COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND THE COLONISATION OF QUEEN ADELAIDE PROVINCE, SOUTH AFRICA

Alan Lester

Number 34

HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY
RESEARCH SERIES

October 1998

HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY
RESEARCH SERIES No.34

COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND THE COLONISATION OF QUEEN ADELAIDE PROVINCE, SOUTH AFRICA

Alan Lester

St. Mary's University College, University of Surrey,
Waldegrave Road, Twickenham, TW1 4SX, UK

ISBN 1-87-0074-16-5

Table of Contents

Table of Figures and Maps

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Jo Nash for her constant support and encouragement.

Thanks also to Philip Howell and the anonymous referees for their comments.

COLONIAL DISCOURSE AND THE COLONISATION OF QUEEN ADELAIDE PROVINCE, SOUTH AFRICA

Figure 1. The Eastern Cape 1778-1865.



INTRODUCTION:
COLONIAL DISCOURSE

Queen Adelaide Province consisted of some 7,000 square miles of Xhosa territory annexed by the British Cape colonial government in May 1835 during a frontier war. The province was held only until the end of 1836 when it was abandoned under pressure from the imperial government. Nevertheless, it represented the first British attempt to extend direct colonial control over a large body of formerly independent Africans. No such ambitious scheme had ever been attempted before. In this study of the early nineteenth century British presence on the Cape frontier, of the administration of the province, and of the debates over its future, I attempt to contribute towards a more nuanced conception of British imperialism and of colonial discourse.

Geographers are acutely conscious of their discipline's collusion in imperial domination and exploitation. Recent research has uncovered many of the ways in which previous generations of geographers contributed to the expansion of European empires and reinforced their legitimation, particularly through late nineteenth and early twentieth century scientific racism.[1] Anthropologists have also become uncomfortably aware of their predecessors' contributions, but they tend to have been more active in using post-structuralist insights to reinterpret colonialism itself. Jean and John Comaroff and Ann Laura Stoler, for instance, not only expose the imperial complicity of their discipline but revise our understanding of the wider discursive field within which it operated.[2] Historical geographers, I believe, are well positioned to enhancethis revision by emphasising the critical spatial dimensions of colonial discourse. This study examines the interaction of various 'located'

British schemes for the colonisation of the Xhosa, paying particular attention to Queen Adelaide Province. In doing so it refines our understanding of the ways that colonial discourse was constructed through circuits of knowledge and power linking, as Anne McClintock puts it, 'tensions within metropolitan policy' to 'conflicts within colonial administrations'.[3]

In Edward Said's seminal postcolonial study of Orientalism, discourse is defined, through an application of Foucault, as a body of knowledge constituted through the authority of certain texts. Said argued that Western writers' texts on the 'Orient', 'purporting to contain knowledge about something actual', became imbued with authority from academics, institutions and governments. Through repetition,

> such texts can create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to describe. In time such knowledge and reality produce a tradition, or what Michel Foucault calls a discourse, whose material presence or weight, not the originality of a given author, is really responsible for the texts produced out of it.[4]

For Said, it was not only the 'Orient' that was shaped by this discourse. Through it, 'Europe' was also defining itself as something different. As Timothy Mitchell suggests, 'in order to determine itself as the place of order, reason, propriety, cleanliness, civilisation and power, it must represent outside itself what is irrational, disordered, dirty, libidinous, barbarian and cowed'. Europe requires this 'outside' 'in order to present itself, in order to constitute its singular, uncorrupted identity'.[5] Pursuing these insights further, some postcolonial theorists have concentrated on the historiographical dilemmas

involved in representing 'others', when even such representations constitute the exercise of power.[6] A larger group though, including Mitchell, have attempted to utilise Said's Foucauldian idea of discourse in further analyses of nineteenth century colonialism.

Mitchell associates Said's discourse of the Orient with late nineteenth century Parisian Exhibitions, in which other regions of the world were represented by artificial streets lined by 'authentic' facades and 'inhabited' by exotically dressed employees, for the entertainment and education of the public. For him, the European discourse of Orientalism was itself 'a vast theatre or exhibition of the real. Within this theatrical machinery, elaborate representations of the "objects" of colonial authority could be produced'.[7] Mitchell's analysis centres on the means by which this authority, based on a particular European conception of order, was imposed upon and insinuated within Egyptian society during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. For Mitchell, as for Said, discourse *representing* an 'external reality' was 'itself a mechanism of power'.[8] However, while the notion of discourse is a useful one, I wish to question applications such as those of Mitchell which treat it unproblematically as a unified field of European conception.[9]

In reality, there was no one European conception of order in the nineteenth century, no single representation of 'external reality', and no uncontested 'mechanism of power'. Such a unitary interpretation of discourse was never intended by Foucault himself. As Stoler points out, in his treatment of racial constitute its singular, uncorrupted identity'.[5] Pursuing these insights further, some postcolonial theorists have concentrated on the historiographical dilemmas involved in representing 'others', when even such representations

constitute the exercise of power.[6] A larger group though, including Mitchell, have attempted to utilise Said's Foucauldian idea of discourse in further analyses of nineteenth century colonialism.

Recent critiques of Said's *Orientalism* and some of the work inspired by it, have accordingly emphasised the need for differentiation. Lisa Lowe, for example, in exploring the heterogeneity within and between French and British representations of the 'Orient', holds that discourse describes a 'nexus of apparatuses that is not closed but open, not fixed but mobile, not dominant although it includes dominant formations'.[11] In this light, Paul Carter's analysis of the different uses to which 'Reason' was put by convicts and by those in authority over them in early colonial Australia, and James Duncan's study of competing Kandyan constructions of the landscape, can be seen as examples of contestation within discourses.[12] Stoler's examination of the boundaries which colonisers in the East Indies drew around themselves and between them and the colonised, similarly draws on a more nuanced conception of Foucault's work. Quoting his *Archaeology of Knowledge*, she emphasises 'the dispersion of the points of choice that the discourse leaves free ... the different possibilities that it opens of reanimating already existing themes, of arousing opposed strategies, of giving way to irreconcilable interests, of making it possible, with a particular set of concepts, to play different games'.[13] Colonial discourse could contain 'competing agendas for using power, competing strategies for maintaining control and doubts about the legitimacy of the venture'.[14]

The notion of colonial discourse which informs this study is one that allows for, indeed highlights, such different and often conflicting 'games'. It thus

seeks to avoid falling into the common trap of colonial discourse analysis identified by the historian John MacKenzie. MacKenzie argues that the notion of imperialism which characterises many postcolonial accounts is merely 'a generalised concept inadequately rooted in the ... facts, lacking historical dynamic, innocent of imperial theory or the ... varieties of economic and political relationships'.[15]

My conception of British colonial discourse does involve a general vocabulary of racial difference which was shared between colonial interests, and which spanned the spaces of British colonialism during the nineteenth century. Africans for instance, were positioned by all British interests below Europeans on a scale of 'civilisation'. Their 'heathenism' was universally regretted or condemned and the necessity for some form of British intervention if their 'improvement' was to be brought about, was universally identified. However, I seek to show that such a vocabulary of difference could be used in flexible and heterogeneous ways, and towards competing economic and political ends. The struggles which I trace between imperial and colonial officials, liberal, reformist humanitarians, and capitalist settlers over the meaning and purpose of colonising the Xhosa illustrate a plurality of colonial projects or, in John Comaroff's phrase, 'models of colonialism'.[16] Officials, humanitarians and settlers were effectively writing frontier space in different ways.[17] In this scheme, much of the ambivalence which Homi Bhabha finds within colonial discourse as a whole (and which he discusses so ambiguously) can be ascribed to the competition between differently situated political interests. Thus Africans were seen as both savage and servile, sexually insatiable and childishly innocent, simple-minded and cunning, partly because they were so constructed by differentiated colonial groups.[18]

However, while political struggles rendered colonial discourse more ambivalent, they could also be resolved in certain ways. I wish to argue that the contests between officials, humanitarians and settlers in the early nineteenth century Cape, together with similar contests in other colonies, ultimately informed a more coherent construction of racial difference, both in those colonies and in Britain. A broad late nineteenth century consensus on 'race' was, as Duncan puts it in a different context, 'the product of an unequal power struggle within which one group [lost] its "voice"'.[19] The 'losing' interest was early nineteenth century liberal humanitarianism, although as we shall see, it did not so much lose its voice as change its tune. Responding to their own, increasingly manifest contradictions, and to external assaults from groups in the colonies and the metropolis, liberals switched during the mid-nineteenth century to a new refrain of utilitarian political economy. The humanitarians' 'loss' was the settlers' gain. Their victory within the colonial body politic contributed to the suppression of some aspects of colonial 'knowledge' and the dominance of others. The once popular and powerful humanitarian idea of the 'salvageability' of 'backward races' was refashioned by the settlers' victory. Instead, their own notion of indigenous 'irreclaimability', forged on particular margins of empire through direct conflict, was imbued with a new and a more universal significance. Political contests between various, and variously situated, colonial interests could thus help restrict the range of debate within colonial discourse.

The significance of political competition between interests at various sites within empire has been overlooked in much of the more theoretical, and especially literary, postcolonial work. This often implies that discourse on racial difference has an ahistorical, and even an aspatial political content.[20]

The 'theoretical excesses' of such approaches have been pointed out by those with a more thorough empirical grounding in various aspects of imperialism.[21] The frequent postcolonial omission of spatiality is, however, rectified in the work of some historical anthropologists and historians, who pay close attention to contestation between situated groups. In particular, they have examined the transactions which took place between colony and metropole, suggesting that they were critical in the reformulation of thought and action at both sites. Stoler, for instance, emphasises the connections between metropolitan bourgeois sexuality and the shifting colonial politics of race, while other studies reveal the articulation between metropolises and colonies in architectural, industrial and family formations.[22] Linda Colley argues that British identity itself was a reaction to 'otherness' encountered and transmitted to the populace not only in Britain's continental wars, but also within the imperial periphery, and both Stoler and Cooper and Shula Marks suggest that the very 'inclusions and exclusions built into [metropolitan] ... notions of citizenship, sovereignty and participation' were influenced by colonial social boundaries.[23]

In this book I seek to take account of this transfer of 'knowledge' across the spaces of empire, treating colony and metropole, as Stoler and Cooper suggest, 'in a single analytic field'.[24] In doing so I also want to further Lowe's complementary theoretical agenda, in which 'discursive terrains' are conceived as 'spatial and ... composed of a variety of differently inscribed and imagined locations'. Building on Foucault's concept of 'heterotopicality', Lowe outlines a theory of interaction which relates well to the imperial transactions studied more empirically by the historians and anthropologists. While her analysis centres on postcolonial literary discourse, nineteenth century colonial

discourse can be described just as well as one in which 'articulations and rearticulations emerge from a variety of positions and sites'.[25]

The focus of this account is on contestation between colonising groups on the Cape frontier and in Britain, but those groups' more obvious encounter with indigenous agency cannot be overlooked. Postcolonial works such as those of the Subaltern Studies Group have analysed the textual 'resistance' of the colonised in so far as it affects the canonical literature and historiography of the West, and Ashis Nandy and Homi Bhabha have indicated ways in which colonial discourse's ambivalence opens spaces for verbal and written subversion.[26] But this approach to resistance is limiting. As Anne McClintock puts it, 'seeking only the fissures of formal ambivalence (hybridity, ambiguity, undecidability and so on) cannot ... explain the rise to dominance of certain groups or cultures, nor the dereliction and obliteration of others'.[27] Indigenous responses, which were themselves multifaceted, did more than simply inform the legacies and exploit the paradoxes of colonial discourse, they were also constitutive of the manifest power relations which informed that discourse.

Xhosa warfare, non-compliance, compromise and/or collaboration both shaped concrete, long-term colonial outcomes such as land distribution and administrative systems, and also contributed to the refashioning of wider colonial thought. Locked in struggle over the purpose of their colonial presence, British humanitarians, officials and settlers constructed different representations of Xhosa responses. Their constructions in turn became the sites of further political struggle, resulting in the dominance of some representations and the suppression of others. In particular, it was officials'

and settlers' constructions of persistent Xhosa resistance which provided raw material for a later, more aggressive imperialism. In the brief discussion which is possible here, it is not my intention to write the history of colonisation in the Cape from any particular Xhosa perspective, nor to pay close attention to the strategies of resistance and compromise which diverse Xhosa groupings adopted. But I do hope to outline some of the ways in which Xhosa activities informed and modified colonial perspectives, activities and outcomes, thus further extending our conception of 'the fields of force in which imperial culture was conceived'.[28]

Part One of this account introduces official, humanitarian and settler approaches to the colonisation of the Xhosa. It deals with the period between 1806, when the Cape was taken by Britain, and 1834, when the critical frontier war which gave rise to Queen Adelaide Province was being fought. In Part Two these approaches are examined in more empirical detail. Discussion of the colonial debates over, and administrative practice within the province leads on to an investigation of the changing terms of colonial discourse within the wider mid-nineteenth century empire.

Figure 2. Cruickshank's satirical cartoon on the fate awaiting British emigrants to the Cape, 1819.

PART ONE

APPROACHES TO THE FRONTIER, 1806-1835

1. Cape Officials

The Cape Colony was seized by the British government in 1806 as part of a grander wartime strategy. Cape Town was the most significant port on the sea route to India, and it was considered vital that the rulers of the Batavian Republic in Holland did not hand the colony to Napoleon's forces. Officials in the British War and Colonial Office were interested only the critical harbours of the Western Cape and the hinterlands necessary for their subsistence, but they inherited a more dispersed pattern of Dutch colonial settlement. Since the late seventeenth century, a colonial population later described by James Stephen, Permanent Secretary at the Colonial Office, as being equivalent only to that of 'one of the second rate towns in England',[1] had conquered territory extending some 200 miles to the north and 400 miles to the east of Cape Town. While the British government had little desire to extend a costly administration over its new colonial subjects, its officials posted to the Cape would soon become embroiled in conflicts on the colony's remote eastern border.

Cape colonial society had been created under the Dutch East India Company through the institution of slavery and the subjugation of the indigenous Khoikhoi and Bushmen.[2] Slaves and Khoikhoi servants were ordered according to the patriarchal relationships which regulated family life within the colonial home, but with an array of legal sanctions to bolster the master's authority.[3] On the eastern margins of the colony though, sparsely settled frontier farmers had proved unable to exercise such domination over a long established Xhosa-speaking population. Competition over grazing land between the Sundays and Fish Rivers had instead left colonial farms scattered among independent Xhosa chiefdoms. Early relationships between frontier

colonists and local Xhosa consisted for the most part of trade, labour service and sexual interaction, but as colonial settlement and pressure on the land increased during the late eighteenth century, such regular intercourse was punctuated by three major frontier wars.[4]

Struggles over grazing land provided the primary 'motor' of continuing instability in this zone throughout the early nineteenth century. On the one hand, colonists had established a tradition of expansion through their conquest of the Western Cape. Relocation to the frontier had long been a means by which those lacking in capital could acquire land, and with a high population growth rate, it was customary that each male generation would eventually move off to claim its own farms.[5] Despite their relative isolation, frontier farmers were tied firmly into a petty commodity exchange and production network extending from Cape Town. Exclusive access to grazing land provided the economic resources, notably supplies of beef, which connected them to this system and allowed them to procure guns, ammunition, soap, coffee and the other necessities of what they considered a 'civilised' existence.[6]

On the other hand, the Xhosa too had a custom of generational expansion onto new lands as men founded their own homesteads (kraals) upon marriage. Through a progressive advance involving the conquest and absorption of Khoikhoi and Bushman groups, Nguni-speaking polities, of which the Xhosa were a part, had settled in the region from about 400 AD. However, during the late eighteenth century their established dynamic of westward expansion was exacerbated by political fission among ruling groups. While the paramount Gcaleka house remained located to the east of the Kei River, a new Rarabe section of the ruling house was established to the west.[7] Unlike the colonists,

the Xhosa conceived of no individual and exclusive rights to the ownership of land, but traditions of occupation nevertheless tied certain chiefdoms to particular territories. Chiefly authority was sustained by the prerogative of allocating arable land to dependent kraals, and further communal access to broad swathes of grazing land was essential for the reproduction of a cattle-based political economy.

When colonists did succeed in dispossessing Xhosa kraals, they generally paid a heavy price. As the British missionary Henry Calderwood later explained, 'no argument can convince [the Xhosa] that it is either just or reasonable to take their land from them'.[8] Long after they had seized land and settled upon it, frontier colonists found themselves subjected to a continuous round of cattle raids. While some Xhosa remained to work on colonial farms, bands of Xhosa warriors would steal cattle from them, partly in retribution for lost land and partly as an efficient means of accumulating wealth. It was the colonists' complaints about these incessant 'depredations' which brought the early British governors' attention to bear on the frontier.

During the first three decades of the nineteenth century, all of the autocratic governors appointed to the Cape had military backgrounds and most had served under Wellington in the Peninsular campaign or at Waterloo. These men received their administrative appointments in much the same way as they had obtained their military commissions, through their ability to exploit aristocratic networks of patronage. Their approach to the problems of the eastern Cape frontier was a consistent one, paralleling their class's response to mounting challenges within Britain. The overriding goals, both at 'home' and in the colonies, were the immediate protection of the social order and,

thereafter, the maintenance of stability. In the Cape in particular, officials wished to safeguard that order at minimal cost to the British exchequer. Governors' reputations as efficient administrators depended largely on their ability to avoid, as James Stephen put it, 'endless expense without compensatory returns'.[9] The problem for the military governors though, was that their concept of order was based implicitly upon neat and discrete 'national' boundaries. As Governor Sir John Cradock admitted, 'I can only reason and act upon such general [European] principles as will apply to every case of the present nature', and this meant, in the case of the eastern Cape frontier, that 'British territory' must be maintained 'inviolate ... resisting under any pretence the inroads ... of any neighbouring state'.[10] The impression of a disorderly frontier zone requiring official intervention, was an inevitable consequence of this ontology.[11]

Sharing the desire of the previous Dutch government for a block on further, 'messy' colonial advance, the early British governors pursued the same strategy. A border between colony and Xhosa had been fixed by the Dutch at the Fish River in a treaty reached in the late eighteenth century with the Xhosa chief Ngqika. Neither colonists nor Xhosa were to cross this river without the consent of their respective authorities. The Earl of Caledon, appointed Governor in 1807, adopted the treaty as the best measure for stamping out Xhosa raiding, or as he described it, 'trifling depredations committed by wandering caffres'.[12] Official dictat, however, rarely prevailed at the margins of the colony. Chiefs who were only nominally subordinate to Ngqika and were already located to the west of the Fish River refused to recognise the treaty, and land-hungry colonists who traded with or employed frontier Xhosa had never abided by the Dutch authorities' stipulations against cross-border interaction.

Neither would either party abide by the British proclamations. In reality, as an earlier English visitor had remarked, 'Caffres' were still 'to be found living with the Dutch'.[13]

Overlooking the more mundane patterns of frontier communication and economic interaction, British governors remained preoccupied with the threat to 'order' entailed in Xhosa cattle raiding, and tried to construct the frontier as a more coherent line of separation. Popular representations of Africans in Britain during the early nineteenth century, as we shall see below, were contested, but the most enduring and deepest reservoir of images had come from travellers and slavers, visiting the West African coast over the preceding two centuries. In their tales, the sensational and the degrading were emphasised. West Africans were held up in many respects as the antithesis of Britons: disorderly, licentious and savage.[14] In the face of apparently perpetual 'theft' along the frontier, Caledon's successor, Cradock was easily persuaded that such characteristics could be extrapolated to the Xhosa. He became convinced that they were imbued with a fundamental 'spirit of depredation' and a 'thirst for plunder and other savage passions'.[15] Given this, Cradock explained, 'it should be our invariable object to establish the separation from them, as intercourse can never subsist to the advantage of one party, or the other'.[16]

If the British proclamation of a discrete frontier line was to be enforced, two decisive actions were necessary. First, an expulsion of those Xhosa residing within 'colonial' territory, carried out so as to instil a 'proper degree of terror and respect',[17] and secondly, the more vigilant defence of the newly secured border. Throughout the first half of the century, British officials would continue to conceive of the frontier in such strategic terms, the ideal border

being 'a large unfordable river running through the country with unlimited visibility and no prospects for concealment'.[18] The first step towards this more decisive and militarily-informed frontier policy was taken in 1809, when the minor westernmost chiefdoms and Xhosa farm labourers were driven east across the Sundays River. A more substantial and violent 'clearance' took place in 1812, when British, colonial and Khoikhoi troops concentrated on 'destroying kraals, laying waste ... gardens and fields', shooting resisters and driving survivors, mostly from the large Ndlambe chiefdom, across the Fish River.[19]

If Cradock had understood contemporary Xhosa politics better, he would have realised that the expulsion of the Ndlambe would only exacerbate the raiding of colonial farms. Ndlambe's followers were now ejected onto the territory of Ngqika, Ndlambe's nephew and rival for paramountcy over the Rarabe Xhosa. Competition for land on the eastern side of the Fish River resulted not only in intensified raiding between these chiefdoms, but also in increased incursions by warriors from both chiefdoms against the colony.[20] When Lord Charles Somerset, a High Tory reactionary and descendent of the Plantagenets, arrived to take over the administration of the Cape in 1814, he inherited the same problem as his predecessors: an eastern frontier that simply refused to be rendered 'orderly'.

