis of urban growth. However illuminating ethnic differentiation may be in giving a sense of the patterns of urban life it forms an inadequate substitute for class as a basis on which to explore the social origins of urban expansion.

A second major source of confusion has been a failure to deal adequately with regional contrasts in ideology. The North American literature is replete with studies of sectionalism, but those who seek to relate these to ideological differences are often accused of exaggeration, or of gullibility in the face of popular mythology. Two examples may be cited of interpretations which seem to over-step the bounds of reason. Marshall McLuhan's literary criticism in the 1940's, particularly his essays on Edgar Allan Poe revolved around the concept of a divided American culture.[19] The North was paralleled with such characteristics as reason, abstract knowledge as control and a secular mercantile bourgeoisie, while the South was associated with imagination, intuition, religion with knowledge and piety, and a pious cavalier gentry. Much more recently Luraghi has in effect asked us to reverse the figure-ground relationship of our perceptual map of the Americas and view the Northern United States as a bourgeois anomaly, squeezed between a collection of aristocratic societies dominated by the seigneurie, plantation and hacienda.[20]

In the face of such romantic excesses one can sympathise with the New South spokesman Henry Watterson when he pronounced the notion of a fundamental difference between Northerners and Southerners a product of 'morbid minds.'[21] Yet it is doubtful whether such interpretations do greater violence to history than the pervasive tendency in much of American thought to extrapolate the experience of one regional variant over an entire continent. American sociology, before its recent pluralism, has been summed up by Hawthorn as 'history ignored,'[22] and the same could be said of many branches of American geography. Forty years ago Sauer attributed this tendency to the dominance of the Middle West within the discipline.[23] Here a uniformity of the physical environment and rapid cultural assimilation left location as the major geographic problem and rational economic forces as the most visible spatial determinant. Fraser Hart's more recent portrait reinforces the point.[24] Subsequent paradigm shifts have failed to correct these biases, certainly not the quantitative revolution, which only reinforced them.

The urban literature especially has tended to belie any coherent sense of region, and has shown a capacity for overgeneralization. Again Warner's work, partly because of its importance, is a good illustration of this. The frameworks which Warner developed under the titles of 'urban scaffolding' and 'urban wilderness' have encouraged an approach which is self-consciously urban at the expense of recognizing regional subtleties.[25] It is true that local and community historians have tended to ignore such frameworks and explore a far wider range of themes.[26] But their work is idiographic in nature and defies any attempt at systematic aggregation. It is therefore at an intermediate level of generalization, corresponding to a regional scale of investigation, that the urban literature is at its least adequate. Moreover, it has been too compartmentalized, too separated from the mainstream of political and even social history. Cities are frequently assumed to be *sui generis*; even distinctive regional environments are too often disregarded.

'Through the systems of mass production and mass communications, America and its immigrants have assimilated one another within an urban technological culture that overrides all distinctions of place, class and ethnic type.'[27] This one sentence seems to include most of the components of what is essentially a deficient framework: class and ethnic distinctions are regarded as ephemeral, local and regional variations are minimized, and beneath it all lies a deeply embedded technological determinism. As a characteristic interpretation of American society this statement is more representative of attitudes in urban and economic geography than in history where ideas of ethnicity in particular have recently undergone re-formulation. In neither discipline, however, has the question of regional contrasts been resolved. Urban-economic geographers pay lip service to regional differences, but rarely are these variations attributed to the existence of deeply rooted social contrasts. Variations in economic and social structure are readily explained in terms of city sizes or growth rates or functional mixes or transportation

systems, as if these were somehow ultimate causes. Contrasts in regional urban systems are often explained in terms of developmental stages, as if every region were at a different point on a unilinear path of evolution, and as if this adequately accounted for its distinctiveness.[28]

Historical geographers have been much less prone to these biases, partly because a continued attachment to the regional concept requires a deeper appreciation of local subtleties. However, *urban* historical geographers have understandably found their major examples in the north-east-Middle West axis, and it is here that much of the most innovative work has been done. A survey of the literature in this field over the last decade reveals an understanding of urban processes in the eastern core and Middle Western periphery, and the existence of a broad consensus, especially at the network scale, on a 'normal' form of American urbanization.[29] Outside of these regions, the majority of studies have either been content to transplant assumptions in the name of a universal modernization process, or else have been local geographies.[30]

Through a review of some recent literature on two peripheral regions, this essay seeks some answers to several basic questions posed at a regional scale of investigation. What was the nature of urban-industrial growth away from the heartland? Certainly it occurred later. By the Victorian climax of the 1890's Britain had already passed its period of industrial supremacy, while in North America the northeast-midwest axis had been securely consolidated. To the north and south of the manufacturing belt, however, industrial society was only beginning to take shape, following tentative inroads made during the previous decade. Can these delays be explained purely in locational terms, or were they attended by social and ideological forces? When industrialization did arrive, did it follow the established Victorian middle-class model? What are the implications of any developmental contrasts for geographical methodology?

SOUTHERN ONTARIO

The Canadian urban system as a whole, and its subsystems in particular, have always been highly dependent upon exogenous generating impulses. Traditional accounts have generally stressed the almost heroic efforts of merchants to link remote regions to an emerging heartland, and in so doing to evolve an urban system with a degree of integrity.[31] Crucial in these efforts has been the role of government, and particular emphasis is placed on the National Policy (especially the tariff of 1879, but including also the promotion of railway construction and immigration) as an impulse to the growth of a core, based on American branch plants, and an integrated periphery.

A revisionist view, represented particularly by Naylor,[32] indicts the merchant for a continentalism which impeded Canada's economic development. To Naylor the New Imperialism resulted in the re-imposition of traditional colonial relationships between Britain and Canada which had existed before the free trade

disruptions of the 1840's, so that between Confederation in 1867 and World War I Canada was an economic colony with a social structure to match. The externally-oriented merchant class, their profits tied to the imperial connection, starved industry of vital investment. Railway construction, far from being the essential spur to national development, actually reinforced and extended the staple economy. The banking system, a partial and attenuated transplant from Britain was similarly tied to financing commodity movement, and lacked a regional equivalent of the U.S. state banks which might have compensated for the indifference of metropolitan financing to small business and industry. Private banks merely acted as extensions of the chartered banks, which were in turn tending toward monopolization by the 1890's. Thus developed a chronic dependence on U.S. technology, aggravated (not ameliorated) by the Patents Act of 1872 and by the National Policy itself. American branch plants, according to this view, induced a superficial and dependent form of industrialization - industry in Canada but not Canadian industry - which stifled 'home industry.' However, the crucial dependence was upon British capital investment, which remained greater than American up to World War I, and the resulting dominance of the merchant class.

In spite of important philosophical differences between traditional and revisionist views, they are united in focusing on the exogenous nature of developments which Harold Innis presented as staple theory a generation ago. The implications of this reality for urbanization have been fundamental to the work of Simmons at the systemic scale. At the regional scale it has inspired the work of several authors including McCann in the Maritimes[33] and Whebell in Southern Ontario.[34]

A second element in Canadian economic development concerns the question of whether the value system of Canadian business can truly be claimed as different from the American. It has frequently been argued that Canada's evolution has been deeply influenced by conservative principles, placing class and community above the cult of individualism, and emphasizing peace, order and good government. 'Horatio Alger,' it has been said, 'has never been a Canadian hero.'[35] Here again, those inclined to quarrel with the traditional argument stop short of directly contradicting it. Allan Smith has qualified the view by showing that the self-made man has been very much a part of the mythology of English Canada, but that the myth was increasingly unable to cope with the realities of Canadian development.[36] Even the business community, as Michael Bliss has shown, tempered its espousal of individualism with a strongly moralistic stance.[37] The inter-relationship between attitude, action and physical manifestation is an area which remains inadequately explored, though Bliss has come as close as anyone.[38] It seems clear that this moral order is not simply to be explained away either as part of the search for a separate Canadian identity, or as simply Victorian hypocrisy, though it contains elements of both. Canadian business has never hesitated to promote its own interests in close collaboration with government. But it did so, in the

late nineteenth century, under the influence of a deeply ingrained moral paternalism. Canadian capitalism, as Sidney Webb noted, was of a kind which had become outmoded in England and was difficult to find in the United States. It was a capitalism, as he put it, 'on its good behaviour.'[39]

Although one can admire Simmons' attempt to deal with the complete urban system of the nation,[40] the immense internal contrasts require that further historical appraisal be conducted at a regional scale. In a nineteenth century context Southern Ontario, the most densely populated part of what was formerly Upper Canada or Canada West, is of particular interest. The location is so close, and the physical environment is so similar to adjacent parts of New York, Ohio, and Michigan as to provide something of a laboratory for studying contrasts in human geography.

In one view, Upper Canada was settled by groups of counter-revolutionaries who occupied an area in which Britain sought to establish the heart of a rejuvenated colonial society, more balanced than that of the dissident colonies and closely connected to the homeland by an upper class. The importance of both loyalist ideology and British imperialism on Upper Canadian society is open to exaggeration. Many loyalists were attracted more by cheap land than politics. Further, Simcoe's vision was only weakly shared by his immediate successors; the British government showed only intermittent interest in this corner of the empire; and American land claims truncated the envisioned hinterland. Nevertheless, a case can be made for the persistence of a strong institutional distinctiveness which remained crucial to social evolution throughout the nineteenth century. Regional identity was enhanced by the War of 1812, and the subsequent ban on land grants to Americans, however ineffectual, and the expulsion of Robert Gourlay, however overdramatized, nevertheless indicate the growth of a self-conscious conservatism. The region was touched by the popular movements of the 1830's (whether a colonial variant of Chartism or a northern extension of the influence of Jacksonian democracy) but the feeble rebellion led by McKenzie was put down with great force. Only very modest reforms were achieved. The clergy reserves and with them the *de facto* establishment of the Church of England remained until 1854. The so-called Family Compact, presided over by Bishop Strachan, contained economic development within a framework based upon the tie with Britain, balanced government, and the established church.[41]

It is undisputed that this small oligarchy dominated Upper Canada during the first half of the nineteenth century. The chief questions here are whether the conservative traditions which it established persisted through the period of rapid industrial-urban growth later in the century, and whether the institutional distinctiveness which accompanied it has any geographical significance.[42] Cole Harris has concluded that even before Confederation such elements found little expression in the rural landscape.[43] The problems faced by the pioneers were essentially mid-Western problems, modified only by the absence

of the superabundance of mid-Western land. Likewise Goheen has seemed to find the political and institutional structure of Toronto, the region's emerging metropolis, of great background interest, but of comparatively little importance in an analysis of its social geography.[44] Goheen's important monograph is crucial to this discussion because it contains all of the elements necessary to a fairly sophisticated understanding of process and pattern in Victorian Toronto. The way in which it blends those elements reveals much about the strengths and limitations of approaches which even now underlie much work in urban social geography at the city-wide scale. Goheen's methodology involves the linking of the Thernstrom-Warner reversal hypothesis[45] through Park's concept of natural area[46] to the techniques of data synthesis devised by Shevky[47] (Figure 1). He is able to identify major social dimensions, which tend to persist throughout the period, and marked spatial patterns which change significantly. Toronto as Hogtown seems well served by a methodology which treats it as a mini-Chicago. After all, is it not the Canadian equivalent, with its agricultural processing, its dependence on the



Figure 1. An Interpretation of the Methodology of Goheen's *Victorian Toronto*

railroad workshops, its agricultural machinery factories and hog packers, In Joseph Flavelle - who Anglicized the Canadian hog with the improved Yorkshire breed, fed it on peas, bran and skimmed milk, and packed it for the British market - Southern Ontario produced an entrepreneur with 'the kind of real life that made Horatio Alger plausible.'[48]

Yet before Toronto was Hogtown, it was a 'British Town on American Soil.'[49] This mid-century characterization found echoes throughout the century. Demographically the city long remained overwhelmingly British. In the 1891 census less than 9 per cent of the population listed their father's place of birth as outside Canada or Great Britain, and 84 per cent of the foreign born population were from the British Isles. The city was also largely Protestant, with 80 per cent listed as Anglican, Presbyterian, Methodist or Baptist.[50] The mind of nineteenth century Toronto cannot be understood without an appreciation of the role of the Orange Order, and its religious tensions are not done justice under conventional North American treatments of 'ethnicity.' Toronto, and to a large extent other Ontario towns, were also largely British in their institutional structure. It is true that the old colonial Tory oligarchy was broken around mid-century by a series of measures. Most important to the towns was the Municipal Corporations Act, or Baldwin Act, of 1849 which abolished domination by the magistrates and quarter sessions and put power in the hands of elected representatives.[51] This Act, which fashioned the structure of Ontario municipal politics for the rest of the century (and beyond) reflected the new power of the middle class. Yet, like its model the 1835 Act in England, it fell short of popular democracy. It represented, in Careless' words 'a combination of North American circumstances and precepts of Victorian middle-class liberalism.'[52] It did not displace the deeply conservative and deferential character of Ontario life, and the towns were much more controlled from above than were their American counterparts. Thus, although the technical order was American, the towns remained 'focal points for Victorian British attitudes.' Nowhere was this more so than in Toronto with its large and loudly loyalistic merchant community.