Somerset was the first governor to depart from a strictly separationist policy, although he continued to think of the frontier in predominantly strategic terms. After 1816, his strategy combined two principles. On the one hand, like his predecessor, he intended protecting the colonial border, consolidating it as the barrier against Xhosa 'depredation'. But on the other hand, in the wake of the

recent Ndlambe expulsion, Somerset hoped that the frontier Xhosa might be made more amenable to long term cultural transformation. For the first time, there was an official intention to protect and consolidate the colonial order not only by sealing off its margins from Xhosa 'depredation', but simultaneously by neutralising the Xhosa 'otherness' which was so threatening to that order. Somerset held that

> So long as the habits of savages remain unbroken the colony will ... be exposed to the changes incident to the fickleness of that character ... That the most beneficial result may be expected in due time from [an] attempt [at Xhosa civilisation], I do not permit myself to doubt, but ... this system is not solely to be trusted ... it is essential that it should be supported by that prudential strength which shall tend to overawe the restlessness of our hostile and wily neighbours.[21]

The more effective sealing of the frontier would be achieved through denser colonial settlement of the lands abutting the Fish River. The region would thus be filled with 'men superior beyond comparison to those savages who have plundered [the colonists] so grievously and rendered their abode there irksome and unprofitable'.[22] The gradual cultivation of the Xhosa as more docile neighbours was to be achieved by two means. First, missionaries were permitted to introduce 'agriculture and civilization' to frontier chiefs.[23] Secondly, Ngqika, was to be accorded a special status in the expectation that he would control further Xhosa 'outrages' against the colonists. Contradicting the prohibition on intercourse across the frontier line, Ngqika and his followers were given access to the military garrison at Graham's Town for trade. Through

such interactions, Somerset hoped that 'civilization and its consequences may be introduced into countries hitherto barbarous and unexplored'.[24]

Somerset, however, soon found that if the Xhosa could not be prevented from raiding through expulsion, neither could their political order be controlled from without. In 1819, the colonial ally Ngqika was overthrown by Ndlambe. Colonial intervention to restore Ngqika prompted Ndlambe's attack on Graham's Town, in which the garrison was saved only by the timely arrival of Khoikhoi troops. The battle convinced the governor that more effective measures were needed to protect the colonial margins during the interval before the Xhosa could be transformed into more docile neighbours. A 'neutral' territory was carved out by the expulsion of those Xhosa, including the unfortunate ally Ngqika, living between the Fish and Keiskamma Rivers. Somerset intended 'not to permit the Territory to be inhabited until our endeavours to civilize the Kafirs had been successful'.[25]

Somerset's 'neutral' territory was soon described in official circles as the 'ceded' territory. It was therefore regarded by colonists as merely an extension of the colony. While some Xhosa chiefdoms were 'permitted' to graze there in times of drought, colonial farmers became permanently established within it and colonists and regular soldiers, organised in commandos, could traverse it, supposedly in pursuit of stolen cattle under what became known as the 'spoor law'. In reality, throughout the 1820s, the 'spoor law' was a license for the colonial plunder of Xhosa chiefdoms. Any farmer alleging the theft of stock could call out a commando accompanied by British cavalry and confiscate an equal or greater number of stock from the first Xhosa kraal to which the 'spoor' or track was traced. Frequently, scant regard was paid to the precise spoor being

followed or the culpability of the particular kraal. This incensed even those frontier Xhosa who had thus far been left in possession of their land, and thus provoked further Xhosa raiding.[26]

During the first thirty years of their administration, colonial governors had become inextricably involved in, indeed had unintentionally exacerbated, the conflicts of the frontier zone. They had developed, and conveyed to their superiors in London, an imagery of the Xhosa as rapacious and incorrigible depredators, and believed that until such 'savages' could be tamed (if they ever could), separation was the safest policy. But each successive military strategy to attain that ideal had only stimulated further 'disorder', leading to mounting official frustration. A series of governors' attempts to concentrate exclusively on the 'improvement' of the colony proper had been impeded because of the marginal Xhosa's stubborn refusal to accept land loss and because of their persistence in launching retributive raids. By the 1830s, the Cape had become notorious in Colonial Office circles. As Galbraith put it, 'If he was fortunate a governor could hope to leave the colony in no worse state than he found it, but he ran a grave risk that his career would be ruined'.[27]

2. Evangelical Humanitarians

If the military and often aristocratic governors tended to see the frontier as the front line of colonial order, protecting farmers from the depredations of 'savages', for many largely middle class humanitarians, it was conceived in a very different light. Their approach to the frontier was active and professedly benign rather than defensive and strategic. They saw the colonial margins as an advancing zone in which a utopian order of Christian, British civilisation could be continually extended over those previously denied its benefits. In order to understand humanitarian approaches to the Cape frontier, we need briefly to examine bourgeois humanitarianism's antecedents in late eighteenth and early nineteenth century evangelicalism.

In late eighteenth-century Britain, the nonconformist evangelical revival was eyed warily by an Anglican, aristocratic élite including the Somerset family. John Wesley 'had aimed to "awaken the masses" dispirited by the effects of industrialization',[1] but such an awakening, for any purpose, was contemplated with concern by an aristocracy which, in the wake of the French Revolution, feared for its survival at the apex of the social order. However, by the early nineteenth century, it was becoming clear that evangelicalism held out an alternative prospect to subversion or revolution. Through its uplifting message to labourers and artisans, it promised a more acquiescent, or at least a more resigned, working class.[2] As Britain became involved in war with Napoleonic France, evangelicalism proved itself additionally capable of contributing to a patriotic discourse, upheld by the British élite as part of the strategy for its own preservation. As Colley argues, a sense of national unity was created during the years of warfare, and not simply for the reasons

envisaged by the dominant class.[3] In the struggle with what was widely perceived as continental Catholicism, Protestant evangelicalism claimed to represent Britain's particular brand of liberty and religion. It became 'part of an established consensus', its 'liberal, progressive aspects' underplayed and its 'power to mute popular protest and prevent rebellion' brought to the fore.[4] Evangelicalism though, did not serve simply to insulate the governing classes. In the aftermath of the war, its foundation in a more popular conception of legitimacy also persuaded those classes 'of the necessity of grounding their authority in religion'.[5]

The prolonged debate over slavery, leading to the abolition of the trans-Atlantic 'trade' in 1807, and of the institution itself in 1834, was a manifestation of this religious necessity. Like the contest with France, abolition provided a cause to which evangelical and patriotic fervour rallied in equal measure. With its religious and nationalist connotations, it 'was one of the major questions over which ... the notion of a "civilized" nation was defined'.[6] Once populist forces had helped accomplish the ending of the slave trade, a further powerful influence was brought to bear on the question of slavery itself during the 1820s and 1830s. The curtailment of forced labour in the colonies was justified, indeed required, by the economic and humanitarian ideology of an increasingly influential bourgeoisie. As the cyclical swings of the industrial revolution gathered momentum, and despite its attempts to repress popular agitation, the aristocratic élite was increasingly obliged to come to terms with bourgeois economic and political hegemony. Only through an alliance with the heterogeneous but broadly reformist bourgeoisie, could the representatives of the *ancien régime* hope to withstand the more radical pressure for transformation from 'below'.

Bourgeois incorporation within the dominant classes in turn stimulated new variants of liberal thinking, the domestic implications of which will be explored further below. While the middle-class evangelicalism of the late eighteenth century had been directed passionately against the 'degradation' of British industrialism and the colonial slave trade, early nineteenth century humanitarianism was intended to stabilize a more benign capitalist order in Britain and to eradicate slavery in its colonies, on both economic and humane grounds. John Wesley's and William Wilberforce's enthusiastic proselytising was being refashioned by the 1830s into Jeremy Bentham's, James Lancaster's and John Stuart Mill's considered reformism.[7] The abolition of colonial slavery was, as Thomas Holt argues, one of the most significant ways in which contemporary bourgeois hegemony was manifested and inextricably connected to empire. It represented the reification of Adam Smith's and Jeremy Bentham's principles, close to the heart of every bourgeois reformist, of a free market (in this case in labour), and the need for political reform to achieve it.[8]

Humanitarian abolitionist sentiment was responsible for a certain imagery of Africans, one that contested the established travellers' and slavers' representations in the metropolis. The missionary societies had used the late eighteenth century period, during which they were discouraged by the British élite from proselytisation at home, productively. They had extended their reach into most corners of the newly fashioned British empire, including the Cape Colony.[9] Most of the early nineteenth century missionaries were drawn from those classes which were assuming cultural and economic hegemony in Britain. Having worked their way up from working class backgrounds to a middling status, as Comaroff writes, 'their own biographies, built on an unremitting commitment to self-improvement, were the very embodiment of the spirit of

capitalism, a living testimonial to its ethical and material workings'.[10] With their tales of worthy travails among the heathen, the missionaries came to be perceived as heroes and they were thus able to formulate a 'racial imagery that permeated the metropolitan social imagination'.[11] This was an imagery stemming above all from the moral and economic crusade against the slave trade. Baptist missionaries in the West Indies in particular learned during the era of abolitionist debate to portray Africans as innocent, child-like victims of European brutality; a portrayal encapsulated by Josiah Wedgwood in a popular ceramic badge showing 'a black man crying out, "Am I not a man and a brother?"', but doing so, as Colley notes, 'from the safe position of his knees'.[12]

Representations of those other, independent Africans, with whom the British empire was coming into contact, were constructed by humanitarians from the same philosophy which lay behind abolitionism. Thus, despite their portrayal as rapacious depredators in official circles, the Xhosa could be described even by the conservative *Times* as merely 'an uncivilised people, whose character is for the most part as inoffensive as their powers of annoyance are unworthy of serious notice'.[13] For staunch metropolitan humanitarians like Beverly MacKenzie, who publicised information received from allies in the Cape under the pseudonym of 'Justus', it was important for Britons to appreciate the Xhosa's 'traits of generosity and kind feeling ... their good-natured attentions to strangers and visitors, their quick and grateful perception of friendly feeling; and especially their placable dispositions'.[14]

By the mid 1830s, with resurgent working class agitation threatening the nascent bourgeois order at home, favourable aspects of the Xhosa other than

their passivity could also be usefully highlighted by bourgeois interests. Noting their laudable respect for a hierarchy of social rank, 'Justus' drew an explicit parallel between them and the unruly British labouring classes:

> It appears to me, that setting aside the externals of clothing, and conveniences of civilized life, and viewing the savage mind in a moral and philosophical light, the lower order of the English nation are in many places far more savage than the Caffres - more savage in coarseness of mind and manners, more desperate, unrestrained, and uncivilized, and in one word, very far below the Amakosæ [Xhosa] in the scale of recovered humanity.[15]

As these remarks indicate, early nineteenth century humanitarianism in the metropole and in the colonies was not simply about freedom from oppression, nor even a free market in labour. It contained its own all-encompassing bourgeois vision of a 'just' social order which was far from egalitarian. Colonial missionaries and humanitarians were concerned primarily with the saving of souls, displacing 'superstitious feelings' and 'unmeaning rites' with Christian belief.[16] But in order to achieve this pious goal, they believed that they must convert indigenous peoples, just as the domestic labouring poor had to be converted, to the entire package of behaviour which their conception of 'virtue' demanded. Where they saw irregularity, they wished to instil methodical routine; where they encountered 'chaos' in the landscape, they sought to create regulated dwellings and fields; where they found women working on the land, they encouraged female domesticity; and where they were shocked by nakedness, they attempted to clothe the populace decently. By the 1830s, Holt's description of the humanitarian prospectus for emancipated

colonial slaves applied just as well to both British workers and independent peoples on the margins of empire: 'They would be free to pursue their own self-interest but not free to reject the cultural conditioning that defined what that self-interest should be. They would have opportunities for social mobility, but only after they learned their proper place'.[17]

During the early nineteenth century, a humanitarian approach was articulated most frequently and eloquently in the Cape by John Philip, the London Missionary Society (LMS) Director. The Congregationalist LMS had been established in 1795, its founders having been infected by the Wesleyan revival. It was the first mission to send missionaries, including the notorious Johannes van der Kemp and James Read, to the Cape. Indirectly, it was van der Kemp and Read who had brought Philip out to the colony. They were both loathed by labour-hungry colonists for shielding potential Khoikhoi workers on their missions, but of far greater concern to the LMS, Read had been found guilty of immoral conduct with a Khoikhoi woman, and van der Kemp seemed to have abandoned bourgeois respectability for a Khoikhoi lifestyle. Philip was sent out in 1819 to restore the propriety of the mission and put its affairs in order after the scandal.

Having been raised firmly within a late eighteenth century, lower middle class, Scottish Enlightenment tradition, Philip was determined upon his arrival at the Cape not only to stabilise the local LMS administration, but to promote its more efficient and rational harvesting of souls. Henry Fairbairn, his son-in-law and the editor of the Cape Town-based *South African Commercial Advertiser*, had a similar regional and class background to Philip and was his most influential colonial ally during the 1820s and 1830s.[18]

Both men campaigned initially for the more humane treatment of the Western Cape's indigenous Khoikhoi, portraying their plight, accurately enough, as one akin to slavery. Publication of Philip's *Researches in South Africa* in 1828 caused a furore in the Cape and among humanitarians in Britain since it alleged widespread physical abuse of Khoikhoi servants on colonial farms. In the same year, it was primarily Philip who was responsible for the drafting of Ordinance 50, removing the legal constraints on Khoikhoi mobility. Previously, Khoikhoi who had failed to secure a pass by working for a colonial farmer had been rendered 'vagrants' under the law, and thus liable to arrest. Ordinance 50 not only abolished that system, it also allowed for no further legal discrimination between the Khoikhoi and colonists.

Philip's agitation for Ordinance 50 was justified both by free market economics and by the incontrovertible evidence of Britain's progressive history. Drawing a parallel between the conditions of the Khoikhoi and those of the medieval English serf, Philip wrote: 'To what does England owe the subversion of the feudal system, and its high rank among the nations of the world, but to the emancipation and elevation of its peasantry?'[19] Having been successfully sued by colonists for some of the allegations which he had published against them, Philip's costs were covered by subscription among metropolitan humanitarians including churchmen, philanthropists and Whig politicians. Within these circles, Ordinance 50 was hailed as a first, painful step towards enlightened reform in the colonies. In spite of the 'wrath and spleen' of the 'slave-driving colonists', the Ordinance had changed the Khoikhoi 'from brute beasts into men'. But just as importantly, 'as free labourers', they could now 'demand lawful hire for their services'.[20] Philip's 'crusade', as Comaroff puts

it, had become 'a touchstone in the struggle within the colonizing culture, to refashion the imperial project'.[21]

The 'liberation' of the Khoikhoi apparently behind them, during the early 1830s Philip and Fairbairn extended their critical gaze to the affairs of the eastern Cape frontier. For them this was a crucial arena of interaction between a potentially beneficial 'civilisation' and a necessarily baneful heathenism. The humanitarian agenda for the frontier was clear. It was to bring 'into a cheerful and friendly obedience those barbarian neighbours, who have expected to find in us examples of moral pre-eminence'.[22] If the Xhosa were the rapacious raiders that officials portrayed, then it was up to those officials to 'improve' them by introducing them to the benefits of Christian civilisation. As far as humanitarians were concerned:

> If it could be proved, that after a thirty years' dominion we had done nothing at all ... to bring the barbarian tribes under the mild and transforming power of the Gospel - that the government had in no way advanced the civilization, or improved the condition of the Aborigines of its colonies - then we are weighed in the balance and found wanting; but when we advance beyond this, and prove that our Christian sway has been applied to purposes of spoliation, wrong and cruelty, how shall we find words to express our guilt and degradation?[23]

And it was just such colonial 'guilt' and 'degradation' that Philip and Fairbairn communicated to their metropolitan contemporaries. They condemned both official and settler approaches to the colonisation of the Xhosa. First, they attacked directly the strategies employed by a succession of governors. Using

Philip's, Fairbairn's and other colonial humanitarians' testimony, 'Justus' wrote sarcastically about the series of strategic Xhosa expulsions carried out since 1809: 'The proper boundary in a military point of view was secured, "military men" were set at ease, and the colony was safe !!!' However, he continued, the authorities should have known 'that justice is a stronger wall for a frontier than ... valleys gained by rapine, and that national integrity is worth a thousand cannons, and a hundred thousand soldiers'. For the Cape humanitarians and their British supporters, the problem went deeper than the actions of ill-informed and aggressive individual officials. 'Military habits of acting and thinking' in general were 'inconsistent with the development of justice'. Such habits could 'so confuse the understanding as to make the noblest dispositions assent to the propositions of tyranny, as if they were wise and virtuous maxims'.[24]

The most evident manifestation of colonial 'tyranny' was the 'spoor law'. Its continuance was blamed partly on the colonial authorities, but also on 'those insatiate robbers the Boors [sic]' as well as the British settlers who had arrived on the frontier in 1820.[25] Drawing on representations from Philip and liberal settlers and officials such as Charles Lennox Stretch, 'Justus' persuaded metropolitan humanitarians that 'nothing was so easy [for colonists] as to augment their own herds without the trouble of purchase; they had but to complain to the military stations, and immediately, without examination, the patrols were set in motion, and brought back to the complaining farmers anything they wanted'. The spoor law was thus a peculiar 'wickedness to be found nowhere but in the British colony of the Cape of Good Hope'.[26] If the Xhosa's cultivation as acculturated Christians was to be achieved, they would

have to be shielded from such rapacious dispossession by a more benign colonial government. Philip wrote:

> On the subject of it being desirable that the caffres should be retained as British subjects, I have long made up my mind ... The caffres cannot otherwise be saved from annihilation. Were the Colony surrounded by belts of Native Tribes under the British government, nations would get time to form beyond us, but no Tribe will be allowed time to rise into civilisation and independence on our borders, if they are in immediate contact with our colonists.[27]

It was this approach which brought Philip and the other Cape and metropolitan humanitarians into direct confrontation with the recently arrived British settlers.

Figure 3. Graham's Town, British frontier garrison and settler town.

3. British Settlers

Since 1816, as we have seen, Governor Somerset had been agitating for a British settlement on the Cape frontier as part of his wider strategy for contending with Xhosa 'depredation'. In 1819 the British government developed its own reasons for supporting such a scheme. It was prompted by the prospect of domestic insurrection, in particular by textile workers and agricultural labourers. These and other artisans had encountered severe economic depression and rising unemployment since the end of the Napoleonic War. In 1819, industrial unrest was peaking in Stockport, Leeds, Carlisle and Glasgow, threatening the revolt, as Home Secretary Sidmouth put it, of 'the disaffected in the north of England'.[1]

While radicals opposed emigration on the grounds that it undermined the urgent imperative for social reform, the theories of Thomas Malthus and Adam Smith lent bourgeois weight to colonial resettlement as both a demographic safety valve and a source of new markets. At the same time, humanitarians were agitating for the transfer of a white working class to the colonies as a substitute for forced indigenous labour. Parliament ultimately voted £50,000 for subsidised emigration to the Cape. However, while the government wished to be seen to be doing something about the plight of 'paupers', it was the Colonial Office, which would actually select the emigrants. Colonial officials certainly had no desire to see the unstable frontier zone populated with the 'indigent' and, as a result, the scheme was directed in practice not at the poor, but largely at those who could form a self-sufficient community along an unstable frontier.[2]

In the midst of unprecedented 'emigration fever', 4,000 settlers were chosen from 90,000 applicants. They were organised into three kinds of emigrant parties. First there were proprietary parties, consisting of a wealthy leader and ten or more indentured labourers. Proprietary leaders such as Major Pigot, Thomas Philipps and Miles Bowker generally wished to recreate in the Cape the lifestyle of the gentry which they felt to be threatened within Britain. They would be allocated land on behalf of themselves and their followers. Joint stock parties formed the bulk of the settlement. These were comprised mainly of artisans or professionals and most were attracted by the Colonial Office's promise that 'To small capitalists, say of £100, an opportunity is presented of employing it most advantageously, and thereby acquiring a handsome independence for themselves and families'.[3] The members of these parties elected nominal heads to pay their deposits and secure land on the party's behalf. Finally, four parish parties were formed from those dependent upon relief. Their costs had to be raised through extra parish donations and they were not to be granted land in the Cape. Instead, 'responsible' men, appointed as party leaders, would oversee their hire as labourers for the more 'respectable' settlers.