Goheen's monograph as a whole does not neglect such issues, but only rarely are they carried through into the analysis. The philosophical stance here seems very close to that labelled by Firey 'empirically compromised rationalism.'[54] What is valid for the Hogtown in Toronto does little justice to that blend of Britisn population, institutions and ideology with an American environment, a theme which persists throughout the nineteenth century. Neither does it illuminate that other side of Victorian Toronto's character which is described in the phrase 'Toronto the Good.' The images of temperance meetings and drab Victorian Sundays conjured up by this characterization are only a part of what was, in fact, a deeply ingrained moral order which triumphed in Mayor Howland's administration in the 1880's but which persisted, admittedly with a struggle, well into the present century.

Much more needs to be done before the effect of this moral order on the city's urban geography can be assessed. It can possibly be traced in the fate of the City Beautiful movement[55] and in early and continued municipal planning of the city's waterworks, an important factor in urban development.[56] Above all, perhaps, local transport in Toronto has already repaid some careful consideration. Toronto was not late, in relation to its population size, in adopting the horse-car in 1861, or electrifying its system in 1892.[57] But the relationship between the system and city expansion has been unusual: the franchised company failed to keep up with suburban development. The reason for this, as Donald Davis recently remarked, has not been adequately explained.[58] The street railways never acted as loss leaders for the real estate industry as was characteristic of their U.S. counterparts. In fact the Toronto Railway Company, which gained a thirty-year franchise in 1891, stubbornly refused to build beyond the city boundary of that date, despite subsequent annexations. Possibly its owners were too busy with continental speculative schemes to concern themselves with urban real estate. Certainly the heavy city taxes on lines were a strong disincentive, and the activities of Ontario Hydro, a government commission, blocked off some potential avenues for integration and speculation.

Although Davis is critical of Doucet, none of this is inconsistent with the latter's view that Toronto's street railway system hovered between laissez-faire on the one hand and municipal socialism on the other.[59] Yet it is important, in addition, to recognize the embrace of the moral order. As Armstrong and Nelles have demonstrated, local transport in Toronto was a moral as well as a technical issue.[60] It was bound up with the religious fervour for which the city was famous. The most visible demonstration of this was the battle which raged over the issue of Sunday streetcars, in which the Protestant middle class saw a foreign, mainly Catholic, threat to their moral domination. Yet the very Victorian combination of economic prosperity and righteous indignation affected more than this famous controversy. It penetrated the whole question of urban reform in the 1890's. The fact that the middle class was slow to suburbanize is undoubtedly related to the effectiveness of the moral order which it championed. With respect to the relationship between transport and streetcar suburbs, Toronto seems to lie about half way between Leeds and Boston.[61]

THE SOUTH

The lag in the economic and urban development of the antebellum South is conventionally accounted for in terms of a colonial-style dependence upon the rapidly evolving northeast-midwest axis. Douglass North has shown how, in the three-region system which evolved before the Civil War, the South became dependent upon Midwestern grain and Northern processing and markets, leaving it without internal multipliers.[62] Rupert Vance's *Human Geography of the South,* written thirty years previously, stressed the persistence of such inter-relationships well into the twentieth century.[63] Although the accompanying Southern value system

was partly a reflection of harsh realities, it undoubtedly also played an active role in fabricating Southern society. The dominant ideology was that of the planter who, in Nicholl's words, found it:

> both personally congenial and political expedient to advocate an agrarian philosphy which positively opposed Southern industrial-urban development as an inferior way of life.[64]

Genovese went so far as to characterize antebellum society as 'prebourgeois' since it revolved around land and slaves, and was dominated by the master-slave relationship.[65] It is not necessary to embrace this extreme to make the point that the merchant community was subservient to planter interests, and that the level of urbanization was little greater than that needed to serve a plantation economy. The Southern antebellum value system was increasingly at odds with laissez-faire attitudes, and the region became closed not only to abolitionism, but to industrialization and notions of progress in general.[66]

However tight the hold of the planter elite on the antebellum value system, surely it was swept aside, if not in war, then with Reconstruction and occupation by the troops of a jubilant North. Such indeed is the viewpoint which has occupied historiographical centre stage since C. Vann Woodward's *Origins of the New South* appeared in 1951.[67] According to this view, the abolition of slavery and the impoverishment of the planter class destroyed much of what had been distinctive in Southern society. After Reconstruction a new middle class, with the help of Northern capital and technology, erected a new industrial base which shifted the South toward the economic and ideological mainstream of American life. Urban-industrial growth is thus seen as having been delayed until the New South movement, at which point it proceeded along conventional lines.

Yet the rapidity and scale of New South urbanization were sufficiently modest to suggest that this view is, at best, an exaggeration. Moreover, as Nicholls has shown, there is little evidence for the existence of a substantial middle class even in the cities until the 1920's.[68] Reissman has suggested that as late as 1930 aristocratic domination and traditional deferences were strong, and the emergence of the middle class was not a major feature until after World War II.[69] If the South was becoming more like the North, it was doing so with painful slowness.

The South, perhaps more than most regions, resists attempts at generalization. Considering that the War and Reconstruction imposed no major change of direction on Charleston, S. C., for example, it is possible to consider that Charleston was by-passed in the New South.[70] Its persistent social and racial structures seemed increasingly anachronistic within the South as portrayed by the liberal historians. Yet there exists considerable evidence that Reconstruction initiatives had in the final analysis relatively little lasting impact upon South Carolina,[71] and William Cooper has advanced an interpretation which placed the

State's re-emergence in the 1880's firmly in the hands of the old planter families with antebellum ideologies.[72] Moreover, recent work in a broadly Marxist tradition has suggested that South Carolina's experience was not exceptional. Wiener in Alabama,[73] Billings in North Carolina[74] and Salamon in Mississippi [75] have traced a persistent planter dominance even as these states underwent industrialization. Following the insights of Barrington Moore,[76] they have, in fact, attempted to disassociate Southern industrialism entirely from the notion of middle class evolution. The South is regarded as having experienced a 'revolution from above,' an industrialization induced, not by a bourgeoisie challenging aristocratic notions of wealth and land, but by the planter class itself. The South, in fact, pursued the so-called 'Prussian Road' as Southern planters allied themselves with Northern industrialists. Without challenge from any of its traditional rivals - the peasantry, central government, the middle class - the rural aristocracy provided a continuity of planter dominance. Wiener sees little difference between the planter position of the 1880's and that of the 1850's. Railways were to be encouraged to the extent that they increased the efficiency of staple extraction, and immigration to the extent that it would enhance cotton profits. Industrialization was tolerated to a degree, where it might provide a market to allow some agricultural diversification, and reduce dependency on other areas for clothing and so on. But a move to a general industrial society as advocated by New South spokesmen was out of the question. It would create an underprivileged and dangerous proletariat, lead to materialism and social demoralization, and undermine the authority, and ultimately the existence, of the planter class.[77]

> In Alabama, the combination of textiles plus iron plus railroads did not add up to a case of general and sustained industrialization ... the limited nature and extent of industrial development were shaped by a dominant non-bourgeois planter class and by external 'imperialist' corporations seeking raw materials and markets which strengthened the local forces leading the region down the Prussian Road.[78]

Late nineteenth century Southern uniqueness lies, therefore, not so much in the experience of defeat, Reconstruction and redemption emphasized by Vann Woodward, as in the persistence of a distinctive class structure.

The literature thus suggests three major models of New South industrialization: first, the Vann Woodward middle class growth thesis (conventional Victorian development delayed pending the removal of an anachronistic social system); secondly, a position which regards the middle class view as greatly exaggerated and taking half a century or more to come to fruition; and thirdly, a view that rejects the middle class thesis entirely.

How then is one to interpret the growth of cities in the New South? The small group of Southern urban historians are undoubtedly closer to the middle class hypothesis than to any other. In fact one of the best known, David Goldfield,[79] takes a more extreme position which fails to find much evidence for the

supposed regional contrasts even before the Civil War. Goldfield blames a preoccupation among Southern historians with rural and especially plantation themes for a virtual neglect of the region's cities. In attempting a corrective, Goldfield has been at pains to show how echoes of the Northern Urban experience are to be found throughout the South. In doing so he has come dangerously close, it seems, to perpetuating a false dichotomy between 'urban history' using 'universal' or Northern ideas and 'Southern history' which is rural. The ideologies and aspirations of Southern industrial capitalists are viewed as identical to those of Northerners, even in the antebellum period. He sees a nineteenth century continuity in Southern history, but it is obscured by an historiographical overemphasis on the plantation: reduce the planter presence and the continuity becomes visible. This re-revisionism, which he expresses as 'plac(ing) the magnolias on Main Street'[80] is, of course, the precise opposite of that advocated in the Marxist view, and equally extreme. Brownell's examination of Southern cities in the 1920's[81] is more convincing because, although it also advocates an urban interpretation of Southern history, it deals with a period when increasing technology, particularly the automobile, was glossing over some of the regional contrasts.

Debate over the class structure of the New South is a current preoccupation in Southern history, and some have viewed with a mixture of alarm and amusement the picture of Junkers pacing up and down between rows of cotton.[82] Yet the Marxist perspective has performed a useful role in introducing a comparative framework to the discussion, and in questioning several underlying assumptions of the liberal approach. Moreover, it has no monopoly over the notion of planter continuity. Forty years ago, Wilbur Cash, in a book best known for its exposure of planter foibles and pretensions, presented a view of a New South emerging under the control of the old 'master class.'[83] Southern industry was founded and controlled by the long arm of the plantation. The Southern elite, defeated on the battlefield, embraced the formerly repulsive idea of 'Progress', but largely as a tactic designed to beat the Yankee at his own game, as a way of preserving Southern identity, and without any transformation in ideology. In common with several other observers, Cash finds the middle class a late phenomenon not clearly marked even in the towns until the 1920's.[84]

There is much support, then, for the idea that New South industrialization did not represent a conversion to the ways of industrial society, but an absorption of industrial techniques into a surprisingly resilient Southern social system. Resistance to liberal industrialism was as great as it had been in the antebellum period.

A case for nineteenth century continuity is more easily made for other social variables than it is for class. In the area of race, for example, debate is largely over whether segregationist replacements for slavery were imposed directly after Reconstruction, or at the turn of the century following a period of uncertainty.[85] Ethnic differentiation among the white population

continued to be the relatively unimportant basis of social differentiation it had been before the War. Characteristics such as the importance of religious appraisal of secular issues, religious and social conservatism, the restricted nature of education, and so on, were subject to very little change.[86] Above all, the idea of Southern distinctiveness lived on. Indeed it may well be, as Michael O'Brien recently suggested, that Southern identity, far from being obliterated by the Civil War, actually intensified after it lost its geographical expression in the Confederacy.[87]

There are profound implications for our approach to urban structure, which, even more than in the Canadian case, make Northern models inappropriate as analytical frameworks. Edd Parks displayed more than sectional bias when he wrote in 1934 that whereas Southern cities 'could not be transposed without being uprooted', Akron or Chicago might as easily be in Michigan and Detroit in Ohio or Illinois.[88] The statement is revealing both of the character of Southern cities and of the moral order which enveloped them, even in the twentieth century. Parks conceded that Birmingham was the biggest exception to the idea of the deeply planted Southern city. However, even Birmingham, in Wiener's view, was to a large extent a local product under the control of planter interests.[89]

Goldfield wanted the 'magnolias on Main Street' to symbolise the need for an urban view of Southern history. Their truer function would be to symbolise the continued dependence of the Southern city on a regional, largely rural, moral order. We need neither neglect the Southern city, nor erect an urban interpretation of Southern history. It is not a question of choosing between urban history and Southern history, but of pursuing a Southern urban history (and historical geography) which does not obscure the fact that nineteenth century Southern cities were more Southern than Northern; more Southern, perhaps, than Victorian.

INTEGRATION

'Do not the Americans as a whole' wrote John Stuart Mill in 1840, 'both in their good qualities and in their defects, resemble anything so much as an exaggeration of our own middle class?'[90] This early Victorian insight into American society was followed throughout the nineteenth century by others in similar vein. Matthew Arnold, prominent in a Victorian tradition which ran counter to Mill's liberalism, also wrote of the dominance in America of the middle class, whom he labelled 'Philistines.'[91] Modern historians have sometimes echoed the view that the predominant American experience in the nineteenth century was a kind of exaggerated version of middle class Victorianism. Daniel Walker Howe, for example, has observed that because of the virtual absence of an aristocratic tradition of the kind which ameliorated middle class forces in Britain, 'Victorian culture was experienced more intensely in the United States than in Victoria's homeland.'[92]

This view contains a measure of truth but its value is limited by a lack of regional refinement. In contrast, Elkins and McKitrick, in a rare integration of ideology with social structure and urban growth, have vividly demonstrated the singularity of that Mid-western case which has so often been taken as a norm.[93] According to these authors, the frontier which swept through the Old Northwest - Ohio, Indiana and Illinois - was organized around market centres which emerged within a social context of evolving democracy. The market towns were the foci of a broadly-based public participation within society and their success was measured almost exclusively in terms of commercial viability.