Despite an early politics dictated by a struggle for status between classes and failed attempts by the wealthier settlers to retain control over their indentured servants, by the early 1830s settlers from a variety of backgrounds had found pressing reasons for co-operation.[4] They were located in the district around Graham's Town which had been occupied until their expulsion by the Ndlambe. Not surprisingly, many settlers soon found themselves the victims of Xhosa raiding. In September 1821 they were shocked to hear of an isolated raid in which a settler herd boy was killed. The colonial military's aggression under

the spoor law provoked a further bout of raids during 1822, resulting in more settler deaths.[5] Within a few months, almost all of the most exposed settlers' livestock had been taken. For those located on the immediate frontier line, 'books were now exchanged for guns', and a statement of grievances sent to the Colonial Secretary in March 1823 and signed by 374 settlers warned that 'existing measures can only lead to a war of mutual extermination'.[6] Within three years of their location on the frontier line, many settlers had constructed a stereotype of the Xhosa similar to that of the military officials with longer experience. The Xhosa had been proved a 'cunning ... and dangerous enemy'.[7]

However, settler representations of the Xhosa in the early 1820s were far from homogeneous. While those who had sunk their capital in exposed land and sought to prosper through pastoralism had good reason to fear Xhosa 'depredation', a minority, like the well-informed Thomas Philipps, did sympathise with the frontier Xhosa's plight: 'We have driven those nearest us to encroach on the other tribes ... can it be supposed then ... that the settler can ever be free from such depredations?'[8] Thomas Pringle believed that Xhosa raiding was 'not so very "enormous" as some of the settlers have been prone to consider it'.[9] Most of the educated, upper class settlers in fact initially paid the Xhosa the barbed compliment of drawing analogies between their physiques and lifestyle and those of admired Greek and Roman antiquity.[10] They too were generating a stereotype, and one which cast the Xhosa backward in time and rendered their landscape an 'anachronistic space', but theirs was not the cunning and dangerous raider portrayed by frontier farmers.[11]

Carrying more weight than the sympathy of a few gentlemanly diarists were the material interests and experiences of a larger group of settlers. From the early

1820s, many settlers were dependent on the Xhosa for capital accumulation. Settlers like Edward Driver, William Thackwray, George Howse and Charles Wood quickly appreciated the potential for acquisition through trade, exchanging beads, iron-ware and guns for Xhosa ivory, hides and cattle. William Southey boasted that 'we get from 20 to 100 per cent profit on goods'.[12] Even labourers like John Montgomery and Jeremiah Goldswain could acquire generous credit from Cape Town merchants with London connections. Benjamin Norden, who had started life in the settlement as a labourer, was able to earn between £40,000 and £60,000 over twenty years in the 'kaffir trade'.[13]

In their memoranda applying for a more extensive exchange to be legalised, traders' constructions of the Xhosa differed from that of the rapacious raider. Some traders made representations about Xhosa land loss to the British authorities and over 170 settlers petitioned the governor, stating that raiding was stimulated only by official restrictions on trade which denied the Xhosa the chance to acquire colonial goods legitimately. One trader went so far as to berate the colonial authorities for failing to understand the humiliation which their overbearing conduct had inflicted upon Xhosa chiefs, implying that raiding was simply a natural reaction.[14] Aside from their material interest, these settlers' more accommodating approach was perhaps influenced by the trust which they placed, and found fulfilled, in the Xhosa. In entering Xhosa territory, early traders were flaunting the explicit colonial regulations against interaction, and could expect no support from the authorities. Laden with valuable commodities, they were conducting, as Henry Dugmore put it, a 'life-in-hand venture into the power of the Kaffers'.[15] And more often than not, it was a successful venture.

During the early years of settlement then, settlers from a variety of backgrounds and adopting a range of material relations with the Xhosa, constructed differentiated stereotypes which helped them to orientate themselves within their alien environment and towards an alien people. They did not yet do so according to any public discourse of Xhosa savagery. In 1826, and without fear of universal contradiction, Philipps could still write 'What a noble race of People all the neighbouring Blacks are ... Of all that I have yet seen the Hottentot [Khoikhoi] is the lowest in the scale'.[16]

As Philipps' remark suggests, if the settlers' constructions of Xhosa 'otherness' did not initially bind them together, their defence of the colonial racial division of labour, based on 'Hottentot' service, did. Following the abolition of the slave trade and the official denial of slaves to the settlers, the eastern frontier districts were suffering from an acute shortage of labour before the settlers' arrival. Within á few years, even some of the settlers who had emigrated as indentured servants were employers in their own right, and were experiencing the economic constraints brought about by a lack of workers. Settlers attempted first to hire individual Khoikhoi, but finding that they would not be separated from their families, they adopted instead the Dutch colonial practice of incorporating Khoikhoi households as labour tenants. Some, like John Montgomery, simply bought servants from their former Dutch masters.[17] By 1827, the merchant George Thompson felt able to assure prospective emigrants that 'the Hottentot population affords an important resource ... and, when judiciously treated, generally prove useful and obedient dependants'.[18]

Despite such assurances though, the domination of Khoisan labour was not quite taken for granted by the settlers themselves. There was always the unsettling potential for a loss of control over this new-found workforce, especially with reformist metropolitan and humanitarian thought being directed, as we have seen, at the greater freedom of the Khoikhoi. When Ordinance 50 was enacted, it caused considerable consternation in the British settlement. Thomas Stubbs described it as 'that abominable false philanthropy which made [the Khoisan] free and ruined them ... They were a people that required to be under control, both for their own benefit and the public; the same as the slaves in this country'.[19] By the early 1830s, many of the settlers were agitating for a Vagrancy Ordinance which, like the planters' proposed substitute for slavery in Jamaica, would enable the reimposition of control over the potentially rebellious and criminal 'coloured classes'.[20] Pringle voiced his disappointment that the settlers had, 'with lamentable facility adopted similar sentiments towards the "native labourers" as the established colonists'.[21] But in reality, with their novel positioning as employers of coerced and dispossessed indigenous labour, these 'sentiments' were among the first which settlers from a variety of class origins could share completely.

After the establishment of free ports at Port Elizabeth and Port Frances during the early 1830s, the growth of woollen production promised the significant commercial expansion which many settlers had long anticipated. A realisation of the eastern Cape's potential for sheep breeding corresponded with a massive increase in the demand for raw wool in Britain, and the easing of tariffs on imports from the colonies. Crucially though, the development of an extensive local woollen industry required the further geographical expansion of the colony into Xhosa territory. The linked projects of wool production and Xhosa

dispossession thereafter provided the focus for a coalescence of 'respectable' settlers. Both merchants located in Graham's Town and landed proprietors distributed along the frontier saw in wool the economic future of the settlement, and both became involved in its production and sale.[22]

Wool not only allowed for the greater economic coherence of capitalist settlers. Indirectly, it also prompted their first public voice in the pages of a settler press. After 1831, the *Graham's Town Journal* (*GTJ*) took the lead in extolling the virtues of sheep farming to its settler readership, and in expressing their united interest in the industry. The newspaper's status was enhanced during the late 1830s as the settler population expanded and dispersed, partly on to farms vacated by Dutch-speaking 'trekkers', and the public meetings which had at first secured consensus on political strategy became less inclusive. In many respects the *Journal* served as a substitute medium of communication, partially overcoming the barrier of distance. A relatively high circulation of 700 gave the *GTJ*'s editor, the former London printer Robert Godlonton, a virtual monopoly on public expression in the settlement.

In pursuit of expansion, particularly to allow greater wool production, Godlonton and settler contributors used the *GTJ* to bemoan incessantly their insecurity in the face of Xhosa raiding and to call for imperial intervention to punish the culprits with the confiscation of their land. From the range of contributors, it would seem that the Journal was successful in generating a broader consensus on expansion. But in standardising and reproducing the stereotype of them as 'cunning depredators', the *GTJ* was also creating a new, public representation of the Xhosa. With the repetition of this representation,

and its accessibility to settlers, earlier, differentiated settler constructions were beginning to be compressed.[23]

By 1834, the acceptance of a racial division of labour and the diffusion of a public discourse of settler capitalist 'progress' had helped to forge shared settler values and material aspirations. But a more encompassing sense of settler identity and a more uniform approach to the frontier was brought about largely by the experience of war. In December 1834, frontier Xhosa chiefdoms led by Maqoma, whose people had been expelled from their lands on three successive occasions, launched an unexpected, co-ordinated counter-attack on the colony, killing twenty-four settlers within a few hours. The attack was the most effective yet and it was the first to which most British settlers had been exposed. By the time that colonial, British and Khoikhoi forces had gained the Xhosa's surrender the following year, forty-three colonists had been killed and 765 farms burnt or pillaged. Most of the settlers outside Graham's Town had lost a significant proportion of their property, even while some within it engaged in war profiteering.[24]

The war, and the metropolitan and colonial debates to which it gave rise, prompted an unprecedented number of the original settlers to close ranks and to forge a clear and embattled sense of affinity extending far deeper than the public discourse of settler 'progress' that had thus far been established. A British settler approach was now defined in opposition to two mutual challenges. The first was the Xhosa themselves and the second, the humanitarians who sympathised with them. Neither, opined John Mitford Bowker, 'ought for a moment to be allowed to thwart in any way the general progress of improvement'.[25]

The Reverend Shaw, who had been in England during the war, found upon his return to Graham's Town soon after its conclusion, 'a great revolution in the sentiments of the British Settlers in reference to the Caffre race', and the military commander, Harry Smith, noted 'a spirit pervading all classes of society ... to teach everyone to view and treat a Kafir as a beast'.[26] Prominent settlers declared themselves convinced that 'many of the missionaries have been labouring under the greatest delusion and although living for years amongst the Kafirs, they have not been able to form anything like a correct estimate of the character of the people around them'.[27] In the wake of the war, the *GTJ* took the lead in reconstructing settler representations of the Xhosa, setting out 'scientific' assessments of the 'Kafir character' in an attempt to rationalise the recent display of 'savagery'.[28] The *Journal* publicised a series of post-war lectures given in Graham's Town by Dr H.E. Macartney, a man intent on introducing an early form of scientific racism to the frontier zone. His public addresses on the 'now popular science of phrenology', using skulls including those of Xhosa 'lately received' as trophies of the war, were received enthusiastically by the town's settler community.[29] As Andrew Bank points out, the 'science' of phrenology held little attraction for established Dutch-speaking colonists 'whose world view was shaped by institutions of slavery and servitude rather than frontier violence', and was ridiculed by humanitarians like Fairbairn. But it had 'greater appeal for those with experience of frontier conflict and an associated antipathy towards a "savage" enemy'.[30]

By the mid 1830s, settlers whose diverse class backgrounds and heterogeneous approaches to the frontier had initially allowed for little harmony, had adopted a coherent and fairly inclusive stance. Ambivalent representations of the Xhosa stemming from the individual experiences of traders, or from Romantic

gentlemanly notions of the Noble Savage, had succumbed to shared opportunities for capitalist accumulation and the mutual experience of vicious conflict. In the wake of the 1834-5 war, although there were notable exceptions, most settlers saw the frontier as an opportunity for further wealth creation and the Xhosa as an obstacle. Through their indisputable 'savagery', the Xhosa had justified their own removal.

PART TWO

COLONISING THE XHOSA

The 1834-5 war brought the tensions which had been building within colonial society since the arrival of the settlers to a point of crisis. The full-scale Xhosa attack forced colonial officials to reassess hybrid frontier policies of exclusion and cultural transformation, and resulted in the first officially sanctioned colonisation of the Xhosa. It also prompted settlers and humanitarians to engage in an unprecedentedly vigorous struggle. Each of these interests upheld specific representations of the Xhosa and each sought to convey their representation exclusively to the metropolis. The political war between settlers and humanitarians broke out even before the colony's war with Maqoma and other Xhosa chiefs was ended. It continued against a backdrop of Xhosa resistance and a politics of compromise within the newly colonised territory. Part Two traces the contests within colonial discourse and the effects of indigenous agency through the period in which the Rarabe Xhosa were finally subjected to colonial rule.

Figure 4. Maqoma, leader of the Xhosa in the 1834-5 war, with his wife Noxlena.

4. Official Programmes: The Military Ordering of the 'Savage'

General Sir Benjamin D'Urban arrived in the colony shortly before Maqoma's attack. For the first time, this newly appointed governor came with instructions from London to settle the frontier problems through treaties. The Colonial Office, still desperate for economies on this most troublesome of imperial margins, had finally been swayed by humanitarian critiques of the prevailing frontier system. It had decided that if military forcefulness could not bring order and economy to the region, then perhaps a formal recognition of Xhosa independence and an agreement over mutually beneficial trade and mission interaction could. D'Urban's arrival in Cape Town did not promise the humanitarians' preferred extension of a more protective British authority, but it was nevertheless welcomed heartily by Philip and his allies as heralding a great improvement in frontier policy. Aware of the Xhosa's mounting anger, Philip and LMS missionary colleagues toured the frontier zone assuring prominent chiefs that the new governor would soon remedy their grievances.[1]

However, to the humanitarians' enormous disillusionment, their attempts to counsel patience among the Xhosa failed. The chiefs launched their attack before D'Urban found the time to visit the frontier. When the governor did travel there, it was not to sign treaties, but to examine a scene of burnt-out farms and meet dispossessed and grieving settlers. All thought of treaties was dropped during the war and D'Urban, reverting to a familiar Cape official rhetoric, wrote to his superior in London of 'the devastation and horrors which these merciless barbarians have committed'.[2] It was not only D'Urban's rhetoric which was familiar though. While the colonial troops were launching

their counter-attack, he was planning a new, unambiguously military post-war strategy.

In January 1835, together with Lieutenant-Colonel Harry Smith, the commander of the colonial forces, D'Urban envisaged the expulsion of the offending Xhosa to beyond the Kei River. This, the two men believed, provided a shorter and more secure line of defence for the colony. Smith, stating it to be 'evident that Christian principles and the rules of conduct which [the Xhosa] are taught by their religious instructors are disregarded whenever an opportunity presents itself of indulging their unconquerable propensity to commit robbery and murder on their neighbours',[3] intended first securing the new territory by building military posts, roads and fords. Then, despite his view that the Xhosa's 'extermination would be a blessing', he would ensure that their ejection from that territory was as peaceable as possible.[4]

However, it was not the entire Rarabe Xhosa population that was to be expelled. Some Xhosa chiefs were not fighting against the colony, but collaborating with it. The chiefs Patho, Khama and Kobe of the Gqunukhwebe chiefdoms had ordered any men who stayed with them during the war to desist from attacking the British and to return any stolen cattle that they came across. The Ndlambe chief Mqhayi also claimed that he wanted no part in the war, and the Ntinde chief Dyani Tshatshu's people were forced by other Xhosa to leave the Buffalo River because of their support for the colony.[5] It was Phatho though, who went furthest in his collaboration, assuring the governor that he would pass on any relevant intelligence and informing him that he had placed his men along the Keiskamma, doing his 'best to prevent the hostile Caffers

from crossing that river'. Furthermore, he had killed two of the hostile Langa chief Nqeno's men, including his chief councillor.[6]

These 'friendly' chiefs, who had proved their capacity to be 'docile', were to be allowed to remain within the conquered territory. D'Urban also made it clear that he wished Suthu, Great Wife of Ngqika and her son Sandile, Ngqika's successor as Rarabe paramount, to reside under British influence.[7] Finally, the Mfengu, discussed below, were to be located there. But for the remainder, Smith wrote 'it is absolutely necessary to provide for the future security of the colony ... by removing these treacherous and irreclaimable savages to a safer distance'.[8] These 'irreclaimable' Xhosa included the chiefs Maqoma and Tyhali (both sons of Ngqika), Bhotomane of the Mdange, Nqeno and the remnants of the Ndlambe Xhosa.

On 19 May 1835, King William's Town was declared the capital of the new Province of Queen Adelaide, much to the annoyance of the LMS missionary, Friedrich Kayser, on whose former station it was to be built.[9] However, Smith's declaration was premature. Even the military headquarters in the new capital could not be secured in the face of 'hundreds of kafirs ... watching every post night and day for the purposes of murder and plunder'[10] and the colonial forces had little prospect of controlling the remote fastnesses of the province's Amatole mountains. There, the colonial troops and their allies found it almost impossible to penetrate the steep thickets and flush out resisting Xhosa, let alone round them up and expel them across the Kei.[11] Queen Adelaide Province in fact began as a compromise between British official intentions and what the frontier Xhosa could be forced to accept. Xhosa resistance made their expulsion

and seizure of their land impossible and in the event their chiefdoms were to remain by and large in situ.

A colonial census of the Xhosa population was completed and the locations of the various chiefdoms assigned in February 1836. Each location contained missionary and military stations for its supervision. The most significant component of the province's population were the Ngqika Xhosa under Maqoma and Tyhali, numbering 56,000. They were to remain within a location larger than that originally envisaged around Burn's Hill mission station on the upper Keiskamma. The smaller chiefdoms comprised the remnant Ndlambe under Nqeno (9,200); the largely 'friendly' Gqunukhwebe under Kobe (7,600) and the Ntinde under Dyani Tshatshu, the most Christianised chief (1,000). The main body of Gcaleka Xhosa, located to the east of the Kei River, were to remain free of direct British control and outside the new province. The Xhosa newly taken under British jurisdiction therefore numbered some 73,800 in total. Combined with the debatable figure of 16,800 Mfengu who, as we shall see, were escorted into the colonial margins by Smith during the war, the colonial government now had 90,600 new subjects. Fairbairn pointed out that this would give a population density within the province of between ten and eleven per square mile - about ten times that of the colony proper.[12]

Once the colonial authorities had been forced to accept continued Xhosa occupation, their first priority was to exert effective military domination over the province, so as to gain, in Smith's words, 'a firmer hold over these slippery vagabonds'.[13] King William's Town, some forty miles east of the previous advanced colonial post was to have two forts of its own. From there along the one hundred miles of wagon road to the Kei, and around the Amatoles, a string

of forts was to be built, descending, as Mostert puts it, 'like an imprisoning grid upon all the Xhosa'.[14] Not content with this, Smith, delighting in the idea that 'it would appal the Kafirs to see me coming out of the water [with three or four hundred men]', proposed the construction of ports at the mouths of the Fish and Buffalo Rivers.[15] With this military infrastructure in place, it was intended to supplant Xhosa chiefly power with direct colonial control. Gradually, the chiefs would be 'reduced to the more wholesome position of subordinate magistrates ... acting under ... the subjection and subordination of ... salutary authority'.[16] With their chiefs disempowered and 'military posts of occupation ... within, around and among their locations', D'Urban anticipated that 'the means will be ever at hand to subdue any serious resistance'.[17]

Having established military supervision, the next and most ambitious aspect of official plans involved nothing less than the mass cultural transformation of the Xhosa, who were now, whether they liked it or not, British subjects. As it intended all along, a programme for their experimental 'civilisation' was developed. However, it was a programme which, as we will see, departed from the humanitarian agenda in certain crucial respects. D'Urban wrote 'it was indeed high time to devise and adopt some new measures at the conclusion of this Kafir war differing in character from those pursued after all former ones'.[18] Smith declared that 'treacherous barbarians will be converted into Christians and peaceable neighbours'. Those who had previously been 'irreclaimable savages' now possessed 'the same attributes as ourselves' but remained 'poor degraded sinners' who could be saved only by 'the necessary restraint of just laws and the diffusion of the doctrines of our blessed religion'

Smith vowed to 'reclaim these savages unless the Devil himself has so established himself that he cannot be cast out'.[19]

The Xhosa first learnt of this new colonial strategy when Smith, in his inaugural address to the assembled chiefs as provincial commander, informed them that they wished to become 'real Englishmen'. He went on to explain that once the English had been as naked, as ignorant and as cruel as they were, but love of the true Christian God had been their first step towards redemption. Having thus become civilised, the English were able to 'cast away our vicious habits and put to death and banish by the law everyone who by his crime and wickedness was a pest and an enemy to society at large'.[20] Smith's programme for the similar conversion of the Xhosa would be realised through four main institutions. Magistrates, police, churches and schools would effect transformations in every aspect of the Xhosa's social life.

Crime, religion, agriculture, the gender division of labour and clothing were especially targeted. The attack on 'crime', which was defined widely so as to include the chiefly prerogative of confiscating cattle from subordinates, was to be marshalled through the magistrates and a new police force. But it was the more powerful chiefs themselves who were to implement British laws as co-opted magistrates under the supervision of local British Resident Agents (themselves reporting to Smith). They were therefore guaranteed initially an annual 'rent' in cattle from each kraal, and then an annual salary, in order to secure their compliance. In addition, they were favoured with European clothes and a magistrate's medal.[21] Smith promised to make whole kraals responsible for thefts if individual culprits could not be traced by his police force. This was comprised of collaborating Xhosa and Mfengu men attached to each magistrate.

While the police were to carry their own brass-knobbed sticks as signs o office, Smith characteristically reserved the largest stick with the biggest gol knob for himself. He boasted that 'when I seized the stick, held it myself, an gave a decisive order, that was formal and irrevocable'.[22]

Transformation in Xhosa religion, clothing and agriculture was to be achieve largely through the missionary churches and schools and Smith let it be know that clergymen would be the Xhosa's instructors. He was, however, particula to request of D'Urban only a certain type of missionary for this task: 'those o active and industrious habits are to be preferred, who would enforce a observance of the Sabbath, and occupy the rest of the week in practical lesson of industry to the natives'. In a reference to Philip and others such as th LMS's James Read, who were seen as being far too sympathetic towards th Xhosa, he wrote, 'Your fanatical preacher is to be avoided'.[23] He told the assembled Xhosa 'You must send your children to School, or you are wicked an base Parents'. Particular attention was paid to exhorting the mothers of th paramounts to this injunction, and the ally Gqunukhwebe chiefs who ha mastered the use of the plough, were upheld as examples of what could b achieved with a willingness to learn.[24]

For Smith, the use of ploughs in Xhosa agriculture was merely part of a wid transformation of gender roles, bringing Xhosa culture in line with English. H wanted to convince the Xhosa that

> it is the duty of men to work in the fields [rather than simply mind th cattle] - not of women - they ought to make and mend you [sic] clothes an their own, and to keep the children clean, wash your clothes, cook yo

food, take care of the milk - you will know from observation what the Englishmen and what their women do - this you must imitate, and not sleep half your time.[25]

Spiritual conversion, the practice of European-style agriculture and the adoption of European rather than African forms of gender discrimination were all desirable attributes of the Xhosa's transformation, but the most visible and therefore most politically potent manifestation of that transformation, was the adoption of European clothing. Smith held that 'It was one of my great endeavours to make them regard appearing naked as a grievous sin, now that they were British subjects'.[26] Accordingly, in his address, he declared in heroic Nelsonian fashion, that 'England expects of her subjects - leave off this trash of brass, beads, wire, clay ... and replace them by soap, linen and clothes'.[27] A change of clothing, above all else, would signify the systematic neutralising of Xhosa 'otherness'.

However, for all his apparent conversion to humanitarian intentions for the Xhosa's 'improvement', Smith occasionally admitted that his immediate goals were more limited. Despite his faith in 'parsons, magistrates, secretaries, religious institutions and schools of industry', he was forced to concede that 'the only institution for the suppression of vice for some time to come is the hand of power wielded by innumerable Patroles [sic] and thief catchers'.[28]

Figure 5. Harry Smith, Commander of Queen Adelaide Province.

5. Settler Politics: Land, Labour and Security

If official intentions to exclude most Xhosa from the new province were modified in the light of residual Xhosa strength, in turn many settlers' expectations had to be revised. Three issues mainly preoccupied both Dutch and British settler frontier politics during the period in which official plans for the province were being formulated. These were land, labour and security. Woven together, they formed colonial visions of capitalist expansion and development. Queen Adelaide Province would be judged by colonists according to its contribution to these visions.

Jeff Peires draws a distinction between largely subsistence Dutch and commercial British attitudes to land in general. Above all, he states, it was British settler speculation which drove colonial expansion after 1820.[1] However, while a general distinction between Dutch and British attitudes may well hold, there were Dutch colonists who had become commercially-orientated landholders and speculators in their own right, and others who wished to do so.[2] Furthermore, not all British settlers desired land purely for speculation. Although they may have been more commercially orientated than most of the earlier colonists, as we have seen, there was an increasing demand for owner-managed sheep farming, rather than quick-sale speculation. Ultimately, it was not so much the precise motivation for expansion which differentiated Dutch and British during the mid 1830s. Rather, it was the likelihood of each group achieving its expansionist goals under the prevailing British administration. It was fairly clear that the authorities favoured the granting of any new lands to British rather than Dutch colonists, and it was probably for this reason that the

four hundred odd applications for land in the new province came largely fro British settlers.[3]

D'Urban and Smith were both inclined more towards British settler expansio than Dutch, seeing this as being most in line with the colony's genera commercial 'improvement'. However, there were differences between the tw men. While Smith was recklessly expansionist, D'Urban was more cautious When the expulsion of the Xhosa from the province was still being considered Smith enthused that it offered 'every faculty on earth for emigration'.[4] D'Urban's approach though, was more informed by security considerations. H envisaged the placing of settlers between the Xhosa locations and along th main communications routes primarily as a strategic guard against future Xhos mobilisation. He also realised early on that, due to Colonial Offic opposition, he was going to be constrained in his ability to accede to settle land demands.[5] In the short term, settler pressure for land could be released only within Somerset's 'ceded' territory between the Fish and Keiskamm Rivers, rather than within the new province itself, and even there it would hav to compete with Mfengu, Khoisan and possibly 'friendly' Xhosa claims.

Settler expectations however, had already been raised by the initial promise o a mass Xhosa expulsion and then the subsequent prospect of smaller grant among the Xhosa locations in the new province. When Xhosa expulsion ha still seemed likely, Holden Bowker had anticipated the whole of the ne province becoming 'excellent sheep farms'.[6] Some settlers were outraged once it was realised that the 'irreclaimable savages' were to have 'not only the old haunts and fastnesses, but nearly the whole of their territory back', but th

GTJ counselled patience, seeing in a confirmation of D'Urban's current plans the ultimate prospect of considerably more land grants.[7] Indeed, in the long run, direct state support for settler penetration right through the Xhosa and Mpondo to Natal was not seen as being out of the question.[8]

In pursuit of more land, the most vocal of the settlers could be devious, often manipulating both official security and even humanitarian concerns.[9] Playing to the security fears of the colonial state, the *GTJ* advised its readers that if they wished for land grants, they must consider their 'efficiency ... as forming a line of defence against the common enemy'.[10] Godlonton sought to head off large scale settlement of 'friendly' Xhosa and Khoikhoi within the 'ceded' territory by emphasising the opportunity that this would allow for plunder of the colonial margins. But in stark contrast to the journal's frequent diatribes against Khoikhoi perfidy and unassimilability, Godlonton also went on to argue that appropriation of the 'ceded' territory on behalf of the Khoikhoi would go against the grain of their benign integration with the colonists: 'any attempt to separate their interests cannot be entertained without danger to the whole ... the whole community should be treated as one large family'. This resort to humanitarian rhetoric appears particularly cynical when it is contrasted with the argument developed by Godlonton in the previous week's issue of the *GTJ* that, 'amidst such incongruous materials as we have here', amalgamation between colonists and the 'coloured classes' was unattainable.[11]

Land expansion was clearly a pressing concern among the settlers of the frontier. However, as the wool economy expanded, their desire for more land was necessarily accompanied by a more acute concern over labour supply. An enhanced demand for indigenous labour in turn brought further anxieties about

personal security. It was the Mfengu who provided the greatest contribution to colonial labour supplies as a result of the war and the foundation of Queen Adelaide Province. Here the focus is on their role in settler aspirations and in settler conflicts with official programmes.

In colonial accounts, established first by the Wesleyan missionary and 1820 settler John Ayliff and then disseminated by the authorities, the Mfengu originated entirely as refugees from a series of conflicts, later known as the 'mfecane', which had erupted on the east coast and in the interior of southern Africa during the early nineteenth century.[12] According to Ayliff and Harry Smith, they had been held by the Gcaleka Xhosa on the other side of the Kei River from Queen Adelaide Province as 'slaves', until they were 'rescued' by colonial forces during the war. In fact the refugees from the 'mfecane' were by no means slaves. They had been accepted by Gcaleka chiefs as clients, pasturing and keeping the offspring of loaned cattle until such time as they became fully integrated within their host society. Such patronage was an established means by which chiefs could accumulate followers and hence acquire greater power, although it was becoming more difficult to exercise as the Xhosa's own land was put under increasing colonial pressure. Whether these refugees would ever achieve a fully equal status within an already under-resourced Xhosa society may well have been doubtful.

During the 1830s, Ayliff had engaged in a bitter dispute with the Gcaleka paramount Hintsa. It was caused partly by the missionary's determination to attract as many Mfengu clients to his mission as possible. With their chiefly structures and identities already disrupted by warfare, the flight from the interior and clientship, he found the Mfengu more pliant material for Christian and

cultural conversion than the local Xhosa who retained their cultural integrity. Some Mfengu rapidly adopted European clothing, housing and farming as far as was within their means and, later in the nineteenth century, many would constitute a successful and literate Christian peasantry. During the war, Ayliff promised them colonial protection, land, and assistance with agriculture if they emigrated into the new province and became colonial allies. Many of the original refugees planning this 'exodus', were subsequently joined by local Xhosas, also seeking colonial patronage. When Harry Smith's invasion forces crossed the Kei River into Gcaleka territory in 1835, Ayliff brought an official figure of 16,800 (but probably somewhat fewer) of these new allies, all now designated as 'Mfengu', across to the conquered province.[13]

Despite the fact that many 'Mfengu' were dispossessed or opportunistic Xhosa, D'Urban and Smith constructed them deliberately as a different 'race'. Whereas the Xhosa were supposedly idle, savage and thieving, the Mfengu were almost their antithesis: 'an industrious, gentle and well disposed tribe, good herdsmen, good agriculturalist [sic] and useful servants'.[14] Medical opinion supported the distinctions. The Army Doctor Murray obligingly reported that 'Our new allies and colonists the AmaFingos are a very healthy race of people - indeed they seem to have no diseases among them; and they appear to be of a mild, docile and industrious character, which is more than can be said either of the Caffres or Hottentots'.[15] The superior designation of the Mfengu was intended to make their absorption within the colony more palatable to settlers and their attributed origin as liberated slaves of the Xhosa was designed to placate humanitarian sentiment in the metropole.

Certainly many settlers saw the Mfengu as a potentially useful labour supply. D'Urban admitted to the Colonial Office that their 'rescue' from the Gcaleka would relieve a labour shortage brought about by the recruitment of Khoikhoi workers for the war. He was congratulated for this reason by the leading inhabitants of George.[16] Henry Francis Fynn, appointed Superintendent of the new Mfengu subjects, was gratified that once they were guided into the new province, many went further west: 'great numbers have ... taken service in the colony'. He hoped that they would be particularly valued given their animosity towards those Xhosa who remained hostile to colonial supervision. Whereas hired Xhosa labourers would often return across the old frontier with their payment and themselves steal colonial stock, Mfengu men would stay to work and had their own interests as 'collaborators' in fighting off Xhosa raiders. The Mfengu's designation as being almost synonymous with labour ultimately led even to the transhipment of some to the Western Cape in order to relieve labour shortages there.[17]

However, while Mfengu labour was very much in demand by colonists, it was not necessarily required at any price. And it was clear from the start that a price was being paid for their influx in terms of the colonial sense of security. The *GTJ*'s initial response on hearing of the Mfengu migration was far from welcoming. It expressed the hope that the news was unfounded since 'we are firmly convinced that no people of that class can or will, resist the temptation of plundering the colonists'.[18] A contributor to the journal's letters column reminded frontier colonists of the difficulty that the colonial authorities had experienced controlling labour admitted from across the frontier under Ordinance 49 of 1828, when a pass system had proved ineffectual. The conclusion was that 'much as we may want servants ... the Kafirs [in this case

including Mfengu] cannot with safety be employed generally for many years to come'.[19]

Fears concerning the Mfengu's 'reliability' as labourers seem to have been widely realised. As one colonist put it, 'The Fingoes having been allowed to enter the Colony and work for the inhabitants have had an opportunity (and one they have not failed to improve) of stealing from the farmers to a very considerable extent'.[20] Despite the officially constructed difference between Mfengu and Xhosa, vocal colonists soon perceived that 'there is not a shade of difference between the Kafir and the Fingoe, and ... both of them will steal whenever there is a chance'.[21] A particularly thorny issue was the arming of Mfengu herdsmen against possible raiders. For a start, the value of a gun was likely to exceed the amount that a servant would earn by remaining in service - a temptation to desert if ever there was one. But in addition, many settlers had qualms about putting 'weapons into the hands of those who may, very probably, turn them upon us'.[22]

The colonial authorities' ability to ensure that only docile labourers were admitted into the colony was evidently seen by colonists as being far too limited. Some suggestions envisaged a return to the type of vagrancy legislation which had been vetoed in 1834. Other proposals included a system whereby Mfengu within the colony would have to carry certification that the cattle accompanying them had been paid in wages, and an annual hiring fair at which those to be employed on farms and those to be barred from the colony would be designated. Settlers also advocated the adoption of a treadmill to punish Mfengu found wandering within the colony without productive employment.[23] In the event none of the settler proposals was implemented.

Official attempts to reconcile labour and security demands hinged on an attempted pass system which, as we shall see, created further colonial divisions.

Apart from a simple lack of policing resources along the frontier, there was another reason why colonists did not get the official control that they wanted over Mfengu labour. This was that the authorities themselves did not perceive the Mfengu exclusively in terms of their labouring function. They were also intended to serve a particular strategic function. It was realised in official circles that Mfengu men would act as a more effective buffer against future Xhosa incursions if at least some were established within the colonial margins as settled farmers, with a stake in colonial stability, rather than entirely as servile labourers.[24] Mfengu were located within the 'ceded' territory around Fort Thomson on the Tyhume River and at Peddie and Fort Beaufort. In Queen Adelaide Province, they were concentrated around King William's Town. Commissioners were to locate them in designated areas, as far as possible in 'tribes' and families, making sure to leave fertile ground between the locations for colonial farms. All the Mfengu men on the locations were to assemble armed for the defence of the colony when required and to pass on intelligence concerning the Xhosa, but a particularly vital strategic role was to be played by the Mfengu located on the Tyhume River. They were to 'serve as a cordon or watch line' against Xhosa from the Amatoles.[25]

It was for this reason that the designated Mfengu locations were not merely labour camps. Within their locations, a significant minority of Mfengu seem to have flourished with colonial support. The Commissioners of Fort Beaufort reported that in the six months since the Mfengu had been located there,

'barren' land had been turned into 'large patches of Indian corn in a most luxurious state'. The Commissioners felt assured that 'the first step towards their civilization has been made'. Colonial donations of food, goats, seed corn and agricultural implements and what seemed to be stable tenure within the Mfengu locations had assisted an élite group to emerge.[26]

However, the establishment of Mfengu as landed colonial allies directly conflicted with settler claims to land, and was accordingly resented. Godlonton complained that while British settlers were denied land, 350 square miles of the 'ceded' territory was allocated to the 'friendly' Gqunukhwebe Xhosa (located in a wedge of coastal land extending either side of the Keiskamma River) and the Mfengu, 'a strange nation who had no claims upon us, but who plundered us'.[27] In one sense his fears were well-founded. It quickly became evident that the majority of Mfengu, who were not favoured with land and colonial assistance, were being driven by distress to ignore the pass regulations and enter the colony or move back into Queen Adelaide Province around King William's Town. Some returned to seek a humiliating reinstatement of their former status as clients of the Gcaleka, or if they were originally Xhosa themselves, simply returned to their kraals hoping to remain unmolested for their 'betrayal'. While others sought work, as had been intended, many, as we have seen, threatened the colonists' herds.[28] Despite the convergence of official and settler views on the extension of the colony into Xhosaland, and despite the settlers' enthusiastic support for D'Urban's forceful post-war intentions, the strategic approach of the governor was still insufficient to fulfil settler imperatives for land, labour and security.

6. Missionaries and Civilisation

Harry Smith, as we have seen, intended the missionaries distributed among the Xhosa in Queen Adelaide Province to be the key agents for their cultural transformation, the harbingers of a new colonial order. The LMS had Friedrich Kayser at Knapp's Hope and John Brownlee at King William's Town. The Glasgow Missionary Society (GMS) had William Chalmers and Robert Niven at the Tyhume, James Laing at Burnshill, John Ross at Pirie and John Bennie at Lovedale. James Weir and Alexander McDiarmuid were further GMS missionary artisans. The Wesleyans (WMS) in Xhosa territory included John Shepstone at Wesleyville, William Boyce at Mount Coke and John Ayliff at Peddie.[1]

Philip, the LMS Director, disagreed vehemently with D'Urban and Smith over the causes of the war and their initial policy of expulsion. For him, the Xhosa attack, however regrettable, had not been launched on 'unoffending' colonists and it was by no means unprovoked. In his correspondence with London humanitarians, he had made his view clear: the war had been caused by the series of Xhosa expulsions, and above all by the iniquitous spoor law. To then expel the Xhosa from a further, unprecedentedly large slice of their territory was, for Philip, outrageous.[2] Nevertheless, the objectives of the individual LMS missionaries in the new province overlapped significantly with the expressed intentions of D'Urban's subsequent policy of conversion and acculturation. The LMS missionaries all requested to be allowed back into the new province immediately after the war to carry on enthusiastically a proselytisation that was now, apparently, to be more coherently backed by the colonial government. Reporting to Smith, most returned in December 1835.[3]

Once the plan to expel the Xhosa had been stymied by their continuing military resistance, Philip and Fairbairn themselves saw, for the first time, the potential for coherent support for their evangelical endeavours. They both held visions of colonial advance just as strongly as the commercially-orientated settlers, but, as we have seen, of a very different nature. Smith's rhetoric seemed for a while to promise that Britain would indeed make, as Philip ardently desired, 'her dominion a blessing to this illfated continent'.[4] However, from the start Fairbairn had some pragmatic reservations concerning the military's attempts to undermine chiefly authority and the cost of establishing a proper administrative infrastructure. As the nature of the transformative process really envisaged under military occupation became clearer, he expressed further reservations.[5] Philip's was soon to become the leading voice invoked against D'Urban's scheme in the metropole.