> Everyone understood that success must depend upon the town's prosperity, that it must be advertized, its virtues broadcast. The town must grow - it was vital to get people there and keep them there. Capital must be attracted . . . population must be increased, for this meant automatic benefits, more customers, . . . and the keynote, the watchword, the trumpet call, must be Opportunity.[94]

Every town was, in effect, a 'promotion', as boosters rivalled each other in their forecasts of spectacular growth. The openness of society and the breaking down of structure and restraint left competition as the sole effective sorting mechanism for people and towns alike. 'Acted out on the Illinois frontier (laissez-faire capitalism) meant unfettered opportunity for all . . . and a gleeful willingness to manipulate government in any and all ways that might advance business.'[95] This environment soon proved to be unusually hospitable to industrialization, thus ensuring the rapid rise of boom towns based first on primary processing and then on secondary manufacturing.

One can detect in these developments a certain resemblance to the middle class Victorian model, but the processes are greatly accelerated and overblown. The experience of this region represents the extrapolation into an abundant environment of principles derived both from Victorian Britain and from autochthonous influences on the Eastern Seaboard. The unrelenting logic of the emerging inter-relationship between core and periphery created so dynamic a system that rapid immigration and upward social mobility were the dominant social trends. If the comparative growth of urban centres correlates nicely with nodality and flows of capital, commodities and information, it is because of the inexorable logic in a settlement process mediated by the 'self-regulating market.' If the internal structures of the cities are illuminated by the 'classical' models it is because they conform to the assumptions of rapid population increase, disaggregated land ownership, a free land market, social heterogeneity but rapid assimilation and high rates of social and spatial mobility. In such a rational environment the wilder excesses of spatial theory (even, perhaps, the gravity model) retain a certain plausibility, and the ideological caricature of 'peasants into achievers' does not seem out of place.[96]

Some authors have tended to see in these developments a society operating outside of the restraints of any moral order, governed only by the principle of 'survival of the fittest.'[97] It is probably more accurate to assume the continued presence of a moral order, but one which, being dominated by a universalistic-achievement value orientation, sanctioned rampant competition as a basis of social order.[98] If so, it was not the moral order of conventional Victorian society but, as many Victorians themselves observed, a distorted and exaggerated version. Carlyle's 'cash nexus' was nowhere so clearly dominant and the name of Herbert Spencer nowhere so venerated. If one chooses to persist with the description 'Victorian' at all in this context, it must be qualified to reflect such extremes. The term *hyper-Victorian* seems appropriate.

The regions to the north and south of the emerging American manufacturing belt found themselves increasingly forced to define their identities in reaction to it. In both cases this reaction involved a whole range of postures, from literary criticism, through attempts at censorship, to tariff struggles, and outright war. Throughout the nineteenth century, and in spite of the Canadian disapproval of slavery, there is evidence of a literary, and philosophical sympathy between individual Southerners and English Canadians.[99] Fundamentally different in many ways, the two peripheral regions also shared several social characteristics (such as a relative ethnic simplicity and deferential class behaviour), certain technical attributes (staple-oriented railways, paucity of industrial investment, and dependence on outside markets) together with a common fear of attempts by the 'Republic of self-made men'[100] to make them over in its own image.

Much of Canada, certainly urban Southern Ontario, was dominated by a *transplanted Victorian* variant of urban-industrialism, a colonial form, showing a pragmatic willingness to compromise with a new environment while maintaining institutional correctness. The middle class emerged comparatively slowly, and emphasized links with the motherland, ties which were constantly reinforced by migration. The rather earnest and ultimately somewhat antiquated moral order which governed industrial development made it the most recognizably Victorian variant of all.

The South can only be termed *counter-Victorian* since, even at the end of the century, its key decision makers remained resolutely opposed to the modernizing influences of Victorian society. The abolition of slavery, one of the few lasting achievements of the Northern intervention, had been forced upon it. Whenever possible the New South reverted to a version of its older ways (for example in racial segregation) or, where this was impossible, attempted to absorb the inevitable change and minimize its social impact.

The two important peripheral regions chosen for close observation were therefore separated from the mainstream of middle and late nineteenth century urban America by fundamental discontinuities. It would perhaps be possible to demonstrate the

existence of similar levels of contrast in certain other regions. The variations found here can to some extent be accounted for in terms of such factors as remoteness, biased information flows, lack of markets, shortages of capital and perhaps labour, and low innovative capacities. But these are merely the measurable aspects of a complicated set of interacting social processes. The path towards industrialization taken by each region was no more determined by such factors than by the nature of its own enduring traditions.

METHODOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

The main aim of this essay has been to argue for the existence of several varieties of urbanism in middle and late nineteenth century North America, and to examine how two cases deviated from the mainstream of events. Some brief comments may now be made in closing on the methodological significance of the conclusions. Little more need be said to underline the futility of attempting to understand these regional variants purely in terms of models conceived within an inheritance of hyper-Victorianism. There is much in Goheen's monograph and in Goldfield's work on Virginia which is illuminating and absorbing, but their implied dependence on the notion of a universal set of consequences for industrial urbanization has the effect of limiting, not enhancing, the degree of insight. The contribution of these authors to our understanding of urban processes in their respective regions is made in spite of, rather than because of, the conceptual frameworks which govern their analyses.

The more important question is that of suggesting an alternative and more satisfactory approach. One which immediately presents itself is the Marxist, since much of the revisionist history reviewed earlier reflects to a greater or lesser degree Marxist perspectives. Indeed, the Marxist literature has been highly effective in challenging earlier assumptions. In its ability to dissect the implications of capitalism, in its refusal to be content with the superficial or the technical as substitutes for explanation, in its exposure of ideology in other interpretations, and in its insistence on the use of an integrated and comparative framework, the Marxist critique is invaluable. On the other hand, the Marxist approach seems as yet unequal to the task of furthering our insight much beyond current levels. First, it is too self-limiting. While the regional variations described earlier owe much to class inter-relationships, other factors such as race, ethnicity and religion are not readily reduced to the status of dependent variables. Regional ideologies transcend class boundaries, and the regional moral order is not done justice if regarded as merely part of a superstructure which rests upon a particular mode of production. Secondly, while invaluable in a critical capacity, it is debatable whether the Marxist approach is able to provide a real alternative to those frameworks which it dismisses.[101] The very inadequacy of conventional urban theory in an historical context has sometimes made a Marxist mode of analysis seem a better alternative than it really is. Thirdly, one detects in much

Marxist writing a failure to appreciate the degree to which its own position, even where intended purely as a method of analysis, is fundamentally ideological in nature.