Like their LMS counterparts, the GMS missionaries were willing to utilise the opportunity of Queen Adelaide Province for what they saw as the spiritual gain of the Xhosa. All agreed that the British conquest had opened the door to the Xhosa's widespread conversion, provided the province's subsequent occupation was handled properly. Chalmers in particular held fondly a vision of the Xhosa 'transformed and saved and made happy' under more direct British influence, and he, Niven and Laing were impatient to employ converted Xhosa to fan out across the countryside and provide grassroots Christian training.[6] To assist in this long term endeavour, Bennie began labouring on a first Xhosa translation of the Bible. Alongside the GMS missionaries' educational efforts were more immediate contributions. Notable among these was the construction of a model irrigation channel, reflecting Christianity's status as part of the entire package of material civilisation.[7]

However, there were varying degrees of enthusiasm within the GMS over the mechanics of the British administration and in particular, over Smith's plans for the missionaries. Chalmers was most pleased with Smith and communicated his enthusiasm to a metropolitan GMS audience.[8] But even he had reservations about the formal role which Smith envisaged for the missionaries, and he came into direct conflict with the provincial commander over the appropriation of Xhosa land for a new mission station. Chalmers, like the other GMS missionaries, did not wish to be alienated from the Xhosa by too close an association with Smith's military state.[9] Laing ventured further in expressing his concern that the missionaries' endeavours, at least in the short term, might be actively undermined by Smith's unsubtle interventions. His initial approval for the military authority soon gave way to reservations about the quasi-official role that was being developed for the Wesleyans in particular, and about the whole concept of 'forced civilisation'.[10] For these nonconformists, despite their broader programme for cultural transformation, the original evangelical goal of driving 'a wedge between the realm of the spirit and the temporal affairs of government' was still remembered. With all their initial hopes for extended British authority in the province, their object was not to enforce military discipline, but rather 'to lay the ground for a new moral economy based on the clear separation ... of sacred authority and secular power'.[11]

The Wesleyan missionaries generally shared the LMS and GMS missionaries' early perceptions of Queen Adelaide Province as an opportunity for government-backed evangelicalism, but they alone maintained enthusiastic support for Smith's administration. This was largely because of their much closer settler ties. Rather than being evangelicals sent to the Cape by their

societies in Britain, two of the leading Wesleyan missionaries, Shepstone and Ayliff, had themselves arrived as members of settler parties in 1820. The settlers' first frontier ministry was delivered by Wesleyans, and many were allowed to participate in Methodist classes and lay preaching from which they would have been excluded in the Anglican Church.[12] Unlike Philip, and far more clearly than most GMS missionaries, the Wesleyans agreed with the leading settlers, Smith and D'Urban that the Xhosa were the ruthlessly guilty party in the recent war, and the settlers entirely innocent. Even before the war, Rev. Shrewsbury had declared of the Xhosa that 'were it not that I desire to promote the salvation of their souls, I would not dwell amongst such a wretched people another hour'. After it, while Rev. Shaw proposed the seizure of their land and its distribution to settler sheep farmers, Shrewsbury suggested that Xhosa who had killed colonists and soldiers should be executed, and those spared be tagged with tin identity plates so that their movements could be monitored while they were put to 'merciful' hard labour building colonial roads.[13]

Regardless of their different attitudes towards the authorities and towards the Xhosa in the province, all the missionaries were to experience frustration. Much as they had done before the war, when most converts, like the Mfengu, were in some way marginal to Xhosa society, the missionaries continued to despair at the Xhosa's resistance to the Christian message.[14] Christianity would be appropriated and refashioned by the Xhosa *en masse* later in the century, as part of an ongoing struggle to increase their realm of autonomy within the colonial system.[15] But while they still had a cultural independence, while their society had yet to be reconstructed under a more powerful colonialism, they remained largely impervious. Most missionaries in the

province had roughly 20 to 40 regular church attendees, but if other Xhosa did not mock them in private, they told them straight that they would not support the God of the men who had destroyed their gardens in the war. Pious GMS missionaries who attempted to interrogate the Xhosa whom they met on the road as to the meaning of the immortal soul or to interrupt their daily activities to sermonise, failed to see the amusing side of Xhosa men, women and children amiably deserting their kraals and fleeing in all directions at their approach. Amongst many dissapointments, Chalmers himself noted as typical a chance encounter with two Xhosa girls during one of his regular preaching tours. Having been reprimanded for bathing rather than attending Sunday school, the girls appeared contrite and began to walk in the direction of the mission, but only until Chalmers had continued on his way. Upon turning around in his saddle some hundred yards further along the path, the forlorn missionary witnessed the girls as happily immersed in the pool as they had been when he first appeared.[16]

Many Xhosa commoners resented missionary favouritism of the Mfengu and most chiefs played a subtle game with the missionaries, attempting to manipulate them as potentially useful representatives of the British authorities, whilst avoiding the cultural surrender and the tedious rituals to which the missionaries wished to subject them.[17] Where there were mutual advantages to be gained, balances could be struck. For instance, Xhosa chiefs more or less co-operated in the construction of watercourses supervised by the exceptional humanitarian Resident Agent Charles Lennox Stretch and the LMS and GMS missionaries.[18] Such schemes brought more reliable water supplies for the Xhosa while they brought signs of a willing transition towards 'civilisation' for the missionaries. However, more typical of missionary-Xhosa interaction

within the province is the resigned report of Laing: 'Failed to persuade boys to attend [Sunday] school as they were looking in the forest for herbs which they needed for their circumcision rites'.[19]

7. Xhosa Resistance and Colonial Compromise

In the wake of the war, wholesale Xhosa destitution was evident and widespread. Communities had not only been shattered by British invasion forces and had their crops destroyed, but were also plagued by locusts.[1] Such was their distress that the *GTJ* was able to report gleefully on 19 May 1836 that the Xhosa would now accept whatever settler traders were willing to offer them. The suffering continued later in some areas than others, where the occupying forces brought partial relief, but particularly to the Mfengu.[2] Xhosa responses to their deprivation varied. Some simply made do under their chiefs, the warriors among them often raiding other Xhosa chiefdoms, colonists or especially Mfengu. Others went to seek material, if not spiritual assistance at mission stations. Many migrated to find work within the colony, possibly claiming to be Mfengu, or begged there or among the Gcaleka.[3] Without doubt, the numbers releasing themselves from direct chiefly authority after the war were unprecedented.

Queen Adelaide Province, as we have seen, was based on an initial intention to pursue more vigorously such a disintegration of chiefly authority. The intention was legitimated partly by an expressed concern for Xhosa commoners vis a vis their chiefs, and Resident Agent Stretch, for example, was genuinely committed to counter the worst abuses of chiefly authority to which Xhosa commoners were subject.[4] The Xhosa chiefs themselves were sincerely worried by the possibility that the British would succeed in hiving their followers away from them and were initially extremely anxious about the presence of the military posts.[5] Maqoma planned an abortive emigration from

the province into Basotho territory and then threatened collaborators while the Gcaleka paramount, Sarhili, apparently bowed to British hegemony and used the British courts in the province, even though British jurisdiction did not technically extend to his territory.[6]

However, it soon proved that, although their autonomy was definitely restricted by the British presence, the Xhosa chiefs were more capable of resistance than they had originally thought. In fact the British military and administrative presence was relatively weak. Despite the construction of forts within each Xhosa location, there were no metropolitan reinforcements and only 1,300 soldiers were available. Many of these were ill with scurvy and their commander, Smith, was distracted for much of the time by an ongoing military Court of Enquiry. During the war, Smith had extended his theatre of operations, as we have seen, into Gcaleka territory, even though it was the Rarabe on the western side of the Kei who had launched the attack on the colony. Having accepted the Gcaleka paramount, Hintsa (Sarhili's father) into his camp for negotiations, Smith had taken him hostage until 'war reparations' were paid in cattle by his followers. When the king had tried to escape, he had been killed and his ears cut off as settler trophies. Settlers and soldiers under Smith's command had also tried to cut out his teeth and possibly sever his genitals. The local Court of Enquiry had been convened under pressure from disgusted humanitarians in Britain, who had been informed of these events by their Cape counterparts. Throughout his command of the province, Smith was obliged to spend much time and effort fabricating an intricate version of events and instructing subordinate witnesses, so that he and certain settlers could escape direct censure by the Court. Even aside from Smith himself though, the officials most intimately involved in running the province, the Resident

Agents, were overburdened by administrative duties during the entire British occupation, and complained that they had no time or resources to devote to colonial initiatives.[7] In a rare moment of candour, Smith wrote to D'Urban 'everything at a standstill ... no salaries for the magistrates, no anything done which ought to be'.[8]

What really developed in the conquered province was not the exertion of British might portrayed by Smith, and by historians who draw upon him, but an unstable balance of power negotiated at a variety of scales. At the largest scale, along a broad stretch of the frontier, the struggle was waged over pass regulations which were supposed to control the entry of Xhosa and Mfengu workers to the colony. Resident Agent Stretch and the settler Civil Commissioner of Graham's Town, Duncan Campbell, were at the forefront of this struggle. Campbell advocated the use of passes as a more effective control over both the Xhosa and the Mfengu and he was supported by Captain Armstrong, in command of the Kat River military post. Both men expressed widespread anger that the humane Stretch was being seemingly duped by Xhosa men and women applying for entry into the colony under a variety of implausible pretexts and often making off with colonial livestock.[9] In the mid 1830s though, Stretch was the more realistic of the three men in recognising the relative weakness of his position. He was aware that the military was unable to police the old frontier line adequately and he knew that harsher implementation of the pass regulations would lead only to their being flouted more obviously. At least with a tolerant application of the regulations, they could retain an apparent integrity.[10]

The Resident Agents within the province were forced into compromised and conciliatory positions due to persistent Xhosa exploitation of the structural weaknesses within their administration. The chief Mhala, described as a 'clever man' even by the *GTJ* and Harry Smith, proved particularly adept at this and his story is illuminating.[11] The Resident Agent placed in charge of him, Rawstorne, first tried to exert his authority over a cow that Mhala had confiscated from a subordinate. Such confiscations were now supposed to be the preserve of the British authorities and Xhosa chiefs had to solicit their permission before undertaking them. When summoned though, Mhala informed the messenger that he was busy going to a dance. After further ignored summonses, Rawstorne had Mhala's cattle seized. Much to his frustration though, Mhala soon appeared with orders from Smith to release the livestock, the commander of the province having realised that costly resistance would be encountered if the chief was not appeased. Shortly afterwards, Mhala unilaterally reclaimed the cattle paid in bridewealth to a man whose daughter had subsequently refused to marry the chief. He then bore patiently Rawstorne's official reprimand, before taking off the cattle anyway.[12]

Things did not always go Mhala's way. In his inability to force this nameless woman to marry him, he faced a definite curtailment of his former power. His anger led to an ineffective outburst at the Resident Agent followed by a scuffle with a sentry (after which he had to be pacified with a silk handkerchief and a sheep).[13] Nevertheless Rawstorne concluded from all this that the power of the chiefs was 'still very extensive'. He continued, 'We must ... guard against giving the chiefs too much trouble ... at present they are losers by the change, whilst we still require of them assistance in administration of justice'.[14] On the one hand Rawstorne was facing up to the fact that his was not the

transformative power heralded by Smith and on the other hand, Mhala was recognising that he no longer had the freedom of action which he formerly held. Both men were negotiating a new power structure which hinged upon a delicate equilibrium between them.

And it was not only Mhala who was able to explore the limits of British power in the province. Resident Agent Bowker found that instead of punishing cattle thieves, he could only enforce the return of the stolen animals and even then many who were summoned on charges of theft sent the 'police' away contemptuously. Bowker complained that 'the Kafirs are such a wild race, should I commit one [to jail] I shall never catch another'.[15] The wartime collaborator Phatho himself restrained his followers from using Bowker's court and Bowker ended up relying on Phatho to secure for him accused Xhosa who did not appear voluntarily, thus giving the chief ample autonomy to decide who the British should and should not punish.[16] As in the case of Rawstorne and Mhala, Bowker and Phatho worked their way hesitantly towards a system in which each co-operated to a certain extent so that both could save face.

Not all the chiefs resented the British presence. Some profited by supplying the occupying colonial troops with food and transport and some needed British protection from other chiefdoms after their collaboration in the war.[17] But as the colonial administration prepared to abandon the province, the majority of chiefs demonstrated that their residual power, tested during the occupation in ways similar to those of Mhala and Phatho, was now to be made manifest once more. During the gradual withdrawal, while still wary of the British response, some revenge was exacted on the Mfengu and, with increased fines and harsher

punishments, the chiefly grip was drawn tighter around those commoners who may have wavered.[18]

Neither the missionaries nor the Resident Agents then, were the representatives of a new and overwhelming imperial power. The latter in particular did exercise power, but of a compromised nature, and within limits prescribed by the need not to push the Xhosa chiefs and their followers too far. Smith himself admitted the lesson: 'When I administered the government of kaffirland in 1836, I opened the gates of a flood which I could not stem, by undermining the power of the chiefs'.[19] By the late 1840s, a colonial administration led by Smith would be exerting a more coherent and effective power over the Xhosa chiefs and their followers. But it was able to do so only because British colonial discourse had shifted ground in the meantime, prompted partly by the continuing struggle between settler and humanitarian visions of 'progress'. The reversals of fortune experienced by humanitarians and settlers during the mid nineteenth century provides the subject of the next chapter.

8. The Metropolis and the Periphery, 1834-1865

In the interval between the sending of D'Urban's despatch describing the Xhosa as 'irreclaimable savages' and justifying the seizure of their land, and its reception in London, Peel's short-lived Tory government had been replaced by a Whig government again led by Melbourne. The new government was even more powerfully influenced by the ascendant humanitarians than its predecessor. The new Secretary of State for the Colonies, Lord Glenelg (Charles Grant) had himself been raised within the 'Clapham Sect' of evangelicals led by William Wilberforce. He was determined not only to follow the government programme of cutting expenditure in the colonies, but also to inject humanitarianism more effectively into colonial policy. His desire should not, however, be seen as a personal quirk. By the mid 1830s, not only Glenelg but, as Thorne shows, the much broader 'religious public' of Britain had become 'enormously receptive' to the 'voluminous body of [missionary] propaganda', produced to raise funds and volunteers, and 'representing the colonial encounter' in a humanitarian light.[1]

Glenelg was personally horrified by D'Urban's use of the phrase 'irreclaimable savages'. He informed the governor that 'there is, I fear, little prospect of reconciling your estimate of the Kaffre character with mine'.[2] And if the Colonial Secretary faltered in his conflict with Cape official and settler representations of the Xhosa, there was the prime proponent of humanitarianism in the House of Commons, Thomas Fowell Buxton, on hand to support him. Buxton, one of the leading abolitionists, was in turn a conduit through which Cape peripheral humanitarianism was channelled to the metropole. He was dependent primarily on Philip, Fairbairn and the LMS

missionaries for his information on the colony and, in the 1830s, Philip especially was industrious with his communications, ensuring that the settlers and officials of the Cape would be brought to book in London for their colonising activities.

With the Cape frontier at the top of the colonial agenda, Buxton succeeded in getting a House of Commons Select Committee appointed to investigate the treatment of 'Aborigines' in the British empire, but particularly in the Cape. As Chair, he instructed the committee 'to consider what Measures ought to be adopted with regard to the native Inhabitants ... in order to secure to them the due observance of Justice, and the protection of their Rights, to promote the spread of civilisation among them, and to lead them to the peaceful and voluntary reception of the Christian Religion'.[3] Implicit throughout the committee's questioning of key witnesses from the Cape during 1836 was the identification of official frontier policy, and of the self-aggrandisement of the settlers as being the main causes of the war. In its conclusion the committee noted that settlers had 'punished the natives as aggressors if they have evinced a disposition to live in their own country'.[4]

In addition to the Aborigines Committee, in 1836, as we have seen, the metropolitan government instituted the military Court of Enquiry into the killing and mutilation of Hintsa. This enquiry was in a sense a microcosm of contemporary colonial-metropolitan ideological interaction: on the one hand, there was a diversity of colonial interests, with settlers defending the culpable colonists, colonial officials closing ranks behind Smith, and local humanitarians calling vociferously for justice. And on the other hand, there was a liberal metropolitan concern prompted by the humanitarians'

condemnation of the settlers and enormously resented by those settlers and their officials. Ultimately, Smith's behind-the-scenes preparations for the Court of Inquiry proved successful. The barbarity of Hintsa's killing was condemned but the crime was pinned on no-one in particular.[5]

Despite Smith personally being let off the hook, however, Glenelg remained appalled by Hintsa's death. Combined with his existing reservations about official policy and the activities of the settlers, it influenced his policy decision. Using the proceedings of the Aborigines Committee and the representations from Cape humanitarians as evidence, and emphasising the need for economy in colonial administration, Glenelg responded critically to D'Urban's measures for the post-war settlement. Indeed, he wrote to D'Urban that the Xhosa, after the expulsions and appropriations that they had suffered at the hands of colony, had had 'a perfect right to hazard the experiment' of launching their 1834 attack.[6]

The reaction of both officials and settlers in the Cape was outrage. D'Urban showed some political astuteness in his own personal defence, invoking humanitarian rhetoric in expressing his intention to 'redeem' the Xhosa within the conquered province.[7] But he also sent envoys to London where they represented the Cape's humanitarians as the cause of the war. They argued that, in convincing the Xhosa of the validity of their grievances, the humanitarians had provoked their attack, and they further alleged that humanitarian missionaries, particularly Read, had directly incited the war and even supplied the Xhosa with arms. Settler and Cape official representatives successfully persuaded the king to the settlers' cause, but his intervention could only delay

Glenelg's final response. To the enormous chagrin of D'Urban, Smith and most of the British settlers on the Cape frontier, D'Urban's scheme for the forced cultivation of the Xhosa as docile subjects of British rule was abandoned in December 1836 and the governor himself was recalled to London. Andries Stockenström, a Boer who had become converted to humanitarianism partly through his friendship with Philip was appointed Lieutenant Governor of the frontier zone and, in 1837, a system of treaties recognising Xhosa independence similar to that which D'Urban had originally been instructed to install was imposed.

The successful campaign of the Cape humanitarians pushed the British settlers in South Africa into a predicament shared by colonists elsewhere during the age of humanitarianism, or, as Bowker put it disparagingly, of 'Aborigines' protection societies, Anti-slavery societies [and] Mission institutions'.[8] Caught up in the contradictions of humanitarian thinking, the settlers were utterly dependent on the metropole for protection, and yet simultaneously threatened by its reformist currents. Just as abolitionism and the agitations of the Baptist missionaries threatened the West Indian planters for instance, so labour reform and sympathy for indigenous land rights threatened the settlers of the eastern Cape.[9] It was this ambivalence in their relationship with the metropole that lay at the heart of a settler identity that was becoming simultaneously assertive, defensive and loudly loyal.

The order to withdraw from the conquered province was carried into effect only some eighteen months after its annexation, but in the meantime settler interests had aroused themselves into a political frenzy, both to justify the annexation and to salvage their own reputation in Britain. Even before the war

settlers, expressing their views in the *GTJ*, were disgusted with Philip and Fairbairn. The latter, after all, had suggested that Xhosa raids and murders were 'to be found only on the lips of lying men or in the imaginations of the timid Cockneys and Pin-makers who shrink from the bold eyes of a natural man'.[10] After their experience of Xhosa attack, it was widely considered among the settlers that the humanitarians were not simply Romantically naïve, but had 'use[d] us most rascally'. They were, in fact, 'unprincipled scoundrels'.[11] What really rankled with settlers such as Bowker was that Philip and his allies, 'with the assiduity of purpose that Satan himself might envy, have gained their object in persuading our countrymen, to whom we looked for sympathy and succour, that we are monsters". He continued,

> England, instead of protecting us, accuses us, who were born and bred in her bosom, and have the like feelings as the rest of her sons, of cruelty and oppression ... I begin to believe that the charge of cruelty fixed upon our West Indian planters has originated more in cant, helped out with a few solitary instances of cruelty, blazoned well forth as examples, than in anything else.[12]

Settlers found a valuable organ of metropolitan support in the Tory-inclined *Times*. The paper, by now protective of its metropolitan readership's expanded trading connections with the settlers, referred to the colonial humanitarians as 'ambitious hypocrites'. An editorial continued, 'When civilisation and barbarism meet, a shock will be felt, and is the liberal Cabinet of Downing Street to decree in their excessive devotion to mistaken philanthropy, that the former is to give way?'[13] In an attempt to build upon this base of support from metropolitan anti-humanitarianism, some leading settlers, inspired by

Canadian colonists, contemplated paying for a permanent representative of their interests in the London parliament.[14]

Although nothing came of this particular proposal, in their vocal protestations, settlers were developing a conscious political strategy, one which connected metropolis and colony. With the *GTJ* providing the central forum, the settlers stressed their economic value as capitalists, contributing to the wealth and prestige of the British empire. They asserted their vulnerability in the face of Xhosa 'savagery', the need to exercise imperial surveillance over this racial foe and the 'madness and despair' caused by the imperial assumption of their own guilt.[15] They pointed out, for the first time in an orchestrated way, their differentiation from the Dutch-speaking colonists who were deserting the frontier zone, and pressed their special claim to patronage as British subjects.[16] And, in a defensive adaptation of humanitarian rhetoric, they stressed their duty, as the bearers of enlightenment, to 'civilise' the Xhosa, whether they liked it or not, by putting them to honest work, thus fulfilling the empire's evangelical mission.

Even while the dust of war was still settling, Godlonton was penning an account of the frontier which he hoped would carry more weight in Britain than the few copies of the *GTJ* which currently circulated among officials and merchants. His *Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes*, published in 1836, was a history of persistent settler endeavour, the very essence of self-help, building up a civilised society on an inhospitable frontier, only for it to be destroyed by the unprovoked terror of the 'irreclaimable' Xhosa. Godlonton's next attempt to publicise the fate of the settlers in Britain, his

1844 *Memorials of the British Settlers of South Africa*, was purchased tellingly by Queen Victoria herself.[17]

In the face of contestation from humanitarians, settlers' representations had proved powerless in the metropole during the mid 1830s. The abandonment of Queen Adelaide Province had marked a defeat for both settlers' and Cape officials' projects. However, by the mid nineteenth century, settler propaganda such as Godlonton's was beginning to pay dividends. Through exactly the kinds of political and discursive struggles in which the Cape settlers continued to engage, a wider imperial consensus was being established. It was one which, in practice, paid far less regard to early nineteenth century humanitarian concern, even though it retained legitimating aspects of its rhetoric. In order to understand the creation of this more politically coherent late nineteenth century colonial discourse, we have to broaden our focus, situating struggles in the Cape alongside those in other colonies and in the metropolis, and identifying the connections between these diverse locales.

The 1830s marked the apotheosis of humanitarianism's direct political influence in the metropole. Shortly thereafter, Buxton lost his seat in the House of Commons and Philip retired from active politics. But the malaise of liberal humanitarianism went far deeper than the loss of influential metropolitan and colonial adherents. It occurred within a broader context of disillusionment with the colonised 'others' of empire. Disillusionment began with the experience of abolition itself. When 'emancipated' slaves, particularly in Jamaica, asserted their autonomy, when they refused to conform to the humanitarians' expectations of continued, diligent plantation work,

their 'inherent' racial characteristics were blamed by planters and their metropolitan supporters. Planters' propaganda concentrated on identifying the 'greatest good' for their colonies, and for the empire as a whole, with the prosperity of the plantations. With the decline of sugar production and the bankruptcy of estates, they argued that the humanitarian assumption that, once freed of legal constraints, blacks would soon 'improve' morally and economically, was evidently flawed. They were so successful that by 1846, even Henry Taylor, one of the principal metropolitan abolitionists, concluded that 'negroes, like children, require a discipline which shall enforce upon them steadiness in their own conduct and consideration for the interests of others'.[18] Stoler and Cooper summarise the ambivalent career of abolitionism well: 'Over the course of the nineteenth century, antislavery arguments defined slaves first as potentially civilizable - making European intervention a liberating phenomenon - and then as potentially resistant to the civilizing mission - making European intervention a necessity for global progress'.[19]

Thomas Carlyle was already channelling the Jamaican planters' imagery of former slaves 'sitting ... with their beautiful muzzles up to their ears in pumpkins ... while the sugar crops rot around them uncut' effectively to metropolitan audiences by the late 1840s.[20] But it was peripheral interpretations of far more widespread and violent resistance to the British 'civilising mission' which proved decisive in the 1850s and 1860s. In 1856, Palmerston's war against the 'kidnapping, murdering, poisoning, barbarian' Chinese, who had refused to co-operate with local British traders, indicated a new willingness on the part of Britain's bourgeois electorate to support peripheral capitalists with a more aggressive imperialism.[21] The Indian Mutiny of the following year was critical. Given India's prominence within the

empire, its administrators and settlers had always enjoyed well-developed connections with the metropolis, and India had figured large in British debates about cultural difference and colonial government.[22] The Mutiny proved a tremendous shock to liberals as well as to the British public at large, generating a 'fever of race hatred'. It gave rise to a more general assertion that 'the Indian could never be improved', and to the determination to maintain a tighter imperial grip over the subcontinent.[23] Combined with the difficulties of the West Indies planters and, as we shall see, new resistance in the Cape, the Mutiny meant that Glenelg's insistence on Colonial Office humanitarianism was virtually abandoned by the end of the 1850s.[24]

During the early 1860s, popular metropolitan notions of indigenous irreclaimability were consolidated by the Maori Wars. As Belich points out, since the well-publicised humanitarian cause of 'salvageability' in New Zealand had come to be 'based partly on [the Maoris'] readiness selectively to adopt European ways in commerce, agriculture, literacy and religion ... resistance was seen as a reversal of this trend; evidence that the civilising mission had failed, or even that it had always been doomed to failure'.[25] In Jamaica again, the Morant Bay rebellion broke out in 1865. Governor Eyre crushed the uprising and had 439 of its participants, as well as a 'mixed-race' member of the House of Assembly hanged. The governor found himself condemned by metropolitan humanitarians and their remaining influential allies, including John Stuart Mill, for treating blacks so much more harshly than he would have treated whites. They saw in the Eyre case the opportunity to challenge increasing British racism, to make a determined stand for the universal principles inherited from their abolitionist forefathers.[26] However, Eyre was defended both by the island's planters and by such leading metropolitan figures as Charles Dickens,

Alfred Tennyson and, predictably, Thomas Carlyle.[27] As Holt argues, 'British sympathy for coloured peoples had [already] been dulled by the Indian Mutiny ... and the ongoing Maori War' and upon his recall to Britain, the relieved Eyre 'soon discovered that racist fears found a receptive public'. His Defence Committee paid the legal bills of his struggle against the humanitarians and agitated in parliament on his behalf, so that he was never convicted of any crime. 'In the aftermath of Morant Bay and on the eve of its greatest imperialist adventures, British public opinion accorded more closely with Eyre and Carlyle than with Mill'.[28]

During the 1860s, the anti-humanitarian representations of settlers and officials from within the British empire were joined by additional influences from outside. As Robert Young argues, 'the debates about slavery that preceded and accompanied the American Civil War were undoubtedly significant in changing the terms of debate about race even in Britain'.[29] Propagandists from the southern states may not have secured material British backing for their struggle in the war with the Union, but they too contributed to a 'discernible hardening of attitudes as the stress on universal brotherhood gave way to the notion of an imperial hierarchy'.[30] The American slave-owners' propaganda converged with the stream of representations of racial 'others' which had been pouring into the metropole from colonial settlers like those in the Cape since at least the 1830s. It was a stream which flowed through potent books and articles such as Carlyle's, through parliamentary debates, through published settler memorials like Godlonton's and through the popular press, although far more work needs to be done on the dimensions of this process before the late nineteenth century.[31] Cumulatively, as Stoler indicates, this colonial stream of representation enhanced the prestige and stimulated the enquiries of

scientific racism, helping to establish it as a more pervasive model of social interaction in both colony and metropole by the late nineteenth century.[32]

Propaganda from settlers on the peripheries, and even from outside the empire then, had assaulted humanitarian arguments and revealed their contradictions more effectively by the 1860s than it had done in the 1830s. Former slave-owners and colonists had managed to persuade those in the metropole more convincingly of the dangers involved in living among 'irreclaimable savages'. The persistence and the sheer volume of their representations, as well as their more rapid communication through technological improvements, did much to ensure their ultimate discursive dominance.[33] But the triumph of settler imagery was also profoundly assisted by its interaction with domestic, bourgeois concerns. The changing tide of imperial opinion cannot be conceived in isolation from Britain's own dynamic class and gender boundaries.

Respected spokesmen for the British bourgeoisie were becoming frustrated by the 1840s with the form of liberalism which enframed humanitarianism. The reformist drive at Westminster, with which colonial humanitarians had been able so effectually to connect in the 1830s, was grinding to a halt. Through the reforms that had already taken place, the bourgeoisie had been effectively incorporated within the governing élite and, as Evans argues, 'government based on property [had] not only survived but was strengthened thereby'.[34] The beneficiaries were now afraid that further reform might give 'proletarian hordes' the opportunity of exploiting 'bourgeois democracy to make socialism'.[35] The universalist liberalism which had helped propel bourgeois incorporation was accordingly being reformulated, allowing it to accommodate

ideas of natural difference between the properly governing classes and their 'others'. Carlyle's 'diatribe' on the inherent limitations of freed Jamaican slaves was itself an important part of this reformulation. It was intended to be an attack as much on Classicial liberal political economy, with its assumption of undifferentiated human nature, as it was on those former slaves.[36] Arguments such as Carlyle's, that the basic premises of Classical liberalism and humanitarianism were disqualified by innate differences, were becoming as characteristic of bourgeois discourse in the 1850s as evangelical rhetoric had been in the early 1830s.[37] Metropolitan liberalism was thus 'changing its tune' to a more defensive utilitarianism, and it was doing so partly through recourse to colonial analogy.

Long-held settler representations became more powerful in the metropolis because they expressed a language of inherent difference in which domestic class and gender relations could now be more conveniently framed. Settler constructions 'captured in one sustained image internal threats to the health and well-being of a social body where those deemed a threat lacked an ethics of "how to live" and thus the ability to govern themselves'.[38] Notions akin to the settlers' racial 'irreclaimability' could be used to legitimate domestic control over women, the 'undeserving poor', the 'insane' or 'criminals'. Such notions were not, as Stoler insists, 'a "European" disorder or a specifically colonial one, but a "mobile" discourse of empire that designated eligibility for citizenship, class membership, and gendered assignments to race'. Through their deployment, the 'others' of empire were associated with the 'others' at home.[39]

9. The New British Imperialism in the Eastern Cape

British settlers on the Cape frontier had been generating coherent, even 'proto-scientific' representations of inherent racial difference, such as those based on phrenology, since the 1834-5 war. But by 1844, explicitly using Carlyle's *Past and Present* for support, Bowker felt able to express an extreme settler agenda without fearing a powerful metropolitan rebuke.[1] In a much reported speech he declared:

> The day was when our plains were covered with tens of thousands of springboks; they are gone now, and who regrets it? Their place is occupied with tens of thousands of merino sheep, whose fleeces find employment to tens of thousands of industrious men: are they not better than the springbok? Yet I must own that when I see two or three of them on the wide plains, and know that they are the last of their race, my heart yearns towards them, and I regret that so much innocent beauty, elegance, and agility, must needs be swept from the earth. My feelings towards the Kafir are not of that stamp. I know that he has disregarded the zealous missionary for years. I know that he has once overrun and destroyed these districts, and I fear him, knowing him to be ready and willing to do it again. I know him to be the great bar to all improvement amongst us. I know that rapine and murder are in all his thoughts, and I see them in his looks, and hate him accordingly ... and I begin to think that he too, as well as the springbok, must give place, and why not? Is it just that a few thousands of ruthless, worthless savages are to sit like a nightmare upon a land that would support millions of civilised men happily? Nay; Heaven forbids it.[2]

While settler constructions were to achieve their greatest influence over the metropole in the late 1850s and 1860s, humanitarian constraints on those settlers had already been loosened by the ideological changes of the 1840s. When the new treaties with the Xhosa were breached by a fresh Cape Governor, provoking the Xhosa to war again in 1846, they had no advocates of any description either in Cape or in British affairs. Their renewed resistance was almost universally seen as a manifestation of their failure, or their unwillingness to 'learn'. Macmillan notes how during this war, humanitarian discourse in the Cape was effectively suspended. 'Fairbairn and the Commercial Advertiser supported [Governor] Maitland's policy, not without some eyebrows being raised'.[3] In fact Fairbairn had made a personal transition reflecting the wider processes of empire. During the 1840s he rejected his earlier 'idealism' and, influenced by Cape merchants, he began to uphold a less sympathetic and more utilitarian political economy. In this new scheme, the Xhosa's conquest should be effected for their own good, as they would never 'improve' without it.[4] Even Philip refrained from defending the Xhosa in 1846 and, in accepting the second attempt at colonial annexation up to the Kei River after the war, the Colonial Office announced its despair of ever attaining peace on the frontier without imperial domination.[5]

With the former Queen Adelaide Province annexed once again in 1847 and now named British Kaffraria, the waning of colonial humanitarianism had its counterbalance in the rise of settler influence. The continued expansion of wool farming tied the settlers closer to the purse-strings of the colonial government and prompted agitation for enhanced political representation. In 1834, the Cape had exported 114,000 lb. of wool; by 1841, the figure was over 1,000,000 lb., and in 1851, 5,500,000 lb., with wool having become the

colony's largest revenue producer.[6] In 1854, the economic value of the Cape settlers was recognised. Although the eastern Cape separatism for which many frontier settlers had agitated was not allowed, with the granting of Representative Government, they were given a formal voice in Cape government policy.[7]

The extension of colonial control over British Kaffraria and the devastation of Rarabe Xhosa society caused by further defeat in war, allowed for the realisation of long-held settler schemes, first for the appropriation of more Xhosa land, and secondly for the more effective domination of Xhosa labour. Settlers bearing arms were strategically placed by the government, now headed by Harry Smith himself, between confined Xhosa locations. This made British Kaffraria, like Queen Adelaide Province was intended to be before it, 'a chess-board of black and white areas'.[8] Labour supplies for the colonial sheep farms would be siphoned from the black areas on the 'board'. A Government Proclamation of 1848 referred to 'the present attempt, by a system of "apprenticing" young natives, to add to the scanty supply of labour [and] reclaim a number of the youth of British Kaffraria [to] contribute to the peace of this important province'.[9] The Xhosa were also to be taxed for the first time, stimulating further labour flows from their 'locations' to the white farms. While, in early nineteenth century colonial discourse, 'segregation' had meant a firm barrier to intercourse between social and cultural bodies of rough parity, by the late 1840s it had come to signify a much more complex pattern of interlocking but unequal spatial and labour relations. The old, bounded form of segregation had disappeared along with a roughly equal distribution of power across the frontier line.

Within the segregationist framework of British Kaffraria, the erosion of chiefly authority was once again pursued, only this time more successfully. Henry Calderwood, Commissioner with the Ngqika, reported in April 1847 that many Xhosa were residing within one chief's location whilst professing allegiance to another. This was a sure sign of the breakdown of Xhosa political structures. Furthermore, a census indicated that in the two years following 1846, the number of Ngqika Xhosa had diminished from 55,000 to 30,000, many being absent in Gcaleka territory in search of food and land.

A testament to the remarkable tenacity of the most direct form of Xhosa resistance, the Eighth Frontier War broke out in 1850. The missionary Rev. Niven outlined the context as well as any, noting the 'evil of depriving [the Xhosa] of so much land and giving the Europeans a position in the little that is left, which will, I fear, end in the Caffres becoming a nation of degraded servants on their own soil'.[10] Despite being joined in their resistance to encroaching capitalism and racism by Khoikhoi servants, peasants and army deserters, the greater commitment of the metropole meant that by 1852, the Xhosa and their allies were brutally defeated once again. In 1857, in the wake of their repeated military failure and in the midst of yet another catastrophe - a lungsickness epidemic which was destroying their cattle - many Xhosa turned in desperation to the spiritual assistance of their ancestors. Despite the exhortations of exceptional local colonial officials, and of other Xhosas who had seen the writing on the wall, thousands placed their faith in the prophecies of a young Xhosa woman. They slaughtered their remaining cattle and destroyed their crops as sacrifices to the ancestral spirits and as a sign of willingness to accept a new purity of existence, if only a precolonial order was restored.

Although the British authorities did not encourage the cattle killing, Governor Grey was determined to 'draw very great permanent advantages from the circumstance', making it a 'stepping stone for the future settlement of the country'.[11] Servitude was made a condition for Xhosa famine relief and the starvation of some 30,000 frontier Xhosa, and the utter dispossession of a roughly equal number, was thereby guaranteed.[12] Further white settlement in the partially depopulated land extended and consolidated the segregated 'patchwork of African and colonial agriculture'.[13] Now the authorities hoped, the process of the Rarabe Xhosa's supervision and, in the long term, disciplining, could begin in earnest. Their subjection to the full gamut of colonial juridical, medical, educational and supervisory institutions, and to further spatial projects of segregated control, could be anticipated.[14] Such institutions were integral to the sophisticated scheme adopted by Grey from 1854 to 1861. Having 'experimented' along the same lines with the Maori whilst governor in New Zealand, he intended fundamentally to alter the Xhosa 'character'. This would be achieved by

> employing them upon the public works which will open up their country, by establishing institutions for the education of their children and the relief of their sick, by introducing among them institutions of a civil character suited to their present condition, and by these and other means to attempt gradually to win them to civilisation and Christianity, and thus to change by degrees our at present unconquered and apparently unconquerable foes, into friends who may have common interest with ourselves.[15]

For Grey and the metropolitan government, this pleasing result could never be realised through benign and humane instruction, only through Xhosa land loss, hunger, dispersal and poorly remunerated toil.

Conclusion

British settler aspirations were forged on the Cape frontier through mutual material ambitions and experiences of conflict. They were worked into a political programme through a public 'conversation', created above all in the pages of the *Graham's Town Journal.* In the late nineteenth century, they proved triumphant. Much of the Rarabe Xhosa's land was appropriated, and their labour more successfully extracted for commercial use. However, this outcome was neither a complete fulfilment of settler plans and nor was it predetermined. Xhosa military resistance had prevented the expulsion which many settlers envisaged and brought about compromised colonial outcomes instead. During the first attempt to colonise the Xhosa within Queen Adelaide Province, their residual power had led to administration through their chiefs, a principle which later became formalised elsewhere and known as indirect rule. Although the Xhosa were subsequently brought within a more powerful colonial nexus, their continuing resistance necessitated further accommodation. Colonists and their officials did not originally intend to create a segregationist landholding pattern. This too was an arrangement reached through contestation between dispersed nodes of colonial and Xhosa power, rather than the result of unmitigated colonial domination. True, once they were officially recognised, the African 'locations' could be used as a tool for social control and labour extraction, but as far as settlers were concerned, they were a tool of second choice to a more decisive expulsion.

Paradoxically though, Xhosa resistance also provided settlers with an effective argument for further conquest and dispossession. Xhosa responses to military aggression and to the missionaries' spiritual work provided settlers and their

apologists with useful 'evidence' of an incapacity to be rendered civilised without the deployment of force. With missionaries themselves, and especially the Wesleyans, becoming disillusioned with the Xhosa's determined cultural integrity, the repetition of this interpretation, and its reverberation between the settler colonies and the metropole, would become the most successful of the settlers' political strategies.

Those political strategies were necessary because settler projects were not favoured within colonial discourse simply by default. They had to be promoted and made to prevail over other, competing colonial agendas. While the recently arrived settlers were beginning to construct a coherent programme for their new frontier environment, their officials were operating within a model of colonialism inherited from the Napoleonic War and based upon military authoritarianism. The Cape's governors were preoccupied with a particular concept of 'order': one which required the frontier to be secured defensively from the 'otherness' of the Xhosa, rather than advanced for capitalist ends. However, it was also a concept which was proving consistently counter-productive because of its strategic insistence on Xhosa expulsions. D'Urban personified the way that colonial policy in the early nineteenth century responded to such failures, and yet still remained wedded to a similar exclusionary concept of order. He arrived in the Cape with faith in a new, humanitarian-inspired strategy to achieve stability through treaties. But in the face of armed Xhosa resistance, and much to the delight of the settlers, he quickly qualified his idealism and reverted to describing the Xhosa as 'irreclaimable', and in need of military subjugation.

D'Urban's intention to expel the Rarabe Xhosa from Queen Adelaide Province and distribute their land as sheep farms seemed to have removed any distinction between official and settler approaches, but Xhosa resistance necessitated an alternative policy - that of 'forced' civilisation. Settlers who thought that they had won a significant victory found themselves disagreeing with the colonial government over land allocation and labour controls. They would not gain a more effective sway over the colonial authorities until they had gained Representative Government and this depended upon turning the tide in an intense and profound struggle with their primary political antagonists, the colonial and metropolitan humanitarians. When, through their influence in the metropole, the Cape humanitarians secured the complete withdrawal from the newly conquered province, an unprecedentedly vigorous political contest was begun.

Evangelical humanitarians had adopted a concept of 'order' which could be attained only at a far more personal level than the governing élite's equivalent vision. Theirs relied upon a deep and subtle change of personality, a transformation of the individual 'soul' as well as of external behaviour. During the early years of the nineteenth century, their programme of redemption became enmeshed within a pervasive bourgeois, liberal political economy in which each individual was assumed to be continually striving for both material and moral improvement. From its beginnings in the abolitionist and reformist movement, humanitarianism was a colonial as well as a metropolitan phenomenon. It was apparently premised on a universalist notion of human nature, and it refused to distinguish between the experiences of slaves and coerced labourers in the colonies, and the benighted working classes at 'home'.

Even before the first experiment of colonising the Xhosa had taken place, conflict between humanitarian ideals and the brute realities of colonial labour coercion and frontier aggression had become evident, and a humanitarian critique of Cape settlers and officials was being relayed effectively to the metropole by Philip. During the brief experience of colonisation in Queen Adelaide Province, the tensions between humanitarians and local officials remained, with LMS and GMS missionaries being deeply ambivalent about Smith's domineering schemes. On the one hand, they sincerely regretted the implications of force in official rhetoric, and sought a purifying separation between their own affairs and those of the worldly colonial state. On the other hand, however, in the face of the Xhosa's refusal to 'learn', like their WMS counterparts, they hoped for more effective official support for their endeavours. Matters became clearer for them when battle was joined with the settlers over the proper course of colonialization as a whole. Here the Cape humanitarians' duty was evident. They had to promote a construction of the Xhosa as 'reclaimable barbarians' more effectively than the settlers could promote their own imagery of the 'irreclaimable savage'. They had to persuade metropolitan opinion at large, and the Colonial Office in particular that neither expulsion nor coercive military domination was compatible with redemption.