It is, then, no solution simply to substitute one paradigm for another. We need, while re-affirming the importance of ideology *in* the past, to retreat from ideological interpretations *of* the past. Views of the past have their own fascination, and the New South view, the Canadian nationalist view, even Arnold Toynbee's view, can each contribute a degree of insight into the social context within which they were conceived. But our ultimate goal, as J. H. Plumb suggests, is not to create a view of the past but to arrive at a history which has to a large extent freed itself from the past.[102] This is somewhing which no ideological interpretation of the past is likely to attain.

The necessary refinement required by the framework outlined above is more likely to be achieved within traditions which are long standing within geography. Cultural-historical geographers have, for a generation and more, dealt rather unselfconsciously with such themes as values, perception, motivation and culture (in addition to the more overtly 'geographic' themes such as social ecology, landscape, and environment). Yet all too often when they have come to the city boundary they have, especially in North America, deferred to a different speciality and an unnecessarily alien set of concepts. The way to a full understanding of the varieties of Victorian urbanization lies in emulating within the city some of the best of the work of the cultural-historical geographers.[103]

The nineteenth century was indeed an 'age of great cities', but it was also an age of great and conflicting ideologies, even in North America. The contrasts were not always as neatly expressed in spatial terms as implied in the highly generalized outline suggested above. But the identification of regional variants will have served its purpose if it succeeds in highlighting the fact that nineteenth century industrial urbanization did not everywhere in North America transcend the cultural environment and refashion it in an urban form. Within the various regions urban processes cannot be fully understood except in the context of a set of enduring moral orders. This was as true at the turn of the century as it had been at the beginning of the Victorian era over sixty years before.

FOOTNOTES

1. Gertrude Himmelfarb, *Victorian Minds* (Gloucester, Mass., 1975) 277; Hilary and Mary Evans, *The Victorians* (Newton Abbot, 1973). 'The bourgeois system of values went beyond class boundaries. It crept by osmosis into a goodly part of the upper class.' Also, 'the middle class through its power to make laws and exert social pressure, imposed the code from above' (on to the working class); Richard D. Altick, *Victorian People and Ideas* (New York, 1973) 240-1.

2. For example Morse Peckham, 'Victorian Counterculture' *Victorian Studies* 18 (1975) 257-276.

3. Martin J. Wiener, *English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980* (Cambridge, 1981).

4. G. M. Young's classic account regards true Victorian ideas as dominating only between 1845 and 1860; G. M. Young, *Victorian England: Portrait of an Age* (2nd ed.) (Oxford, 1953). Houghton defines the Victorian era proper as stretching from 1830 to 1870, being followed by an age better described as Late Victorian; Walter E. Houghton, *The Victorian Frame of Mind* (New Haven, Conn., 1957).

5. For example, James Morris, *Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire* (London, 1968) is a remarkable cross-section of Britain and the Empire in about 1897.

6. Arnold J. Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial* (New York, 1948) 6.

7. Ibid. 18-20; also Philip and Arnold Toynbee *Comparing Notes* (London, 1963) 114.

8. C. Vann Woodward, 'The Irony of Southern History' *Journal of Southern History* 19 (1953) 3-19.

9. This is more generally true of Canadian cities even, as James Morris (op.cit.) suggested, those of Quebec. Similarly, when in 1875 Alexander Mackenzie used the familiar phrase 'More British than Britain', he applied it (in true Ontario fashion perhaps) to Canada as a whole. Nevertheless Canada is above all else a land of contrasting regions and most of the later discussion will be most relevant to Southern Ontario.

10. Rupert Brooke, *Letters from America* (London, 1931) 124. The Canadian House of Commons contributed the phrase 'splendid isolation' to describe British foreign policy; like so many other useful commodities it was exported and became the property of the Mother country. Christopher Howard, *Splendid Isolation* (London, 1967) 14-20.

11. The *Official Programme* June 22, 1897, Toronto City Hall Archives, contains a long list of activities including parades, bonfires, a yacht regatta and fireworks. At the same time in London the Canadian Prime Minister, Wilfrid Laurier, was knighted by the Queen immediately before the procession to St. Paul's.

12. For example, G.M. Trevelyan, *English Social History* (London, 1942).

13. Asa Briggs, *Victorian Cities* (London, 1963).

14. H. J. Dyos, *Victorian Suburb* (Leicester, 1961).

15. E. P. Thompson, 'Time, Work Discipline, and Industrial Capitalism' *Past and Present* 38 (1967) 97.

16. Sam Bass Warner, *The Private City: Philadelphia in Three Periods of its Growth* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

17. Stephan Thernstrom, *Poverty and Progress: Social Mobility in a Nineteenth Century City* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964). There is a substantial literature in urban sociology which insists on the importance of persistent class differentiation in American society. See, for example, William M. Dobriner, *Class in Suburbia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963). Most of the sociological literature is lacking in historical perspective.

18. For example Virginia Yans-McLaughlin, *Family and Community: Italian immigrants in Buffalo, 1880-1930* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1977).

19. H. Marshall McLuhan, 'Edgar Poe's Tradition' *Sewanee Review* 52 (1944) 27-8. See also Jonathan Miller, *McLuhan* (London, 1971) 84-5.

20. Raimondo Luraghi, *The Rise and Fall of the Plantation South* (New York, 1978).

21. Quoted in Paul M. Gaston, *The New South Creed* (New York, 1970) 96.

22. Geoffrey Hawthorn, *Enlightenment and Despair* (Cambridge, 1976).

23. Carl O. Sauer, 'Forward to Historical Geography' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 21 (1941) 1-24.

24. John Fraser Hart, 'The Middle West' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 62 (1972) 258-282. Some perceptive comments on attitudes in American urban geography are contained in: Lutz Holzner, 'The Role of History and Tradition in the Urban Geography of West Germany' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 60 (197) 315-339.

25. Sam Bass Warner, 'If all the World were Philadelphia: A Scaffolding for Urban History, 1774-1930' *American Historical Review* 74 (1968) 26-43; and *The Urban Wilderness* (New York, 1972).

26. John Higham, 'Hanging Together: Divergent Unities in American History' *Journal of American History* 61 (1974) 5-28 discusses the contrasts between consensus and community historians.

27. John Higham, 'Immigration' in C. Vann Woodward (ed.), *The Comparative Approach to American History* (New York, 1968) 91-105; quotation on 103.

28. A good example of unilinear thinking is Berry's account of urban development in Iowa. G. J. L. Berry, *Geography of Market Centers and Retail Distribution* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1967).