Despite the humanitarians' success in 1836 however, the contradictions of their 'universal' premises became increasingly apparent during the next twenty years. While humanitarianism was articulated in abstract, universal terms, it had developed out of the particular bourgeois experiences of Britain's social and economic transformation. Humanitarian desire for redemption involved a transition to a beneficial Christian spirituality for those who had not yet seen

the light, but it also entailed the adoption of what its bourgeois proponents saw as virtue here on Earth. As the British bourgeoisie gained hegemony, it became increasingly apparent that a 'virtuous' social order did not necessarily mean an egalitarian one. When the 'undeserving' poor and the colonised 'others' of empire continued to spurn 'virtue', domestic class and imperial racial concerns could be expressed in the same language. The inherent difference of both the British working class and the racial 'others' of empire legitimated their social exclusion, and tutelage by their betters. As Holt writes, 'It may be that [the] language of "class" provided a vocabulary for thinking about race, or vice versa. It hardly matters; what is important is the symmetry of the discourse, which perhaps intensified the conviction that this vision of the world was just'.[1]

The victory of settler representations was contingent partly upon humanitarianism's internal contradictions, the progressive disillusionment of its colonial proponents, and changes in the nature of bourgeois liberalism in the metropole. But active settler political representations also played their part in reformulating colonial discourse. Through metropolitan intermediaries, settlers pointed out the humanitarians' hypocrisy; they continually publicised their failure to transform the 'character' of indigenous peoples, and they assisted in the wider legitimation of the more callous mid-century liberalism. Their representations based on exclusion rather than universalism were successful partly because they seemed more robust and coherent. The humanitarian premise of a universal human nature, allowing global assimilation into a Christian brotherhood, was contradicted when indigenous peoples fought tenaciously to preserve their difference. But settlers'

constructions of irremediable difference, far from being fatally undermined by resistance to British power, were strengthened by it.

Humanitarianism never disappeared from colonial discourse. Instead, it was itself 'colonised' by settler and imperial interests. Imperial officials continued to invoke its rhetoric of benign evangelicalism and settlers learned to appropriate its notion of barbarian redemption in order to legitimate their capitalist expansionism. But early nineteenth century humanitarianism's political objective, its notion of a just colonial society, had effectively disappeared from colonial discourse in all but its remotest, justificatory guise by the late nineteenth century. The earlier efforts of 'naïve' humanitarians in both the metropole and the colonies had served only to 'prove' that full social inclusion was impossible because of the natural deficiencies within certain groups of people.

More research needs to be completed on the forging of British and other colonial discourses, and historical geographers could play a critical role. First, empirical work is needed on the ways that representations from the imperial periphery were conveyed and reinterpreted in various media, and refracted through the prisms of class and gender in the metropolis, as well as vice versa. Studies of such interactions across the spaces of empire are required especially for the critical mid-nineteenth century, when colonial settler and metropolitan bourgeois discourses intersected so potently. Only with the proliferation of such empirically grounded studies can McClintock's appealing notion of imperial power emerging 'from a constellation of processes' and 'taking haphazard shape from myriad encounters with alternative forms of authority, knowledge and power', be fleshed out.[2]

Postcolonial studies in general can be enhanced if colonial discourse is conceived as being continually constituted and reconstituted through the spatial circuits connecting different people, strategies, knowledges of difference and notions of citizenship. In the nineteenth century, colonial discourse was a critical terrain of struggle between situated agendas and representations of 'otherness'. Contestation between these agendas, combined with resistance from without, shifted the terms of discourse and determined the ways in which it would be manifested in 'concrete' reality. The Cape settlers' discursive victory, for instance, was critical to the more effective realisation of their capitalist agenda, which, in turn, had immediate and devastating consequences for the Rarabe Xhosa. As Stoler points out, the struggles between colonial and imperial interests which resulted in partial victories like that of the settlers, did not mean 'the end of one discourse and the emergence of another'. Rather, following Foucault, we can see discourse as comprised of vacillations. 'It operates at different levels and moves not only between different political projects but seizes upon different elements ... reworked for new political ends'.[3] Discourse analysis then, entails paying close attention to the contingencies of struggle at particular sites, so that these political projects can be understood. But it also requires an emphasis on the articulation of these projects across a broader discursive terrain and, perhaps most importantly, an appreciation of discourse's manifest, experienced effects.

* * *

Notes

Introduction: Colonial Discourse

[1] F. Driver, 'Geography's Empire: Histories of Geographical Knowledge', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space*, 10 (1992), 23-40; F. Driver and G. Rose (eds), *Nature and Science: Essays in the History of Geographical Knowledge* (London, 1992); D. Livingstone, *The Geographical Tradition* (Oxford, 1992), 216-59; A. Godlewska and N. Smith, *Geography and Empire* (Oxford, 1994); M. Bell, R. Butlin and M. Heffernan (eds), *Geography and Imperialism 1820-1940* (Manchester, 1995). Not all geographers of empire have focused on the writings of earlier geographers though. For work in different, broadly postcolonial veins, see for example A. Blunt, *Travel, Gender and Imperialism: Mary Kingsley and West Africa* (New York, 1994); J. Crush, 'Post-colonialism, De-colonisation, and Geography', in Godlewska and Smith, *Geography and Empire*; D. Gregory, 'Between the Book and the Lamp: Imaginative Geographies of Egypt, 1849-50', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 20 (1995), 29-57 and G. Kearns, 'The Imperial Subject: Geography and Travel in the Work of Mary Kingsley and Halford Mackinder', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 22 (1997), 450-72.

[2] Jean and John Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution: Christianity, Colonialism and Consciousness in South Africa*, vol. 1 (Chicago and London, 1991) and *Of Revelation and Revolution: The Dialiectics of Modernity on a South African Frontier*, vol. 2 (Chicago and London, 1997); A. L. Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault's History of Sexuality and the Colonial Order of Things* (Durham and London, 1995).

[3] A. McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (London and New York, 1995), 15.

[4] E. Said, *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient* (London, 1978), 94.

[5] T. Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt* (Cambridge, 1988), 165.

[6] Most notable in this regard is Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. See D. Landry and G. MacLean (eds), *The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak* (New York and London, 1996).

[7] Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 168.

[8] *Ibid.*, 19.

[9] See also D. Spurr, *The Rhetoric of Empire: Colonial Discourse in Journalism, Travel Writing and Imperial Administration* (Durham and London, 1993), 7-8.

[10] Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, 72.

[11] L. Lowe, *Critical Terrains: French and British Orientalisms* (Ithaca and London, 1991), 10.

[12] P. Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay: An Essay in Spatial History* (London, 1987), ch. 10; J. Duncan, *The City As Text: The Politics of Landscape Interpretation in the Kandyan Kingdom* (Cambridge, 1990), 5-6, 16-17.

[13] Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, 61.

[14] A. L. Stoler and F. Cooper, 'Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda', in F. Cooper and A. L. Stoler (eds) *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World* (Berkeley and London, 1997), 6.

[15] J. M. MacKenzie, *Orientalism: History, Theory and the Arts* (Manchester and New York, 1995), xv. See also A. McClintock, 'The Angel of Progress: Pitfalls of the Term "Post-Colonialism"', *Social Text*, 31-2 (1992), 84-98.

[16] J. Comaroff, 'Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience: Models of Colonial Domination in South Africa', in Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*, 16.

[17] See Carter, *The Road to Botany Bay*, 40-1.

[18] H. Bhabha, 'The Other Question: Difference, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism', in F. Barber et al (eds), *The Politics of Theory* (Colchester, 1983).

[19] Duncan, *The City as Text*, 17.

[20] See for example, B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths and H. Tiffin (eds), *The Empire Writes Back: Theory and Practice in Post-Colonial Literatures* (London, 1989). For a critique from 'within postcolonialism', see McClintock, *Imperial Leather*.

[21] See D. Kennedy, 'Imperial History and Post-Colonial Theory', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 24 (1996), 345-63; MacKenzie, *Orientalism*.

[22] Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*; G. Wright, *The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism* (Chicago, 1991); S. Mintz, *Sweetness and Power* (New York, 1985) and A. Davin, 'Imperialism and Motherhood', in Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*.

[23] Stoler and Cooper, 'Between Metropole and Colony', 3; S. Marks, 'History, the Nation and Empire: Sniping From the Periphery', *History Workshop Journal*, 29 (1990), 111-19; L. Colley, 'Britishness and Otherness: An Argument', *Journal of British Studies*, 31 (1992), 309-29. See also M. L. Pratt, *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation* (London, 1992), 6, 36 and B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York, 1991).

[24] Stoler and Cooper, 'Between Metropole and Colony', 14. See also A. Lester, '"Otherness" and the Frontiers of Empire: the Eastern Cape Colony, 1806-c.1850', *Journal of Historical Geography*, 24 (1998), 2-19.

[25] Lowe, *Critical Terrains*, 15.

[26] R. Guha and G. Spivak (eds) *Selected Subaltern Studies* (Oxford, 1988); A. Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self Under Colonialism* (Delhi, 1983); H. Bhabha, 'Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority Under a Tree Outside Delhi, May 1817', in H. L. Gates (ed), *Race, Writing, and Difference* (Chicago, 1986). See also E. Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (London, 1993) and Lowe, Critical Terrains, 192-3.

[27] McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 15.

[28] Stoler and Cooper, 'Between Metropole and Colony', 29. For an account of colonisation from Xhosa perspectives, see J. Peires, *The House of Phalo: A History of the Xhosa People in the Days of Their Independence* (Johannesburg, 1982).

Part One: Approaches to the Frontier, 1806-1835

Chapter 1: Cape Officials

[1] Quoted J. S. Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire: British Policy on the South African Frontier, 1834-1854* (Berkeley, 1963), 36.

[2] The term Bushmen is now seen by South African historians as being more acceptable than the alternative 'San', which was itself a derogatory label applied by the Nama. Bushman languages contain no generic word which transcends various groups: T. Dowson, 'Hunter-Gatherers, Traders and Slaves',

in C. Hamilton (ed.), *The Mfecane Aftermath: Reconstructive Debates in Southern African History* (Johannesburg, 1995).

3 See N. Worden and C. Crais (eds), *Breaking the Chains: Slavery and its Legacy in the Nineteenth Century Cape Colony* (Johannesburg, 1994); T. Keegan, *Colonial South Africa and the Origins of the Racial Order* (London, 1996), ch. 2; R. Shell, *Children of Bondage: A Social History of Slavery at the Cape of Good Hope, 1652-1838* (Johannesburg, 1994).

4 See M. Legassick, 'The Frontier Tradition in South African Historiography', in S. Marks and S. Trapido (eds), *Economy and Society in Pre-Industrial South Africa* (Harlow, 1980); S. Newton-King, *The Enemy Within: The Struggle for Ascendancy on the Eastern Cape Frontier, 1760-1799* (unpublished PhD thesis, London University, 1992).

5 R. Ross, 'The Developmental Spiral of the White Family and the Expansion of the Frontier', in R. Ross, *Beyond the Pale: Essays on the History of Colonial South Africa* (Johannesburg 1994); L. Guelke, 'Freehold Farmers and Frontier Settlers, 1657-1780', in R. Elphick and H. Giliomee (eds), *The Shaping of South African Society, 1652-1840* (Middletown, 1989).

6 S. Newton-King, 'Commerce and Material Culture on the Eastern Cape Frontier, 1784-1812', *Societies of Southern Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries Seminar Papers*, vol 14 (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London, 1988).

7 Peires, *The House of Phalo*, ch. 4.

8 Quoted , W. M. Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton: The Making of the South African Native Problem* (Oxford, 1963), 289.

9 Quoted Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire*, 4.

10 Cape Town State Archives (hereafter CA) GH 28/4, Cradock to Graham, 6 Oct. 1811.

[11] For a discussion of early nineteenth century European authorities' concepts of 'order' and 'disorder', see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 79, 82.

[12] CA GH 23/2, Calderwood to Castlereagh, 18 Sept. 1809.

[13] CA A454/14, Dalrymple to Dundas, 1787 (no precise date).

[14] See P. Curtin, *The Image of Africa: British Ideas and Action, 1780 - 1850* vol. 1 (Madison, 1964).

[15] CA GH 23/4, Cradock to Liverpool, 10 June 1812.

[16] CA CO 5807, Government Proclamation, 21 Aug. 1810.

[17] CA GH 23/4, Cradock to Liverpool, 7 March 1812.

[18] Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire*, 50.

[19] CA GH 23/4, Cradock to Liverpool, 7 March 1812. See B. Maclennan, *A Proper Degree of Terror: John Graham and the Cape's Eastern Frontier* (Johannesburg, 1986).

[20] Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 48.

[21] CA GH 23/5, Somerset to Bathurst, 24 April 1817.

[22] CA CO 5816, Government Advertisement, 18 Apr. 1817.

[23] CA GH 1/20, Goulbourn to Somerset, 22 Oct. 1816.

[24] CA GH 23/5, Somerset to Bathurst, 24 Apr. 1817.

[25] Quoted Macmillan, Bantu, Boer and Briton, 83.

[26] Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO) CO 48/165, Paper Prepared by Mr Beecham for the Use of Mr Buxton: The Cape of Good Hope, n.d. (1836).

[27] Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire*, 61.

Chapter 2: Evangelical Humanitarians

[1] Comaroff and Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, 47.

2 E. P. Thompson, *The Making of the English Working Class* (London, 1980), 385-440.

3 Patriotism was valued by the 'lower orders' partly because it could serve as 'a means of demanding a much broader access to citizenship'. L. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (London 1992), 5.

4 D. Valenze, quoted E. Elbourne, *'To Colonize the Mind': Evangelical Missionaries in Britain and the Eastern Cape, 1790-1837* (unpublished D. Phil thesis, Oxford University, 1991), 14.

5 S. Thorne, '"The Conversion of Englishmen and the Conversion of the World Inseparable": Missionary Imperialism and the Language of Class In Early Industrial Britain', in Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*, 244.

6 Stoler and Cooper, 'Between Metropole and Colony', 30. See also Colley, *Britons*, 351 and D. Brion Davis, *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823* (Ithaca, 1975).

7 E. J. Evans, *The Forging of the Modern State: Early Industrial Britain, 1783-1870* (London and New York, 1996), 48-54; T. C. Holt, *The Problem of Freedom: Race, Labour and Politics in Jamaica and Britain, 1832-1938* (Baltimore and London, 1992), 31-2.

8 Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 17-33.

9 Thorne, 'The Conversion of Englishmen'. The Cape had been taken briefly by Britain in 1795 before being handed back to the Netherlands in 1803.

10 Comaroff, 'Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience', 169.

11 For missionaries as heroes, see Thorne, 'The Conversion of Englishmen', 250-1. Quote from Stoler and Cooper, 'Between Metropole and Colony', 28.

12 Colley, *Britons*, 355. When the implications of humanitarianism

are considered below, it will appear far from coincidental that Wedgwood was best known to his contemporaries 'as a major innovator of techniques for inculcating industrial discipline': Holt, Problem of Freedom, 36.

13 *The Times*, August, 1819, quoted M. D. Nash, *Bailie's Party of 1820 Settlers* (Cape Town, 1982), 17.

14 Justus, *The Wrongs of the Caffre Nation* (London, 1837), 59

15 *Ibid.*, 60.

16 *Ibid.*, 56.

17 Holt, The Problem of Freedom, 53; Comaroff, 'Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience', 181-4. See also M. Legassick, 'The State, Racism and the Rise of Capitalism in the Nineteenth-Century Cape Colony', *South African Historical Journal* 28 (1993), 329-68, 338. On the inherent racial exclusions of Locke's and Mill's liberalism, see Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, 131.

18 A. Ross, *John Philip (1775-1851): Missions, Race and Politics in South Africa* (Aberdeen 1986); H. Botha, *John Fairbairn in South Africa* (Cape Town 1984).

19 J. Philip, *Researches in South Africa* vol. 2 (London 1828), 388

20 Justus, *The Wrongs of the Caffre Nation*, 239-41.

21 Comaroff, 'Images of Empire, Contests of Conscience', 165.

22 Justus, *The Wrongs of the Caffre Nation*, vi.

23 *Ibid.*, xii-xiii.

24 *Ibid.*, 129-30

25 *Ibid.*, 138, vi.

26 *Ibid.*, 171-2, 179. See also S. Bannister, *Humane Policy or Justice to the Aborigines of New Settlements* (London, 1830); PRO CO 48/165, Paper Prepared by Mr Beecham for the Use of Mr Buxton: The Cape of Good Hope,

n.d. (1836) and J.G. Pretorius, *The British Humanitarians and the Cape Eastern Frontier, 1834-1836* (Pretoria 1988).

27 Quoted Ross, *John Philip*, 141.

Chapter 3: British Settlers

1 Nash, *Bailie's Party*. The 'Peterloo massacre' would occur shortly afterwards. For overviews, see S. Lee, *British Political History, 1815-1914* (London, 1994), 28-35; Evans, *The Forging of the Modern State*, 191-200; E. Halévy, *The Liberal Awakening, 1815-1830: A History of the English People* vol. 2 (London, 1987) and K. Robbins, *Great Britain: Identities, Institutions and the Idea of Britishness* (London, 1998), 141-61.

2 H. J. M. Johnston, *British Emigration Policy, 1815-30: 'Shovelling Out Paupers'* (Oxford, 1972), 2-6, 12-14.

3 Quoted Nash, *Bailie's Party*, 7.

4 For the class struggles of the early settlement and the shifts of identity which colonisation entailed, see A. Lester, 'Reformulating Identities: British Settlers in Early Nineteenth Century South Africa', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* (forthcoming).

5 Acts of military aggression also included the attempted capture of Ngqika, the killing of twelve Xhosas while expelling the chief Maqoma from the 'ceded territory' and the firing upon, and capture of Xhosas admitted into the colony to collect clay. T. Stubbs (ed. W.A. Maxwell and R.T. McGeogh), *The Reminiscences of Thomas Stubbs* (Cape Town, 1978), 83, 162; T. Philipps (ed. A. Keppel-Jones), *Philipps, 1820 Settler* (Pietermaritzburg, 1960), 131-4; N. Mostert, *Frontiers: The Epic of South Africa's Creation and the Tragedy of the Xhosa People* (London, 1992), 558-6.

[6] Stubbs, *Reminiscences*, 81; Johnston, *British Emigration*, 46.

[7] CA A602/2, Journal of S. H. Hudson, Bathurst, 1821 (no precise date).

[8] Philipps, *1820 Settler*, 152.

[9] T. Pringle, *Narrative of a Residence in South Africa* (London, 1834), 289.

[10] See for example Philipps, *1820 Settler*, 289 and Moodie, *Ten Years in South Africa* (London, 1835) vol. 2, 274, 328, 336-7.

[11] For a more denigrating later imperialist idea of anachronistic space, see McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 40-2.

[12] Quoted B. Le Cordeur, *Eastern Cape Separatism, 1820-1844* (Cape Town, 1981), 40.

[13] *Ibid.*, 58. See also Moodie, *Ten Years*, 304-5.

[14] A. Lester, 'Cultural Construction and Spatial Strategy on the Eastern Cape Frontier, 1806-c1838', *South African Geographical Journal*, 78, 2 (1996), 101; R. Godlonton, *A Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes into the Eastern Province of the Cape of Good Hope, 1834-5* (Grahamstown, 1836), 39; Pringle, *Narrative*, 312-3 fn.

[15] H. H. Dugmore (ed. F. G. van der Riet and L. A. Hewson), *Reminiscences of an Albany Settler* (Grahamstown, 1958), 30. Missionaries too, 'could not but contrast our defenceless state with theirs; we were completely in their power ... yet no man offered to injure a hair of our head': W. J. Shrewsbury (ed. H. H. Fast), *The Journal and Selected Letters of Rev. William J. Shrewsbury, 1826-1835* (Johannesburg, 1994), 39.

[16] Philipps, *1820 Settler*, 257.

[17] Montgomery, *Reminiscences*, 92. See also Philipps, *1820 Settler*, 77-8, 96-7, 254.

[18] Thompson, *Travels and Adventures*, 1, 124.

[19] Stubbs, *Reminiscences*, 71.

[20] *Graham's Town Journal* (hereafter *GTJ*), 10 March and 7 Apr. 1836. Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 185-6.

[21] Pringle, *Narrative*, 250.

[22] Le Cordeur, *Eastern Cape Separatism*, 42-3.

[23] *GTJ*, various issues, 1831-4. See also C. Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance in Pre-Industrial South Africa: The Making of the Colonial Order in the Eastern Cape, 1770-1865* (Cambridge, 1992).

[24] Le Cordeur, *Eastern Cape Separatism*, 72.

[25] J. M. Bowker, *Speeches, Letters and Selections From Important Papers* (Graham's Town, 1864), 137.