29. For example Michael P. Conzen, 'A Transport Interpretation of the Growth of Urban Regons: an American Example' *Journal of Historical Geography* 1 (1975) 361-382; Edward K. Muller, 'Regional Urbanization and the Selective Growth of Towns in North American Regions' *Journal of Historical Geography* 3 (1977) 21-39. A recent review by Conzen provides a

fuller view of the development of urban subsystems in the nineteenth century U.S. than any account previously available 'The American Urban System in the Nineteenth Century' in D. T. Herbert and R. J. Johnston (eds.), *Geography and the Urban Environment,* Vol. 4 (Chichester, 1981) 295-347.

30. Such a general assessment inevitably ignores the existence of research which runs counter to these trends. One obvious case is Vance's regional differentiation on the basis of urban morphogenesis. James E. Vance, Jr., *This Scene of Man* (New York, 1977).

31. D. Creighton, *The Empire of the St. Lawrence* (Toronto, 1956); George A. Nader, *Cities of Canada* (Toronto, 1975), Vol.1 201-214.

32. R.T. Naylor, *The History of Canadian Business 1867-1914* Vol.1 (Toronto, 1975).

33. L. D. McCann, 'Staples and the New Industrialism in the Growth Post-Confederation Halifax' *Acadiensis* 8 (1979) 47-79.

34. C. F. J. Whebell, 'Corridors: A Theory of Urban Systems' *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 59 (1969) 1-26.

35. S. M. Lipset, quoted in Allan Smith 'The Myth of the Self-made Man in English Canada' *Canadian Historical Review* 59 (1978) 190.

36. Smith, *op.cit.* 189-219.

37. Michael Bliss, *A Living Profit* (Toronto, 1972).

38. Michael Bliss, *A Canadian Millionaire* (Toronto, 1978).

39. Quoted in George Feaver, 'The Webbs in Canada: Fabian Pilgrims on the Canadian Frontier' *Canadian Historical Review* 58 (1977) 275.

40. J. W. Simmons, 'Canada as an Urban System: A Conceptual Framework', Centre for Urban and Community Studies, University of Toronto, Research Paper No.62 (1974).

41. Gerald M. Craig, *Upper Canada: The Formative Years, 1784-1841* (Toronto, 1963) 110.

42. There is a wealth of behaviour patterns which may have geographical relevance; for example the exploits of the Denison family (David Gagan, *The Denison Family of Toronto* 1973) and Egerton Ryerson's ban on U.S. textbooks in Ontario schools (including Morse's Geography) because they were potentially subversive; J. G. Hodgins, *Historical and Other Papers Illustrative of the Educational Systems in Ontario, 1958-1876* (Toronto, 1911) 44-45.

43. R. Cole Harris and John Warkentin, *Canada Before Confederation* (New York, 1974) 114.

44. Peter G. Goheen, *Victorian Toronto: 1850 to 1900* (University of Chicago, Department of Geography Research Paper No.127, 1970).

45. Stephan Thernstrom, *Poverty and Progress* (Cambridge, Mass., 1964); Sam Bass Warner, *The Private City, op.cit.*

46. Robert E. Park, 'The Urban Community as a Spatial Pattern and a Moral Order' in E. W. Burgess (ed), *The Urban Community* (Chicago, 1926).

47. Eshref Shevky and Marilyn Williams, *The Social Areas of Los Angeles* (Berkeley, Calif., 1949). As indicated in Figure 1, the linkage between Social Area Analysis and Park's concept of natural area relies upon the work of Peter Orleans 'Robert Park and Social Area Analysis', *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 1 (1966) 5-19, and Scott Greer, *The Emerging City: Myth and Reality* (New York, 1962). The linkage back to late nineteenth century developments relies on the observations of contemporary observers, particularly the parallels between Park's Chicago, and London as seen by Charles Booth at the turn of the century; Charles Booth, *Life and Labour of the People in London* (London, 1902-3).

48. Bliss, *A Canadian Millionaire, op.cit.* 7. The epithet 'Hogtown', applied to Toronto, originated in rural Ontario and was intended more as a commentary on the city's inhabitants than on its economic base. The duality of this image does not detract from its usefulness in characterizing one version of 'life in the big city'. Indeed, in the Chicago case the same duality was used with great effect by Rudyard Kipling, Upton Sinclair and others.

49. Goheen, *op.cit.* 57.

50. Census of Canada 1891, Vol.1, 282-3 and 348-9.

51. C.F.J. Whebell, 'Robert Baldwin and Decentralization 1841-9' in F.H. Armstrong, H.A. Stevenson and J.D. Wilson (eds.), *Aspects of Nineteenth Century Ontario* (Toronto, 1974) 48-64.

52. J.M.S. Careless, 'Some Aspects of Urbanization in Nineteenth Century Ontario' in Armstrong et al. *op. cit.* 74.

53. *Ibid.* 68.

54. Walter Firey, *Land Use in Central Boston* (Cambridge, Mass., 1947).

55. Walter Van Nus, 'The Fate of City Beautiful Thought in Canada, 1893-1930' in Gilbert A. Stelter and Alan F.J. Artibise *The Canadian City* (Toronto, 1977).

56. Elwood Jones and Douglas McCalla, 'Toronto Waterworks, 1840-77: Continuity and Change in Nineteenth-Century Toronto Politics' *Canadian Historical Review* 60 (1979) 300-323.

57. A. J. Krim, 'The Innovation and Diffusion of the Street Railway in North America', unpublished M.A. Thesis, Department of Geography, University of Chicago, 1967.

58. Donald F. Davis, 'Mass Transit and Private Ownership: An Alternative Psrspective on the Case of Toronto' *Urban History Review* 3 (1978) 60-98.

59. Michael J. Doucet, 'Mass Transit and the Failure of Private Ownership: The Case of Toronto in the Early Twentieth Century', *Urban History Review* 3 (1977) 3-33.

60. Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, *'The Revenge of the Methodist Bicycle Company* (Toronto, 1977).

61. The contrast between these two cities is examined in: David Ward, 'A Comparative Historical Geography of Streetcar Suburbs in Boston, Massachusetts and Leeds, England' *Annals of American Geographers* 54 (1964) 477-489.

62. Douglass C. North, *The Economic Growth of the United States: 1790-1850* (New York, 1966).

63. Rupert B. Vance, *Human Geography of the South* (Chapel Hill, 1932) 467-481.

64. William H. Nicholls, *Southern Tradition and Regional Progress* (Chapel Hill, 1960) 20.

65. Eugene D. Genovese, *The Political Economy of Slavery* (New York, 1965).

66. Of numerous authors who make this point, perhaps the most celebrated is Clemont Eaton, *The Mind of the South* (Baton Rouge, 1964) and especially *Freedom of Thought in the Old South* (New York, 1951).