[26] W. Shaw (ed. W. D. Hammond-Tooke), *The Journal of William Shaw* (Cape Town, 1972), 14; Le Cordeur, *Eastern Cape Separatism*, 76.

[27] *GTJ*, 23 Jan. 1835.

[28] See Lester, '"Otherness" and the Frontiers of Empire'; A. Bank, *Liberals and Their Enemies: Racial Ideology at the Cape of Good Hope, 1820-1850*, (unpublished PhD, University of Cambridge, 1995), 217-23 and 'Of "Native Skulls" and "Noble Caucasians": Phrenology in Colonial South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 22, 3 (1996), 387-404.

[29] *GTJ*, 12 Nov. 1835 and 10 Dec. 1835.

[30] Bank, 'Of "Native Skulls" and "Noble Caucasians"'. Although frontier Boers too, had fought wars with the Xhosa, it was the novel pressure of capitalist expansion which made the 1834-5 war so vicious and which prompted 'civilians' (although still not women and children) for the first time to become general targets. Bank refers to the similar popularity of phrenology among British agrarian capitalists in Australia and New Zealand, in the latter, particularly after the Maori wars of the 1850s and 1860s (402-3).

Part Two: Colonizing the Xhosa

Chapter 4: Official Programmes: The Military Ordering of the 'Savage'

1 Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 106-28.

2 CA GH 23/11, D'Urban to Spring Rice, 21 Jan. 1835.

3 CA GH 22/1, Smith to D'Urban, 14 Jan. 1835.

4 Pretorius, *British Humanitarians*, 75, 107-108; H. Smith, *Autobiography of Lieutenant General Sir Harry Smith, BART. GCB.* vol. 2 (London, 1901), 62.

5 CA GH 19/4, Shepstone to D'Urban, 13 Jan. 1835, Dugmore to D'Urban, 19 June 1835; F. G. Kayser (ed. C. Hummel), *F.G. Kayser: Journal and Letters* (Cape Town, 1990), 117.

6 CA GH 19/4, Hudson to D'Urban, 26 Aug. 1835; Peires, *The House of Phalo*, 163-4.

7 CA GH 28/12/1, Memorandum, 12 May 1835, enclosure no. 16.

8 CA GH 28/12/1, Proclamation, 10 May 1835, enclosure no. 12.

9 CA GH 28/12/1, Notice, 19 May 1835, enclosure no. 19; Kayser, *F. G. Kayser*, 117.

10 Smith, *Autobiography*, 65.

11 CA A 32, Chalmers to Balderston, 12 March 1836; Kayser, *F.G. Kayser*, 116.

12 *GTJ*, 3 Nov. 1836; Pretorius, *British Humanitarians*, 120 and 270; A. Webster, 'Unmasking the Fingo: The War of 1835 Revisited', in Hamilton, *The Mfecane Aftermath*, 259; *South African Commercial Advertiser*, 3 Feb. 1836.

[13] Cory Research Library, Rhodes University, Grahamstown (hereafter CL) MS 17042, Cory transcript, vol. 1589, Smith to D'Urban, 1 Sept. 1835.

[14] Mostert, *Frontiers*, 772.

[15] CA A 519, Smith to D'Urban, 10 June 1836; *GTJ* 11 Feb. 1836.

[16] CA A 519, D'Urban to Smith, 30 Sept. 1835.

[17] CA A 519, D'Urban to Smith, 17 Sept. 1835.

[18] CA GH 23/11, D'Urban to Glenelg, 7 Nov. 1835.

[19] CA GH 28/12/3, enclosure no. 10, Smith to D'Urban, 17 April 1836; CL, MS 17042, vol. 1589, Cory transcript, Smith to D'Urban, 17 Sept. 1835.

[20] CA A 519, Address given by Smith to Xhosa chiefs, 7 Jan. 1836.

[21] Smith, *Autobiography*, 79 and CA, A 519, Smith to D'Urban, 29 March 1836.

[22] *Ibid.*, 78. Before the British take-over of the Cape the Dutch East India Company had issued such sticks as signs of office to collaborating Khoikhoi chiefs, or 'captains'.

[23] CL MS 17042, vol. 1589, Cory transcript, Smith to D'Urban, 22 Sept. 1835. Read was a particular *bête noir* of Smith's, having been accused during the war of hiding arms destined for the Xhosa: *Ibid.*, Smith to D'Urban, 21 July, 1835.

[24] CA A 519, Address given by Smith.

[25] *Ibid.*

[26] Smith, *Autobiography*, 90.

[27] CA A 519, Address given by Smith. Even these numerous spheres of transformation were not enough for Smith. He intended further to alter patterns of burial, mourning and music: *Ibid.*, *GTJ*, 26 Nov. 1835; Smith, *Autobiography*, 93.

[28] Pretorius, *British Humanitarians*, 121.

Chapter 5: Settler Politics: Land, Labour and Security

1 Peires, *The House of Phalo*, 122.

2 Keegan, *Colonial South Africa*, 189-91.

3 Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 83-4; Galbraith, *Reluctant Empire*, 122.

4 Pretorius, *British Humanitarians*, 79.

5 *Ibid.*, 116-20, 159.

6 Quoted Le Cordeur, *Eastern Cape Separatism*, 71.

7 *GTJ*, 19 Nov. 1835, letter from 'A Frontier Farmer'; 1 Oct. 1835, letter from 'A Ruined Farmer' and editorial response.

8 *GTJ*, 1 Dec. 1836.

9 For humanitarian scepticism of settler rhetoric, see Dr. A.G. Campbell, quoted in *GTJ*, 13 Oct. 1836.

10 *GTJ*, 15 Oct. 1835.

11 *GTJ*, 17 and 10 March, 1836.

12 For the intense debate over the causes of these conflicts see J. Cobbing, 'The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo', *Journal of African History*, 29, 3 (1988), 487-519, and Hamilton, *The Mfecane Aftermath*.

13 For Mfengu origins see Peires, *House of Phalo*, 86-9, 224-5, 110-1 and Webster, 'Unmasking the Fingo'. As well as usefully differentiating between various groups of Mfengu, Webster alleges that many were in fact Xhosa captives, taken by British troops and colonists during the war and held forcibly in colonial service. However the evidence for this is lacking and, given the relative weakness of the colonial presence (which will be elaborated upon

below), it is unlikely that a significant Xhosa slave labour force could have been maintained so close to the highly permeable frontier.

14 CA CO 5831, Notice, Headquarters, 3 May 1835.

15 CA CO 444, Health Report, Murray to D'Urban, 25 May 1835.

16 CA GH 23/11, D'Urban to Glenelg, 19 June 1835; *GTJ*, 7 Jan. 1836, Address by Dr. Murray to Governor D'Urban.

17 CA LG 420, Fynn to (Stockenström?), 1 Oct. 1836; GH 30/1, D'Urban to Stockenström, 15 Sept. 1837.

18 *GTJ*, 8 May 1835.

19 *GTJ*, 7 April 1836, letter from 'A.B.' See also CA LG 420, Bradshaw to Campbell, 21 Sept. 1836; CA LG 616, Stockenström to D'Urban, 7 Oct. 1836.

20 CA LG 493, Collett to Stockenström, 17 Sept. 1836. See also *GTJ*, 24 March 1836.

21 *GTJ*, 16 June 1836. Many of these fears were exaggerated. For example, it took a letter to the *GTJ* from J. Dugmore, who was perfectly satisfied with his Mfengu labourers, to dispel the impression created in the journal that they had run off with his stock: 25 Aug. and 1 Sept. 1836.

22 *GTJ*, 19 Jan. 1837, letter from Thomas Robson.

23 *GTJ*, 12 Jan. 1837; 1 Dec. 1836, letter from 'A Colonist'; 19 Jan. 1837, letter from Thomas Robson.

24 CA GH 23/11, D'Urban to Glenelg, 19 Aug. 1837; CL MS 17042, vol. 1593, Campbell to Bowker, 21 May 1835.

25 CA LG 54, Instructions to Fingo Commissioners, 13 July 1835; CA LG 54, confidential instructions to the Fingo Commissioners on the banks of the Chumie, 6 Aug. 1835. Once it had resigned itself to the Mfengu presence, the *GTJ* suggested that the Mfengu not only serve as a military buffer, but also form a frontier police force, suitable for hunting down cattle thieves: 22 Sept. 1836.

[26] CA A 519, Fingo Commissioners to D'Urban, 2 Feb. 1836; Webster, 'Unmasking the Fingo', 269; Bowker, *Speeches, Letters*, 25.

[27] *GTJ*, 5 Nov. 1835.

[28] *GTJ*, 8 Oct. 1835; CA LG 420, Fynn to (Stockenström?), 1 Nov. 1836. After Queen Adelaide Province's retrocession, those Mfengu who had stayed on the locations were left there with the equivocal promise of British protection against Xhosa reprisals: Pretorius, *British Humanitarians*, 93.

Chapter 6: Missionaries and Civilisation

[1] Pretorius, *British Humanitarians*, 120; CL GMS Reports, annual report for 1837.

[2] Ross, *John Philip*, 138. Philip also resented Smith's apparent favouritism towards the WMS missionaries: CA A 50, vol. 4, Philip to LMS Directors, 9 Dec. 1835.

[3] CA CO 443, Kayser to D'Urban, 23 Nov. 1835; CL GMS Reports, Annual Report of 7 June 1836.

[4] Philip quoted Pretorius, *British Humanitarians*, 158.

[5] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, 11 July 1835, 3 Aug. 1836; Botha, *John Fairbairn*, 116.

[6] CA A 32, Chalmers to Balderston, 12 March 1836; CA CO 4382, Prayer said at General Meeting, 7 Jan. 1836; CA CO 443, Laing to D'Urban, 19 Oct. 1835.

[7] CL GMS Reports, Quarterly Paper, 27 Feb. 1837, Report of Weir, 6 Oct. 1836.

[8] *Ibid.* Reports of Chalmers, 29 Sept. 1835 and 7 June 1836.

[9] CA CO 454, Chalmers to Bell, 7 July 1836; CA CO 443, Ross, McDiarmuid and Laing to D'Urban, 12 Aug. 1835.

[10] CL GMS Reports, Extract from Laing's Journal, 30 Nov. 1835; CL MS 16579, Journal of Rev. Laing, 23 Jan., 14 March 1836.

[11] Comaroff and Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, 11.

[12] Le Cordeur, *Eastern Cape Separatism*, 68 and Keegan, *Colonial South Africa*, 65-7.

[13] Shrewsbury, *Journal*, 128-31, 173-7, 215-6.

[14] See J. Hodgson, 'Do We Hear You Nyengana? Dr. J.T. Vanderkemp and the First Mission to the Xhosa', *Religion in Southern Africa*, 5, 1 (1984), 3-47; H. Fast, '"In at One Ear and Out at the Other": African Response to the Wesleyan Message in Xhosaland, 1825-35', *Journal of Religion in Africa*, 33 (1993), 147-74; Peires, The *House of Phalo*, 74-78.

[15] See L. De Kock, *Civilising Barbarians: Missionary Narrative and African Textual Response in Nineteenth-Century South Africa* (Johannesburg, 1996) and H. Bredekamp and R. Ross (eds), *Missions and Christianity in South African History* (Johannesburg, 1995).

[16] CL GMS Reports, Journal of Chalmers, 9 July and 18 Oct. 1836 and Ross's report for 1837; Journal of Chalmers, 17 July and 4 Sept. 1836, Journal of Ross, 2 June 1836; Niven's report for 1837.

[17] Smith, *Autobiography*, 81-2, 89-90; CL GMS Reports, Journal of Chalmers, 9 July 1836, 7 Aug. 1836; Kayser, *F.G. Kayser*, 132-4.

[18] Kayser, *F.G. Kayser*, 134; CL, GMS Reports, report of Laing and McDiarmuid for 1837.

[19] CL MS 16579, Journal of Rev. Laing, 30 June 1836.

Chapter 7: Xhosa Resistance and Colonial Compromise

[1] CL GMS Reports, reports of Bennie and Ross for 1836; Journal of Chalmers, 16 Oct. 1835; CL MS 16579 Journal of Rev. Laing, 10 Dec. 1835.

[2] CA LG 13, Superintendent of Fingoes to Hudson, 29 Oct. 1835.

[3] CL GMS Reports, Journal of Chalmers, 24 Sept. 1836, Extract from Laing's journal, 25 Nov. 1835; CA, LG 396, Campbell to Stockenström, 5 Oct. 1836; CL, MS 16579, Journal of Rev. Laing, 10 Dec. 1835; Kayser, *F.G. Kayser*, 127; CA, LG 405, Bowker to Hudson, 8 Nov. 1836.

[4] CA A 50, Stretch to Fairbairn, 4 Oct. 1836; Pretorius, *British Humanitarians*, 326.

[5] CL MS 16579, Journal of Rev. Laing, 18 Feb. 1836; CA GH 28/12/1, Stretch to D'Urban, 27 July 1836; CA LG 405, Bowker to Hudson, 10 May 1836.

[6] CA LG 405, Stretch to Hudson, 12 Apr. 1836; CA LG 405, Returns of Cases Brought Before Resident Agent at Fort Murray From 1-31 March.

[7] *GTJ*, 10 Nov. 1836; CA A 519, Smith to D'Urban, 4 July, 1, 11 August, 1836; CA LG 405, Bowker's diary for 1836; CA LG 408, return of cases tried before Resident Agent Rawstorne.

[8] CA A 519, Smith to D'Urban, 30 May 1836.

[9] CA LG 396, Armstrong to Stretch, 13 June, Civil Commissioners to Stretch, 5 Oct. and Stretch to Hudson, 17 Oct. 1836; CA LG 420, Campbell to Hudson, 16 Apr. 1836.

[10] CA LG 396, Stretch to Hudson, 12 Oct. 1836. For Bowker's attempts to implement the pass regulations more stringently see LG 405, Bowker's journal, 12 March 1836. For his failure, LG 405, Bowker to Hudson, 5 Apr. 1836.

11 *GTJ*, 24 March 1836; Smith, *Autobiography*, 72-3 and 83.

12 CA LG 408, Rawstorne's journal, 19 and 20 March and 1 Apr. 1836.

13 CA LG 408, Rawstorne's journal, 2 Apr. 1836.

14 CA LG 408, Rawstorne to Hudson, 5 May 1836. Emphasis in the original.

15 CA LG 405, Bowker to Hudson, 27 Sept. 1836.

16 CA LG 405, Bowker's journal, 12 March, 3, 4 April 1836, Bowker to Hudson, 21 June 1836.

17 Smith, *Autobiography*, 89; CL MS 16579, Journal of Rev. Laing, 31 March 1836; CA, LG 405, Southey to Stockenström, 3 Oct. 1836.

18 CL GMS Reports, Niven's report, 10 Oct. and Journal of Chalmers, 18 Sept. 1836; T. Stapleton, *Maqoma: Xhosa Resistance to Colonial Advance* (Johannesburg, 1994), 107.

19 Quoted Pretorius, *British Humanitarians*, 115.

Chapter 8: The Metropolis and the Periphery, 1834-1865

1 Thorne, 'The Conversion of Englishmen', 239.

2 CA GH 1/114, Glenelg to D'Urban, 1 May 1837.

3 Quoted Bank, *Liberals and Their Enemies*, 138.

4 *Ibid.*, 139. See also Pretorius, *British Humanitarians*, ch. 5.

5 PRO CO 48/185, Report of Inquiry into Hintsa's Death.

6 CA GH 1/107, Glenelg to D'Urban, 26 Dec. 1835.

7 CA GH 23/11, D'Urban to Glenelg, 9 June 1836.

8 Bowker, *Speeches, Letters*, 125. See J.P. Greene, 'Changing Identity in the British Caribbean: Barbados as a Case Study', in N. Canny and A. Pagden (eds), *Colonial Identity in the Atlantic World, 1500-1800* (Princeton, 1987), 9.

[9] Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 16-17. Contemporary settlers in New Zealand and Australia, as the *GTJ* frequently pointed out, faced a similar set of circumstances. See for example J. Belich, *The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict: The Maori, The British, and the New Zealand Wars* (Montreal and London, 1986).

[10] *South African Commercial Advertiser*, 4 July 1829.

[11] T. Shone (ed. P. Silva), *The Albany Journals of Thomas Shone* (Grahamstown, 1992), 149, 56; Stubbs, *Reminiscences*, 112, 71.

[12] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters*, 2, 7.

[13] *The Times*, 5 Jan. 1836.

[14] *GTJ*, 7 Apr. and 19 May 1836.

[15] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters*, 119.

[16] See M. Streak, *The Afrikaner as Viewed by the English, 1795-1854* (Cape Town, 1974), chs. 4-6.

[17] R. Godlonton, *A Narrative of the Irruption of the Kafir Hordes*; *Memorials of the British Settlers of South Africa* (Graham's Town, 1844). See Lester, 'Reformulating Identities'.

[18] Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 285, 37, 116-7.

[19] Stoler and Cooper, 'Between Metropole and Colony', 31.

[20] Quoted Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 280.

[21] Palmerston, quoted L. James, *The Rise and Fall of the British Empire* (London, 1994), 177.

[22] E. Stokes, *The English Utilitarians and India* (Oxford, 1959); U. Mehta, 'Liberal Strategies of Exclusion', in Cooper and Stoler, *Tensions of Empire*.

[23] B. Porter, *The Lion's Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1995* (London, 1996), 37, 44.

[24] Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 182.

[25] J. Belich, *Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict*, 328.

[26] The familial allusion was in some cases literal. One of Eyre's major antagonists was Thomas Fowell Buxton's son.

[27] C. Hall, 'Imperial Man: Edward Eyre in Australasia and the West Indies, 1833-1866' in B. Schwarz (ed), *The Expansion of England: Race, Ethnicity and Cultural History* (London, 1996).

[28] Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 305, 307.

[29] R. Young, *Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race* (London and New York, 1995), 124.

[30] *Ibid.*, 119.

[31] Studies such as John MacKenzie's *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1880-1960* (Manchester, 1984) need to be extended backwards in time.

[32] Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*. See also Young, *Colonial Desire*; S. Dubow, *Scientific Racism in Modern South Africa* (Cambridge, 1995); N. Stepan, *The Idea of Race in Science: Great Britain, 1800-1960* (London, 1982); S. Gilman, *Difference and Pathology* (Ithaca, 1985) and D. Goldberg (ed), *Anatomy of Racism* (Minneapolis, 1990).

[33] For the discursive impact of technological improvements, see Mitchell, *Colonising Egypt*, 168.

[34] Evans, *The Forging of the Modern State*, 223.

[35] Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 180.

[36] *Ibid.*, 283.

[37] For Charles Dickens' and Charlotte Brontë's ridicule of missionary humanitarianism, see Comaroff and Comaroff, *Of Revelation and Revolution*, 50-1.

[38] Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, 127.

[39] *Ibid.*, 128. See also McClintock, *Imperial Leather.*

Chapter 9: The New British Imperialism in the Eastern Cape

[1] Although he was condemned by, among others, the Cape's Attorney General.

[2] Bowker, *Speeches, Letters*, 125.

[3] Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 291.

[4] Bank, *Liberals and Their Enemies*, 228-36; Botha, *John Fairbairn*, chs. 6 and 7; Keegan, *Colonial South Africa*, 216-7.

[5] Keegan, *Colonial South Africa*, 82, 127, 167-8 and 214-8.

[6] Macmillan, *Bantu, Boer and Briton*, 193. See also Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance*, 133-38.

[7] See Le Cordeur, *Eastern Cape Separatism.*

[8] *Ibid.*, 152

[9] Quoted Macmillan, Bantu, *Boer and Briton*, 300.

[10] Quoted *Ibid.*, 305.

[11] Quoted J.B. Peires, *The Dead Will Arise: Nongqawuse and the Great Xhosa Cattle-Killing Movement of 1856-7* (Johannesburg, 1989), 247.

[12] *Ibid.*

[13] Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance*, 213.

[14] See J. Robinson, *The Power of Apartheid: State, Power and Space in South African Cities* (Butterworth Heinemann, 1996) for an analysis of the location as means of control and Crais, *White Supremacy and Black Resistance*, 157-203 for the extension of a wider nexus of state institutions.

15 Quoted D. M. Schreuder, 'The Cultural Factor in Victorian Imperialism: A Case Study of the British "Civilising Mission"', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 4, 3 (1976), 290.

Conclusion

1 Holt, *The Problem of Freedom*, 309.

2 McClintock, *Imperial Leather*, 16.

3 Quoted Stoler, *Race and the Education of Desire*, 72, emphasis in the original.



HGRG

ISBN 1-87-0074-16-5