67. C. Vann Woodward, *Origins of the New South* (Baton Rouge, 1951).

68. Nicholls, *op. cit.*

69. Leonard Reissman, 'Social Development in the American South' *Journal of Social Issues* 22 (1966) 101-116.

70. John P. Radford, 'Culture, Economy and Urban Structures in Charleston, South Carolina', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Clark University (1974) 220-229.

71. Peggy Lamson, *The Glorious Failure* (New York, 1973); Martin Abbott, *The Freedmen's Bureau in South Carolina: 1865-1872* (Chapel Hill, 1967). Recent evidence on Charleston strongly supports the view of late nineteenth century continuity; see Don H. Doyle, 'Leadership and Decline in Postwar Charleston, 1865-1910', in Walter J. Fraser and Winfred B. Moore (eds.), *From the Old South to the New* (Westport, Conn., 1981) 93-106.

72. William J. Cooper, Jr., *The Conservative Regime: South Carolina, 1877-1890* (Baltimore, 1968).

73. Jonathan M. Wiener, *Social Origins of the New South: Alabama, 1860-1885* (Baton Rouge, 1978).

74. Dwight B. Billings, Jr., *Planters and the Making of a 'New South'* (Chapel Hill, 1979).

75. Lester Salamon, *The Social Origins of Mississippi Backwardness* (Bloomington, 1980).

76. Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston, 1966).

77. Wiener, *op. cit.* 194-204.

78. Wiener, *op. cit.* 184.

79. David R. Goldfield, 'Pursuing the American Dream: Cities in the Old South' in Blaine A. Brownell and David R. Goldfield *The City in Southern History* (Port Washington, N.Y., 1977) 52-91; and *Urban Growth in an Age of Sectionalism: Virginia 1847-1861* (Baton Rouge, 1977).

80. Goldfield, *Urban Growth in an Age of Sectionalism,* op.cit. 283.

81. Blaine A. Brownell, *The Urban Ethos in the South, 1920-1930* (Baton Rouge, 1975).

82. Remarks by Don Carter at the Citadel Conference on the South, Charleston, South Carolina, April 1979. Carter's paper is published in Fraser and Moore, *op. cit.* 23-32.

83. W. J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (New York, 1941) 183-189.

84. *Ibid.* 270-273,

85. C. Vann Woodward, *American Counterpoint* (Boston, 1964).

86. George L. Maddox and Joseph F. Fichter, 'Religion and Social Change in the South', *Journal of Social Issues* 22 (1966) 44-58.

87. Michael O'Brien, *The Idea of the American South, 1920-1941* (Baltimore, 1979) 5.

88. Edd Winfield Parks, 'Southern Towns and Cities' in W.T. Couch (ed.) *Culture in the South* (Chapel Hill, 1935) 501-518; quotation on 513.

89. Wiener, *op. cit.* 162-185. Rabinowitz has entered a much less radical interpretation of Southern urbanization between 1860 and 1900, which nevertheless stresses continuity rather than change; Howard N. Rabinowitz, 'Continuity and Change: Southern Urban Development, 1860-1900' in Brownell and Goldfield *op. cit.* 92-122.

90. Quoted in Edward Alexander, *Matthew Arnold and John Stuart Mill* (London, 1965) 225.

91. *Ibid.*

92. Daniel Walker Howe, 'Victorian Culture in America', in *Victorian America* ed G. Blodgett et al. (Philadelphia, 1976), 3-28. Quotation on 4.

93. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, 'A Meaning for Turner's Frontier' *Political Science Quarterly* 69 (1954) 321-355.

94. *Ibid.* 343-4.

95. *Ibid.* 349.

96. These would not, however, represent the preferred methods of analysis. For example, the transitional experiences of industrialization are better illuminated in an approach such as that represented by Herbert G. Gutman 'Work Culture and Society in Industrializing America, 1815-1919', *American Historical Review* 78 (1973) 531-587. Marxist viewpoints have done much to expose the inadequacy of existing urban theory; for example Manuel Castells 'Is there an Urban Sociology?' in C.G. Pickvance, *Urban Sociology: Critical Essays* (London, 1976) 33-59.

97. This tendency is strongly represented in the human ecology literature.

98. William L. Kolb, 'The Social Structure and Functions of Cities', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 3 (1954) 30-46.

99. Some Southern planters had summer homes in Southern Ontario; a few settled there rather than take the oath of allegiance to the U.S. after the Civil War. The Denisons in Toronto were attracted to the South, and the region has continued to influence Canadian writers; J.R. Struthers, 'Alice Munro and the American South', *Canadian Review of American Studies* 6 (1975) 196-204.

100. The phase owes much to Eric Foner 'The Causes of the Civil War: Recent Interpretations and New Directions', *Civil War History,* 20 (1974) 197-214.

101. In Walker's 'suburban solution', for example, a much improved or even very different insight from Vance's upper and middle class 'abandonment'? Richard A. Walker 'The Transformation of Urban Structure in the Nineteenth Century and the Beginning of Suburbanization' in Kevin Cox, *Urbanization and Conflict in Market Societies* (Chicago, 1978) 165-212; James E. Vance, Jr., 'California and the Search for the Ideal', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 62 (1972) 185-210; especially 186.

102. J. H. Plumb. *The Death of the Past* (Boston, 1970).

103. Much published work could be cited in this context. Joseph A. Ernst and H. Roy Merrens 'Camden's Turrets Pierce the Skies!': The Urban Process in the Southern Colonies During the Eighteenth Century', *The William and Mary Quarterly* ser. 3, 30 (1973) 549-574, make several points about the role of cities within southern society which remain valid throughout the nineteenth century. Some of D.W. Meinig's work has an urban component, notably 'The Mormon Culture Region: Strategies and Patterns in the Geography of the American West, 1847-1946', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 55 (1965) 191-220, and, less explicitly, *Imperial Texas* (Austin, 1969). Within Southern Ontario, Peter Ennals' case study of the inter-relationship between attitudes and urban growth is an example of a direction well worth pursuing; 'Cobourg and Port Hope: The Struggle for Control of the 'Back Country'' in J. David Wood (ed.)

Perspectives on Landscape and Settlement in Nineteenth Century Ontario (Toronto, 1975) 182-195. Houston and Smyth have shown convincingly that neither the towns nor the countryside of nineteenth century Southern Ontario can be understood without an appreciation of the influence of the Orange Order: Cecil J. Houston and William J. Smyth, *The Sash Canada Wore: A Historical Geography of the Orange Order in Canada* (Toronto, 1980), especially Chapters 3 and 5.

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

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